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THE NEW GREAT DEBATE

Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations

By MORTON A. KAPLAN

OVER the past decade traditionalists have launched a series of attacks on scientific approaches to international politics. Most of the arguments employed against the scientific approach stem from those used earlier by E. H. Carr in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*.[1] The general arguments that have been employed include these among others: that politics involves purpose in a way that physical science does not; that scientific knowledge is applicable to facts, but understanding, wisdom, or intuition are required for areas where human purpose is involved; that those pursuing scientific models tend to mistake their models for reality; that scientific method requires high precision and measurement and therefore is incapable of coping with the most important elements of international politics; and that the practitioners of scientific method can never be sure that they have not left something out of their model.

I

According to Carr, "The laboratory worker engaged in investigating the causes of cancer may have been originally inspired by the purpose of eradicating the disease. But this purpose is, in the strictest sense, irrelevant to the investigation and separable from it. His conclusion can be nothing more than a true report on fact. It cannot help to make the facts other than they are; for the facts exist independently of what anyone thinks about them. In the political sciences, which are concerned with human behavior, there are no such facts. The investigator is inspired by the desire to cure some ill of the body politic. Among the causes of the trouble, he diagnoses the fact that human beings normally react to certain conditions in a certain way. But this is not a fact comparable with the fact that human bodies react in a certain way to certain drugs. It is a fact which may be changed by the desire to change it; and this desire, already present in the mind of the investigator, may be extended, as the result of his investigation, to a sufficient number of other human beings to make it effective."[2]

The two cases cited by Carr are different, but Carr has mistaken the nature of the difference. Carr's inapt distinction results from a

[1] 2nd ed. (London 1956). [2] *Ibid.*, 3-4.

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prior failure to distinguish between the facts he initially holds constant (system) and the facts he allows to change (parameters). It is a fact that rattlesnake venom injected into the blood system will normally kill a person. It is also a fact that the proper antidote administered in time will negate the destructive action of the venom. The cancer worker also desires to change some facts, namely, those relating to the development of cancer. He does this by changing, perhaps by drugs or perhaps by irradiation, the system in which the cancerous cells are embedded. The politician who desires to change the world must also change the state of a system—in this case, the political system. He may do this by the use of force, by the allocation of resources, or by means of verbal persuasion. The system may undergo radical change. Its characteristic operation may be different from what it was before the new inputs, including information, were embedded in the system. But then a similar kind of change in characteristic behavior occurs when, for instance, opium is injected into the human physiological system or flowers are hybridized (step functions)[3].

Systems embodying purpose cannot be studied by the methods ordinarily used by physicists. Suitably defined, however, purpose need not distinguish the physical from the human with respect to the problems raised by Carr. Consider an automatic pilot in an airplane. If the plane moves from level, the automatic pilot reverses the direction of change. Reverse the wires from the pilot to the ailerons and elevators so that now the automatic pilot will introduce positive feedback into the cycle of movement and throw the plane into a spin if it deviates from level. Now reconstruct the automatic pilot system so that it becomes what Ashby calls an ultrastable system.[4] Move the plane from level. The pilot, with its wires reversed, will increase departure from level. The sensors of the pilot system will detect this consequence of the operation and adjust by reversing procedures. Although the operation of the automatic pilot in this case differs from human purpose in two important respects—lack of consciousness and simplicity of the system—it has much in common with it. We can even carry the analogy one step farther. We can think of a tic-tac-toe-playing computer, attached to an information retrieval system, which plays against a human player; receives information from spies about the moves he will make, or, alternatively, extrapolates from his past moves;

[3] W. Ross Ashby, *Design for a Brain* (New York 1952), 80 ff.
[4] *Ibid.*, 99.

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and attempts to anticipate the moves of the human player and to frustrate them by the appropriate countermoves.

All of the systems we have described can be investigated by scientific methods. When one says this, however, one does not necessarily mean that these systems can be investigated by the procedures of physics. The equalities of physics lack explanatory power to account for the behavior of homeostatic or ultrastable systems. Specific explanatory theories must be developed for particular systems. And, in the case of the game-playing computer, one cannot use the calculus but must use some variation of the type of set theory used in game analysis. Thus, though the theories, explanations, and tools used may differ from those of the physicist, they are part of the general arsenal of science.

There are a number of important differences between mechanical systems and ultrastable systems which have not been discussed, and which cannot be discussed, for lack of space. Human psychological systems and human social and political systems differ in still other important ways from Ashby's ultrastable systems and from each other. Our object here is not to carry out a critical examination of these differences but to show the extent to which traditionalist arguments confuse the issues.

II

If the traditionalist has confused the distinction between the facts of physical science and the purposes of politics, then it is clear that he must also have confused the relationship between intuition and scientific knowledge.

There is a large literature on the subject of intuition in physical science and mathematics. Great discoveries, when they do not occur accidentally or as a consequence of trial-and-error procedures, are the product of scientific intuition. If the best statesmen are usually those with the best intuitions and judgments concerning politics, so the best scientists are often those whose scientific judgment or intuition is the best. There are cases in which scientists have been repeatedly right although the reasons they have given to support their theories have turned out to be faulty. The reasons for the superiority of intuition are not hard to find. The brain is more sophisticated and complicated than any computer we can construct. It can scan for variations in ways for which directions cannot yet be coded; it can reason below the level of consciousness in ways that neither numbers nor verbal logic can articulate. As John von Neumann pointed out in his

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posthumously published Silliman lectures, even if we used in its construction the smallest components available, and even if we knew (as we in fact do not) how to link the system up, it would require a housing 10^8 or 10^9 as large as the brain casing (or roughly as large as the Empire State Building) to house an analogue to the brain.[5] Even though miniaturization has made profound strides since von Neumann's death, this gives some indication of the scope of the problem.

The skill of a tea taster gives one indication of the capacity of the human brain to scan for "fits." Computer recognition is hopelessly primitive by comparison. Similarly, the human capacity to find parallels in history defies our ability to code or to articulate. The brain's coding apparently differs from that of mathematics and verbal logic.[6] Its code is apparently less precise but more reliable. And it apparently, along with the scanning capacity, plays a major role in intuition.

The humanist who wants to substitute in human events a verbal process called reason or understanding for a verbal and/or mathematical process called science has confused intuition with the articulation of communicable knowledge. The source of the confusion may possibly lie in the Aristotelian distinction between science and art. Science, according to Aristotle, must be certain, for it derives true conclusions from necessary—not merely true—premises.[7] Thus hypothetical knowledge cannot be scientific, for its premises, even if true, are not known to be necessary. One cannot intuit the necessity of the premises in human events; therefore art rather than science governs knowledge of human events. Modern science, however, insists upon the hypothetical character of all empirical knowledge. The test for communicable knowledge depends on replicability even if only in principle. Thus there is no distinction between the physical and human with respect to the need for confirmation and communication. There is a distinction between subject matters with respect to the degree to which theoretical knowledge is possible and to which warranted belief or precision is possible.

Science requires an articulated secondary language that permits reasonable precision and replicability. Unless scientific procedures are followed, to the extent the subject matter permits, intuitions cannot be falsified and science cannot grow. Even intuition requires the techniques of science to prepare the base on which new intuitions

[5] *The Computer and the Brain* (New Haven 1958), 50.
[6] *Ibid.*, 90-92.
[7] *Organon: Posterior Analytics, Topica,* Loeb Classical Library (London 1960), 33-55.

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develop. If Einstein's intuition produced both the special and general theories of relativity, that intuition operated within a framework of previous discovery and research—e.g., non-Euclidean geometries and Lorentz transformations (based on the Michelson-Morley experiment) —that created an order within which the procedures of his unconscious mind could generate the intuitions that led to relativity theory. Newton could not have had Einstein's intuitions.

III

There is one other way in which traditionalists sometimes assert that human purpose can be apprehended by methods different from those used by the sciences. Motives, they say, are subjective and can be intuited by introspection. The purposes of past civilizations or eras can be seen into by means of introspective, subjective wisdom. We are long past the period when psychological behaviorists insisted upon the exclusion of the concept of consciousness from the realm of psychological discourse. There are no doubt differences between subjective awareness of one's own purpose, at least, and subjective awareness of external phenomena. Yet, however much some of us may reject the more speculative aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis, we also see quite clearly that a number of human actions depend upon unconscious motivations that are often inconsistent with the conscious motivations. It is a rare man who is willing to assert that his own actions have never surprised him or that he has never discovered motivations other than those he thought he possessed. Although these unconscious motivations are sometimes confirmed by bringing them to consciousness, they are more often confirmed by careful observation and analysis of the behavior patterns of people and of attempts to explain these behaviors. Even introspection, through the examination of behavior, often brings to subjective awareness a previously unperceived motivation. In any event, our certitude as to our motivations has long since been discarded as valid evidence of their actuality. The normal tools of careful and controlled scientific observation are invaluable in assessing hypotheses concerning motivation.[8]

[8] The phenomenon referred to has been discussed in a more corrigible sense by psychologists. Psychologists have discovered that the unconscious biases of investigators may determine the responses of those being investigated. The very fact that this has occurred, however, has been discovered by further scientific investigation in which controls have been added for the biases of the givers of the tests. Where the entire macrostructure of politics changes, controlled experiments in this exact sense cannot be carried on. The two situations are different in practice rather than in principle; however, it is this last phenomenon to which the discussion above has reference.

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Group, social, or political behavior cannot, in any event, be derived directly from individual motivation. There are too many group invariances that themselves determine the pattern of individual motivations. Americans do differ from Frenchmen who in turn differ from Chinese. These differences are not merely biological. The behavior of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Korean War was different from the behavior of the field commanders; most of these differences depended more upon social roles and information flows than upon personality factors. Thus, even were the assertions concerning individual motivation and purpose correct, no reliable inferences could be drawn concerning the analysis of group behavior.

Traditional opponents of scientific method have one other argument against the analogies between ultrastable but nonhuman systems and human social systems. They argue that ultrastable systems such as the Ashby automatic pilot are constructed by men and therefore have the purposes of men built into them. The logic here, however, is faulty. An external observer could detect the use and purpose of the automatic pilot by observing its effect upon the behavior of the airplane. He would not require any knowledge of or insight into the purposes of the designer. Alternatively, if the biological revolution permitted us to synthesize the ovum and sperm cell, to fertilize the egg, and to grow the fertilized egg in an artificial culture, we could produce an equivalent of a human being. This may or may not be beyond the ingenuity of men, but in principle it illustrates the point. The appropriate distinction is not between the unconscious designs of nature and accident on one hand and the conscious and purposeful designs of men on the other but between the kinds of systems to which the generalizations are applied. The artificially created human would differ from Ashby's ultrastable automatic pilot in exactly the same ways as do natural human beings. If these differences were overlooked, incorrect conclusions would be drawn and inapplicable generalizations applied. If the likeness of the artificially created human to natural humans were overlooked, the moral consequences would be monstrous. But it is the traditionalist rather than the scientist who would be more likely to make this mistake.

IV

The distinction between determinism and free will that is offered by Carr can be refuted succinctly, for the elements of the refutation have appeared already in the previous sections. There is surely a dis-

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tinction between systems capable of anticipating the actions of others and trying to trick them and systems, such as that of inanimate nature, which can never (however much we may mistake their character) attempt to trick us. The deterministic models of physics obviously are inappropriate to the first kind of systems, but there are scientific methods for studying such systems. This does not imply that science possesses the solutions for all problems of this kind; surely it does not. The point here is only that there are formalized scientific procedures for dealing with these problems and that where these procedures are not successful, it is not merely because purpose is involved. The problem may be too complex for any procedure we have developed, or even for any that we can develop. Or it may be that no solution exists, e.g., some bargaining cases in which rationality cannot be defined and the social and political constraints do not "fix" behavior either. Marginal cases of this kind do arise. To the extent that they do, the procedures of science can provide neither explanation nor prediction. Many of the major problems of macroscopic international politics, however, do appear to be manageable. In any event, the question of manageability can be decided only on the basis of practice and not on the basis of faulty philosophical argumentation.

V

The traditionalist asserts that those who aspire to a "science" of politics insist upon precision, rigor, quantification, and general theory. The traditionalist further claims that the complexity of international politics is such that these goals cannot be attained nor the important questions of international politics be investigated by these means. Whether the charge is correct cannot be answered in general. The appropriate degree of theory and of precision depends both on the state of the discipline and on the subject matter.[9] Since I am most

[9] The assertion that my *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957) attempts a completely deductive theory has been made both by Hedley Bull and by Stanley Hoffmann. Hoffmann apparently quotes *System and Process* to this effect ("The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, XI [April 1959], 357). And Bull, apparently relying upon Hoffmann, then uses the admitted fact that not all assertions of the models are rigorously deduced as a disproof of the claims made for the models ("International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics*, XVIII [April 1966], 366-67, 371-72). Yet the first page of the preface—the page from which Hoffmann takes his quotations—which contains the paragraph describing what an ideal deductive theory would look like, includes as the last line of that paragraph the following sentence: "If 'theory' is interpreted in this strict sense, this book does not contain a theory." It then goes on to say, "If some of the requirements for a theory are loosened; if systematic completeness is not required; if proof of logical consistency is not required; if unambiguous interpretation of terms and laboratory methods of confirma-

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familiar with my own work, I should like to consider it first in some detail and then to examine a number of other scientific approaches criticized by traditionalists. I shall try to show that fundamentally different enterprises are involved and that blanket analyses obscure more than they clarify.

The conception that underlies *System and Process* is fairly simple. If the number, type, and behavior of nations differ over time, and if their military capabilities, their economic assets, and their information also vary over time, then there is some likely interconnection between these elements such that different structural and behavioral systems can be discerned to operate in different periods of history. This conception may turn out to be incorrect, but it does not seem an unreasonable basis for an investigation of the subject matter. To conduct such an investigation requires systematic hypotheses concerning the nature of the connections of the variables. Only after these are made can past history be examined in a way that illuminates the hypotheses. Otherwise the investigator has no criteria on the basis of which he can pick and choose from among the infinite reservoir of facts available to him. These initial hypotheses indicate the areas of facts which have the greatest importance for this type of investigation; presumably if the hypotheses are wrong, this will become reasonably evident in the course of attempting to use them.

The models of *System and Process* provide a theoretical framework within which seemingly unconnected kinds of events can be related. A few examples of these can be given. For instance, it is asserted in the traditional literature that the framework of European international law is the product of a common civilization, culture, set of values, and personal ties. Our hypotheses indicate that the "balance of power" type of system is likely to motivate and reinforce the kinds of norms that were observed during the modern European "balance of power" period. If the traditionalist hypothesis is correct, then one would expect that international law would have been strongest in the earliest part of the modern European "balance of power" period, when, as a

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tion are not required; then this book is, or at least contains, a theory. This theory may be viewed as an initial or introductory theory of international politics." This qualification is repeated in the conclusion (pp. 245-46): "A complete and systematic statement of these assumptions has not been offered. One reason for this gap lies in the belief of the author that international politics, and social science generally, is so poorly developed that the construction of a precise deductive system would be more constrictive and misleading than enlightening, that, at this stage of development, some ambiguity is a good thing." I did believe, however, that the ambiguity could be reduced and that more disciplined reasoning and scientific method could be introduced into the study of international politics. *That* was what *System and Process* tried to do.

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consequence of a common Catholicism and interrelated dynasticism, the cultural factors making for uniformity of norms would have been strongest. If the systems model is correct, then one would instead expect the norms to develop over time as the actors learned how these norms reinforced their common interests. One would also expect on the basis of the systems model that a number of these norms would receive less reinforcement in a loose bipolar system. No systematic study of these hypotheses has yet been carried out. Peripheral results from comparative studies directed to other aspects of "balance of power" behavior, however, indicate the likelihood that the systems explanation will account for the historic evidence better than the traditionalist one. The early evidence indicates that the norms were weaker in the earlier phases of the period. Such results are not conclusive. We may find still other "balance of power" systems in which our initial expectations are falsified. This would then create a new problem for investigation. However, the systematic nature of the systems hypotheses would make this kind of comparative analysis easier by providing a framework within which questions could be generated and research carried on. It is perhaps no accident that the first set of comparative theories of international relations was developed within a systems framework and not within a traditionalistic framework.

An illustration of the way in which systems models may be used to connect or to explain seemingly discordant facts may also be offered. According to the systems model of the "balance of power" system, alliances will be short in duration, shifting as to membership, and wars will be limited in objectives. The reason offered for this is that the need to maintain the availability of potential alliance partners is greater than the need for the additional assets that would result from the destruction of the defeated foe. If one looks at Europe after 1870, however, one finds a set of relatively permanent alliances centered on France and Germany which produced a war that, according to the standards of the time, was relatively unlimited. The models, however, are closed in such a way that public opinion does not interfere with the rationality of external decision-making. The seizure of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany after the war of 1870, as Bismarck foresaw, produced in France a desire for revenge that, despite German attempts to buy France off, made it impossible for France and Germany to be alliance partners in any serious sense. For this reason, Germany considered a preventive war against France. That Germany and France became the hubs of opposing alliances therefore is consistent with the model if the parameter change is taken into account. Since

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neither France nor Germany viewed the other as a potential alliance partner, the motivation that served to limit war would not have been operative with respect to these two nations. Although this is surely not a complete—nor even a "proved"—explanation of the events leading to the First World War, it does establish a consistency between the predictions of the model suitably adjusted for a changed parameter and the actual course of events. Thus the systems model has some additional explanatory power even for some nonconforming events.[10] It may be possible to offer similar explanations for other parameter changes. One would not expect that this could be done with respect to problems of system change involving the transformation rules of the system. If this were possible, we should have a general theory of the system rather than a set of comparative theories. Although it cannot be demonstrated that a general theory is impossible, the reasons for its lack of likelihood have been stated by me elsewhere."[11]

In addition to empirical investigations, the systems theory of international politics calls for the use of models. The reason for this is quite simple. Even statesmen make statements about the relationship of states. From what assumptions are such statements derived? This is often unclear. Are they correctly derived? Only a much more systematic statement of the assumptions and of the conditions under which they are proposed to apply permits any kind of answer. Under what conditions do the generalizations apply, if at all? How much difference does it make to add one state or two states to a five-state system and under what conditions? Is Arthur Burns correct in asserting that five is the optimal number for security, with declining security both below and above that number,[12] or is Kaplan correct in believing that five is the minimal lower bound for security but that security increases as the number of states is increased up to some as-yet-undiscovered upper bound? How many deviant states can a system tolerate? What degree of deviance is tolerable? Can deviance be accommodated so that deviant states are forced to behave as if they were merely security-oriented? How will changes in weapons systems affect

[10] It was long known that certain poisons produced death. It was not known, however, how they did so. Eventually chemists learned that when certain poisons entered the blood stream, they combined with the oxygen in the blood and thereby deprived vital organs of the oxygen necessary for life. Although the end result of the poisoning was long known, the chemical explanation contributes to knowledge. Under some circumstances it has important utility. For instance, if one knows the mechanism involved, it may be easier to find the antidote.

[11] *System and Process*, xvii-xviii.

[12] Arthur Lee Burns, "From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics*, IX (July 1957), 494-529.

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the problem of stability? What of geographic constraints? To what extent do internal decision-making organs, either by facilitating or impeding concentration on problems of external concern or by influencing the speed of reaction time, affect the stability of the system?

Some of these questions can be explored at a theoretical level in terms of the consistency and implications of the basic assumptions. Computer realizations are helpful to this end. The relevance of the questions for the real world can be explored by means of historical comparative studies. If the theoretical model is stable and the historical system is not, this is an indication that some factor not taken account of in the theory is operating. If both systems are stable, it is possible that this may be so for reasons other than those contained in the assumptions. Possible responses to this proposition may be obtained either through more thorough research into particular systems or by means of additional comparative studies that may permit discrimination of the cases. Elucidation of the constraining parameters would likely require a large series of comparative studies. The degree of confidence we place in our studies will never approach that which the physicist has in the study of mechanics (although other areas of physics may present problems as bad as those of politics); but without theoretical models we are unable even to make the discriminations open to us and to explore these questions to the same degree of depth.[13]

International systems theory is designed to investigate problems of macrosystem structure. It is not, for instance, easily adaptable to the investigation of microstructural problems of foreign policy. Techniques in this area would involve closer analogies with histology than with macrosystem analysis. This is an area in which extensive knowledge of a specific course of events, immense accumulations of detail, sensitivity and judgment in the selection of relevant factors, and intuitive ability of a high order are extremely important. We cannot easily use comparative evaluation, for the large number of variables involved in such events would not be even closely paralleled in other cases. In this sense, histology has an advantage over political science, for the histologist can at least examine generically similar material time and time again. Although elements of these problems can be subjected to scientific analysis, in many cases the use of intuitive judgment outweighs that of demonstrable knowledge. In these last cases, the conclusions can often be communicated, though usually in poorly articulated

[13] The problem of confirmation of systems models is explored in greater depth in Kaplan, "Some Problems of International Systems Research," in *International Political Communities* (New York 1966), 497-502.

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form, but the means by which they were reached can be only badly misrepresented.

International systems theory, however, is only one of the scientific approaches to the subject matter of international politics. I hesitate to speak of the research of other scholars because I have not examined their work with the care required of a serious critic. Yet even superficial analysis would seem to indicate that the scientific approaches discussed together by Hedley Bull, for instance, have little in common.[14] They address themselves to different questions and use different methods. I shall try to indicate what some of these differences are—and my own attitude toward these other approaches—with the understanding that I do not consider myself an entirely competent judge.

Hedley Bull discusses Kaplan, Deutsch, Russett, Schelling, and various others as if they represented a sufficiently common position that similar criticisms would apply to all of them. Whereas I begin with a macrosystem analysis, however, Karl Deutsch proceeds with an inductive analysis based upon the quantification of the parameters of systems.[15] Whereas I study general system behavior, Deutsch studies the growth of community. Hedley Bull criticizes Karl Deutsch for counting all communications as if they were equal in some respect. Yet surely that is a most economical initial hypothesis. Unless Deutsch makes that assumption or a similar one, he can not discover whether such an item count will provide him with meaningful indicators for the growth of community.

In any event, it is rather discouraging to find Deutsch attacked because he does not differentiate messages according to criteria of importance. Deutsch developed his indices on the basis of a sophisticated set of hypotheses and after elaborate historical studies. If the indices prove not to be exceptionally useful, this will likely be uncovered by further empirical work. If further categorizations prove necessary—as they have, for instance, in assessing group differences in intelligence—empirical scientific work will no doubt establish this fact. If Haas is right that elite activity that produces institutions is more important than an increased flow of communications in establishing a pluralistic security community, the empirical evidence will likely in-

[14] Pp. 361-77.

[15] "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (March 1960), 34-57. See also Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957); Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York 1953); and Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (Garden City 1954).

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dicate this also.[16] If differentiation of flows according to the kinds of systems they develop within—a systems orientation—is likely to make for finer discrimination, it is again the empirical scientific evidence and not abstract literary considerations that will establish this point.[17]

Russett uses still a different technique.[18] I believe that his fitting curves to data by means of quadratic equations is not suited to the data he uses. This, however, is true, if true at all, not on the basis of some general philosophical principle, but on the basis of a specific evaluation of the use of the technique in terms of the subject matter to which it is applied. I am also, for instance, skeptical of the techniques employed by Zaninovich in his *Empirical Theory of State Response*, with respect to the Sino-Soviet case.[19] Although I find his conclusions unexceptional—for instance, the conclusion that when two states are involved in a critical relationship, each will misperceive the intentions of the other—I do not find them particularly useful in the form in which they are applied. The phenomenon of mistaken perception is well known. As a mere phenomenon, it does not require further documentation. Nor in this abstract form does it add much to our understanding of the political process. It is not very useful for policy-makers either. It does not tell them what the misperceptions will be or the particular kinds of responses they will produce. Moreover, since most of the analysis is based upon the coding of public statements and editorials in the party newspapers, there is the additional danger that the public stance of the state will be misperceived by the investigator as its private one. Whether my judgment of the procedure is right or wrong, however, depends not upon the crude general propositions enunciated by the traditionalists but upon a specific analysis of the application of the methodology to a specific subject matter.

One may desire to raise questions about some of the simulations of international politics that are being carried on. Whether small group simulations reveal more about small groups simulating international relations than about the more complex pattern of international politics is, at the minimum, an open question. If simulation is a quite useful tool for generating hypotheses, it is likely much less useful for confirming them. Here the reader must be warned: I am not here offering

[16] Ernst Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," *International Organization*, XII (Autumn 1958), 440-58.

[17] For a responsible discussion of Deutsch's categories and techniques, see Ralph H. Retzlaff, "The Use of Aggregate Data in Comparative Political Analysis," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (November 1965), 797-817.

[18] Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York 1965).

[19] Martin George Zaninovich, *An Empirical Theory of State Response: The Sino-Soviet Case* (Stanford 1964), mimeographed.

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an analysis of whether this is the case or not, and may merely be asserting my own prejudice.

Much of the criticism of the work of Thomas Schelling seems misguided. It is generally agreed that there are many interesting insights in Schelling's work;[20] but the traditionalists, e.g., Hedley Bull, sometimes object that the insights are not derived from game-theoretic methods. This argument is misleading; Schelling rarely uses mathematical game-theoretic methods. Most of his analysis is sociological; that is the root of his assertion that he desires to reorient game theory. On the other hand, although his insights in the usual case are not rigorously derived from game theory, it must be admitted that insights of this kind did not seriously begin to enter the literature until the questions posed by game-theoretic analysis directed attention to them.

Schelling is so identified with game theory by the traditionalists that he is credited with contributions he has not claimed. According to Hoffmann, "Until now game theory has . . . weaknesses that Schelling reviews. The main flaw is that game theory has dealt *only* [italics added] with zero-sum games. . . ."[21] It is not entirely unexpected that a political scientist would commit a technical error in the area of game theory. It is surprising, however, that one who presumes to evaluate the utility of that theory would make this elementary a mistake. The point is covered in every treatise on the subject (and by Schelling), and there is a large literature on the subject. The mixed-motive game is one of the basic classifications of mathematical game theory. However, Hoffmann does not rest there. He continues, "Therefore, game theory applies only to a marginal and paradoxical case: pure conflict with limited stakes, i.e., the characteristic conflicts of moderate, balance-of-power, international systems."[22] Unfortunately, the "balance of power" case is neither paradoxical nor zero-sum. Moreover, although there are many mixed-motive games for which there are appropriate game-theoretic models, the "balance of power" case is not one of them. Game theory has only limited applicability to most problems of international politics, but we are hardly likely to learn from the traditionalists what these limits are and why they exist.

Although traditionalists quite often have accused those using scientific method of neglecting Aristotle's dictum to use those methods appropriate to the subject matter, I would contend that it is the user

[20] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).
[21] Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York 1965), 205.
[22] *Ibid.*, 206.

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of scientific method who has more often observed the dictum. This is illustrated by the fact that so intelligent a student of politics as Hedley Bull, who openly recognizes the danger that he might be talking about discordant things, nonetheless falls into what I would call the trap of traditionalism: the use of overparticularization and unrelated generalization. Thus Bull lists highly disparate methods and subjects with minimal discussion and inadequate or nonexistent classification and applies to them extremely general criticisms. Such broad and universal generalizations are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to falsify. Who would deny that the complexity of the subject matter places constraints on what can be said? But different subject matters and different degrees of complexity require different tools of analysis and different procedures. The traditionalist, however, as in the case of Bull, does not discuss how or why the complexity of a specific subject impedes what kind of generalization, or how and in what ways generalizations should be limited. The traditional literature in international relations, even when it is directly concerned with the subject matter, is of much the same order: a great mass of detail to which absurdly broad and often unfalsifiable generalizations are applied. Thus traditional "balance of power" theory is asserted to apply regardless of the number and kinds of states, variations in motivation, kinds of weapons systems, and so forth. Remarkably the same generalizations are asserted to apply not merely to the macrostructure of international politics but to the individual decisions of foreign policy. The generalizations are applied indiscriminately over enormous stretches of time and space. They are sufficiently loosely stated so that almost no event can be inconsistent with them.

And the vaunted sensitivity to history that the traditionalists claim—and that they deny to the modern scientific approaches—is difficult to find. Those traditionalists who have done a significant amount of historical research—and they are the exceptions—confine themselves largely to problems of diplomatic history that are unrelated to their generalizations about international politics, as in the case of Martin Wight, or to more specialized problems that are idiosyncratic. This is not an accident but is a direct product of the lack of articulated theoretical structure in the traditionalist approach. It is ironic that the traditionalists are so sure that they alone are concerned with subject matter that they are unaware of the extent to which those applying the newer approaches are using history as a laboratory for their researches. This development is unprecedented in the discipline and is a direct product of the concern of those using scientific approaches for

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developing disciplined and articulated theories and propositions that can be investigated empirically.

If those writers of the newer persuasion sometimes seem to ignore the traditional literature, it may not be entirely without good reason. Yet ignoring it is a mistake. There are honorable exceptions among the traditionalists, such as Raymond Aron, whose remarkable writings are surely useful to political scientists and whose methodology may not be quite so far removed from the newer scientific approaches as some traditionalists like to believe. Hedley Bull, one of the more vociferous critics of the newer approaches, has himself contributed a solid study of arms control to the literature.

VI

The traditionalist seems to feel that scientific models are inapt for a political world in which surprises may occur. He seems to feel that scientific theories must achieve generality and completeness or lack rigor. This seems more like a seventeenth-century view of science than like a modern view.

Physical science presents analogies to the surprises that stem from parameter changes in social or political systems. One of these is the phenomenon of superconductivity under conditions of extreme temperature and pressure. The phenomena associated with superconductivity had not been predicted by the then current physical theories. Only after experimentation with extreme temperatures and pressures were the phenomena noticed. And only then did it become necessary to explain them. Whether a highly general theory comprehending all novel phenomena, of which superconductivity is merely an example, can be developed by physical theory is still open to question. For reasons already evident, such a general theory would be even more questionable in the area of international politics. Were someone to suggest to a physicist that the discovery of novel phenomena such as superconductivity which had not been predicted by previous theory established either the lack of rigor of previous theory or the inappropriateness of the methodology employed, the argument would be dismissed.

VII

Another major charge made by the traditionalist against the newer methods is that since they use models, their practitioners are likely to mistake the models for reality. If the causal connection were not in-

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sisted on, I would not lightly deny the charge. There is a human tendency to reification. Surely the psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists—and even the physicists, who know very little about politics—have a tendency to apply very simplified assumptions to very complex events. If, however, the traditionalist were to examine the propositions of the psychologists, for instance, he would find them no different from empirical generalizations—a category he likes. When a psychologist talks of projection or of a mirror image he is not, in the usual case, deriving these generalizations from an integrated theory, but is simply asserting an empirical generalization explicitly. The trouble with a generalization of this kind, apart from its general inapplicability, is that no context for its application is specified. Thus, as in the case of traditionalist arguments, it can be applied safely, for, in the form offered, it can never really be falsified.

On the other hand, it is natural to expect sophistication with respect to models from one who explicitly uses them. Only someone who has worked with models and the methodology of models knows how sensitive at least some models are to parameter adjustments. Thus a builder of models does not think of them as generally applicable. They are applicable only within a specified context; and it is extremely important to determine whether that context in fact exists. Moreover, the person who has worked with models usually has gone through the difficult task of trying to associate the parameters of the model with the real world. No one who has attempted this is likely to take it lightly.

I would argue that it is rather the traditionalist, whose assumptions are implicit rather than explicit and whose statements are made usually without reference to context, who is more likely to mistake his model for reality. Of course, even traditionalists are not likely to be as incautious as the historian Webster, who asserted that Castlereagh inherited his phlegmatic disposition from his mother who died when he was one year old. Yet the traditional literature of diplomatic history and international politics is filled with implicit assumptions as to motivation, interrelationships between variables, and so forth, that are implicit rather than specified, and the limits of application of which are never asserted. Even so careful and intelligent a traditionalist as George Kennan has made assertions about the likely effectiveness of United States aid in encouraging diversity and pluralism within the Soviet bloc which hardly seem to be sustained by the evidence.[23] Kennan did not explicitly articulate his model. He no doubt assumed that the provision of American aid provided the Polish

[23] "Polycentrism and Western Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XLII (January 1964), 178.

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government with an alternative to Soviet pressure. I would argue that had Kennan explicitly articulated his model, he might more likely have considered variables not included in his implicit model. Had he done so, he might have considered the possibility that the Polish government could argue to the Polish citizens that if the United States gave aid to Poland it must be a sign that the Polish regime was an acceptable regime. Therefore it would be unwise for the Polish citizen to oppose that regime or to expect even psychological aid from the United States in opposition. He also might have considered the hypothesis that the Polish leaders, as good Communists, and as a consequence of accepting American aid, might find it important to reassert at least some elements of Communist doctrine more strongly either to reassure themselves or to assure elements within the Polish Communist party whose support they needed that the leadership was not becoming a stooge for United States imperialism.

The probability that traditionalists will mistake their models for reality is further exemplified by Hedley Bull's criticisms of the new scientific approaches. Bull is so confident, on the basis of his premises, that those following the scientific method will engage largely in methodology both in their research and in their teaching, graduate and undergraduate, that he ignores the abundant evidence to the contrary. He himself admits that the other traditionalist critics of the new methods do not have adequate knowledge of these methods; yet he somehow fails to draw the inference from his own evidence that these critics have mistaken their implicit models for reality.

The traditional techniques with their inarticulated suppositions, their lack of specification of boundaries, and their almost necessary shifting of premises create a much greater danger that their implicit assumptions will automatically be applied to reality and a much greater sense of complacency than do scientific methods. I have no desire to be invidious, but, just as the traditionalists find it legitimate to characterize what they believe to be the inadequacies of the newer approaches, so it is equally legitimate to relate the defects of traditionalism to their sources. Bull, for instance, points out that English political science, as contrasted with American political science, remains committed to traditionalism. It is surely no secret that English political science is somewhat less than distinguished.

VIII

The traditionalists talk as if the newer methods have excluded philosophy as a tool for the analysis of international politics. Unfortu-

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nately few of them—again Raymond Aron is a conspicuous exception—have demonstrated any disciplined knowledge of philosophy; and many of them use the word as if it were a synonym for undisciplined speculation. There are many profound questions that in some senses are genuinely philosophical; the systems approach, among others, is related to a number of philosophical assumptions. The relationship between these philosophical assumptions and the validity of empirical theories is more complicated. It is entirely possible for an erroneous philosophy to furnish the ideas from which a valid empirical theory is derived. And it is dubious that the relationship between philosophical position and empirical theory is so direct—in either traditional or scientific approaches—that the arguments between or within competing approaches or theories can be settled by philosophical argument. There are, moreover, some important mistakes that ought to be avoided. Political theory ought not to be called philosophy merely because it is formulated by a man who is otherwise a philosopher unless the ideas have a genuine philosophical grounding. If the ideas are merely empirical propositions, as in the case of most philosophical statements used by traditionalists, they stand on the same footing as other empirical propositions. There is hardly much point in quoting one of the philosophers unless one understands him and can apply him correctly. I remember listening to a lecture by a well-known scholar, one cited by Bull as a good example of the traditionalist approach, who attempted to disprove Hegel's philosophy of history by showing that there were accidents in history. He was obviously unaware that for Hegel history was the realm of accident, that a major element of the Hegelian system involves the working out of necessity (often contrary to the wills of the actors) in a realm characterized by accident, and that, in any event, the whole matter was irrelevant to the point he thought he was making. Even if some matters of concern to international politics are profoundly philosophical, not all are. It is essential, if I may use that philosophical term inappropriately, to address the proper methods to the proper questions and not to make global statements about international politics, as do the traditionalists, which assume the relevance of the same melange of methods regardless of the type of question.

I have no doubt that the early attempts at a scientific approach to international politics are guilty of crudities and errors. It would be amazing—and I do not expect to be amazed—if the earliest hypotheses and models designed as tools for the orderly and comparative investigation of the history of international politics survive in their

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original form in the face of sustained empirical and methodological investigations. The self-corrective techniques of science will, however, likely sustain orderly progress in the discipline. The traditionalists are unlikely to be helpful in this task.

Having read the criticisms of the traditionalists, I am convinced that they understand neither the simpler assertions nor the more sophisticated techniques employed by the advocates of the newer methods. They have not helped to clarify the important issues in methodology; they have confused them. The traditionalists have accused those writers who advocate modern scientific approaches of using deterministic models despite explicit statements by those writers to the contrary. The traditionalists mistake explicitly heuristic models for dogmatic assertions. They mistake assertions about deductions within the framework of a model for statements about the open world of history. They call for historical research and do not recognize either that they have not heeded their own call or that they are merely repeating the words of the advocates of the newer approaches.

The traditionalists are often quite intelligent and witty people. Why then do they make such gross mistakes? Surely there must be something seriously wrong with an approach that devotes so much effort to such ill-informed criticism. One suspects that this sorry product is the consequence of the traditionalist view of philosophy as elegant but undisciplined speculation—speculation devoid of serious substantive or methodological concerns. Thus traditionalists repeat the same refrain like a gramophone endlessly playing a single record; that refrain is beautifully orchestrated, wittily produced, and sensitive only to the wear of the needle in the groove.

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THEORY AND REALITY IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

By RAYMOND DAWSON and RICHARD ROSECRANCE*

I

CONVENTIONAL alliance theory asserts that calculation, not sentiment, determines original combinations; thereafter, ideology, cultural ties, and common historical traditions may buttress the connection achieved.[1] Moreover, interest governs the breakdown of alliances;[2] cultural affinities can only be retarding factors. Since the national "parts" are postulated as greater than the alliance "whole," the logic of egocentric interests had led some to predict nuclear fragmentation within contemporary alliance systems. An alliance armed with nuclear weapons, according to Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, is "obsolescent," for "either it cannot be relied on when the chips are down, or it gives one member power over the life and death of another member." Perforce, "An alliance preserving the status quo of virtual nuclear bipolarity cannot be accepted by the major non-nuclear nations; an alliance with more than one member armed with nuclear weapons cannot be accepted by any member thus armed."[3] The policies of France and of China, vis-à-vis their allies, and the antecedent development of a national nuclear capability by Great Britain, thus become explicable within a consistent framework of theory.

On close examination, however, the theory cannot explain the Anglo-American alliance. That alliance is ordinarily set apart as a "special

* The article that follows is partly based on interviews with The Rt. Hon. F. J. Bellenger, Sir Frederick Brundrett, Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, Sir John Cockroft, Sir Maurice Dean, Admiral Sir Michael Denny, Desmond Donnelly, Air Chief Marshal Sir Alfred Earle, Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliott, Lord Franks, Lord Gladwyn, Mrs. Margaret Gowing, Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, Sir Robert Hall, General Lord Ismay, Lt. General Sir Ian Jacob, Brigadier Sir Fitzroy Maclean, Air Chief Marshal Sir George Mills (Gentleman Usher of the Blackrod, House of Lords), Lord Normanbrook, Sir William Penney, Lord Plowden, General Sir Nigel Poett, Lord Sherfield, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, The Rt. Hon. George Strauss, C. W. Wright, The Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger, Sir Philip de Zulueta. The authors also wish to express their indebtedness to The Hon. Alastair Buchan, Professor M. E. Howard, and Michael Palliser.

[1] See George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore 1962), 12, 26.

[2] *Ibid.*, 54-55.

[3] "The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (March 1964), 35.

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relationship," as indeed it is, but it is still an alliance, the most durable and most influential of the nuclear age. No acceptable analysis of the impact of nuclear weapons on alliances, or of the process of nuclear proliferation, can fail to take it into account. Its history demonstrates that an alliance may itself generate a set of interests that become central to the formulation of policy by the members of the system, and that the preservation of the alliance may be a salient national objective, overriding egocentric calculations of interest, on the part of both ascendant and dependent powers. The corollary concept of alliance interests carries significant theoretical and policy implications.

By the summer of 1945 the close relationships that had developed between Washington and London after May 1940 were visibly waning. The Axis was defeated, the strongest incentive for cooperation withdrawn. New leaders in both capitals were preoccupied with long-neglected domestic problems, while on many international issues their interests diverged. Most serious of these disagreements were conflicts about atomic energy and economic cooperation. In each area London anticipated a close working relationship with America, but in both its expectations were immediately disappointed.

Britain had accepted American domination in atomic weapons developments after 1942, but it had placed great store on Roosevelt's promise—given at Hyde Park in 1944—of "full collaboration" after the war.[4] In November 1945, concern about U.S. atomic energy policy brought Prime Minister Attlee to Washington, where he won President Truman's agreement, also, for "full and effective collaboration."[5] In fact, however, American policy had already come to be dominated by two contradictory pressures, both of which excluded atomic energy cooperation with Britain.

First, proponents of a comprehensive international control plan were convinced that U.S. cooperation with Britain would preclude any control agreement with the Soviet Union. Operationally, the "controllers" were momentarily in alliance with a second group, whose aim was the preservation of the secret of the bomb for purposes of national advantage. For both groups, a policy of national monopoly was advantageous in 1945-1946. This strange amalgam of nationalism and internationalism, as expressed in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, con-

[4] The U.S. copy of the Hyde Park aide-mémoire was erroneously filed and for a time American officials were mystified by British references to it. See Leslie R. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (New York 1962), 402.

[5] This was the Truman-Attlee-King Statement issued on November 16, 1945.

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founded the expectations of Britain, whose cooperation in American purposes was irrelevant to the nationalists and presumably taken for granted by the controllers.

This restrictive policy actually accelerated a British national nuclear program. The Prime Minister announced the beginnings of a "research and experimental establishment" in October 1945. A nuclear production unit was authorized early in 1946, and Attlee advised Averell Harriman shortly afterward that passage of the McMahon Bill would compel Britain "to build her own plants for atomic energy production for both military and civil purposes."[6] Predictably, in the fall of that year the British Government began planning a weapons program.[7]

STEPS TOWARD ALLIANCE

Shortly after the passage of the McMahon Act it became obvious that some central American and British assumptions about the postwar international system were invalid. Both governments were compelled to recognize that a long period of tension and conflict with the Soviet Union lay ahead. The interests of both nations converged in Europe. Britain's dependence upon American economic, political, and military support was obvious after the winter of 1946-1947. Less obvious but no less real, was American dependence on Britain if Europe were to be protected against Soviet encroachment.

Initially both Washington and London hoped that U.S. economic aid would suffice. By abruptly canceling lend-lease and driving a hard bargain over the 1946 loan, the U.S. had aroused British anxieties. Eventually, however, and contrary to the atomic energy experience, the American response to Europe's economic plight was an act of unparalleled generosity. Even then, however, it remained for Britain—and specifically Ernest Bevin—to organize and lead the European response to the Marshall Plan. Thereafter Bevin realized that military measures were no less important, and that American cooperation with Western European collective self-defense was no less essential.[8] Washington interpreted events similarly, but the application of American military power required British cooperation. Joint efforts began in 1948, with the U.S. driving hard bargains under the pressure of its

[6] H. G. Nicholas, *Britain and the United States* (London 1963), 64.

[7] See Sir Leonard Owen, "Nuclear Engineering in the United Kingdom—The First Ten Years," *Journal of the British Nuclear Energy Society*, II (January 1963), 23; and R. N. Rosecrance, ed., *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics* (New York 1964), chaps. 3, 4.

[8] The turning point in Bevin's policy was publicly marked by his foreign policy speech in Commons late in January 1948. Within two months the Brussels Pact was signed.

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"nuclear nationalists," and Britain responding with striking restraint to ensure that nothing imperiled an American commitment.

THE MODUS VIVENDI

The bargaining began when it became evident that, notwithstanding the Atomic Energy Act, Britain still had a crucial involvement in the American program. First, that program was dependent upon the Congo uranium ore supplies controlled by Britain. During the war this ore had been at the disposal of the U.S., but in an agreement reached in May of 1946 Britain had reclaimed half the Congo production for its own use. This posed the most serious consequences for U.S. atomic weapons production. Access to the Congo ores, and to new sources of supply in South Africa and Canada, were of highest military priority to Washington. The bomb was the backbone of American power, and raw material limitations were matters of very serious concern.[9]

Moreover, Britain was involved in the control of American atomic weapons. At Quebec in 1943 Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that the atomic bomb would be used only by "mutual consent." The existence of this agreement was not known to the McMahon Senate Committee while it was drafting atomic energy legislation in 1946 nor, indeed, to any but a small group of presidential advisers.[10] When its existence did become known to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, the reaction was sharp and quick. Senator McMahon presumably gave the official view in saying that the use-restriction was "undoubtedly binding upon us,"[11] while Senator Vandenberg and others on the committee, though denying this and branding the restriction "astounding" and "unthinkable" as well as inconsistent with the 1946 law, also insisted that it was essential that the restriction be unequivocally removed.[12]

[9] The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, David Lilienthal, warned in early 1947 that production was on "thin ice" because of raw material shortages, which compounded all the problems afflicting the atomic energy program in the postwar transition. Looking back on that period in 1949, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy said that the weapons situation "verged upon the tragic." See *The Journals of David Lilienthal*, Vol. II, *The Atomic Energy Years* (New York 1964), 185; and Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Investigation into the . . . Atomic Energy Commission*, S. Rp. 1169, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), 13.

[10] When Churchill read the text of the agreement in Commons on April 15, 1954, he said that when he had first shown it to Senator McMahon two years before, the Senator had remarked, "If we had seen this agreement there would have been no McMahon Act" (*Parliamentary Debates* [*Commons*], 5th Series, Vol. 526, col. 52).

[11] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 96, Pt. 7, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950), 9763.

[12] See Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston 1952), 361.

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Application of the Atomic Energy Act thus created strain within one year. An understanding with Britain was mandatory. The result was the *modus vivendi* of January 1948. That accord terminated the Quebec limitations on the use of atomic weapons, leaving the decision entirely in American hands. It also relieved American raw material shortages by allotting to the U.S. the entire Congo output for 1948, slightly over half the 1949 output, and an option on any 1949 production not required by Britain. In return, restrictions upon industrial and commercial applications imposed on Britain at Quebec were also lifted, and information exchange between the two nations was authorized in nine specified areas. The nuclear nationalists kept these restricted in scope and under close surveillance in operation. It was intended, as one of them (Lewis Strauss) later wrote, that none of the nine would have "any relation to the field of weapons."[13]

British aims were thus scarcely realized in the *modus vivendi.* Mindful of the ultimatum-like overtones of Vandenberg's warning that "failure to revamp the agreements would have a disastrous effect on Congressional consideration of the Marshall Plan,"[14] Britain had abstained from using its high cards. Indeed, it had its own reasons for desiring an improvement in U.S. atomic capabilities. There was consolation in President Truman's private assurances that he would, in H. G. Nicholas' words, "continue to work in the spirit of Quebec,"[15] but this was a nebulous substitute for "mutual consent."

U.S. BASES IN BRITAIN

The "spirit of Quebec" was soon of more than hypothetical significance to British interests, as Soviet actions in early 1948 led both Washington and London to conclude that a visible commitment of American military power was vital to Western Europe. Fortunately, the armed forces of both nations had kept intact much of the machinery, as well as the habits, of military collaboration during 1946-1947. Agreements had been concluded on standardization of equipment and staff methods, training, and research, and on officer-exchange in command and staff posts.[16] Most important, perhaps, the Combined Chiefs of Staff structure was kept alive.

The activation and expansion of this pattern of cooperation was instantaneous in 1948. The Czech coup and the harassment of West

[13] *Men and Decisions* (Garden City 1962), 371.
[14] *Vandenberg Papers*, 361.
[15] P. 66.
[16] See the illuminating discussion in "U.S. Bases in Britain," *The World Today*, XVI (August 1960), 319-25, and the sources there cited.

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Berlin produced a galvanic effect, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff became again an "effective, dynamic institution."[17] Consultations began in April on the development of joint plans to meet a Soviet attack, although there was no political charter for such activity.[18] In the meantime, the appeal from the Brussels Pact ministers, and a letter from Ernest Bevin to the President, had set in motion the negotiations for the NATO treaty, and the Vandenberg Resolution passed the Senate early in June. The imposition of the Berlin Blockade on June 24, however, created an immediate crisis that could not await the long process of trans-Atlantic diplomacy. The unwritten Anglo-American alliance filled the breach.

Alarmed in March 1948 by reports from General Clay about the possible Soviet military initiative, the Truman administration had called upon Congress for expanded military programs. To meet any immediate crisis, however, there was little on hand. Only 98,000 U.S. troops were in Germany, and only 31,000 of these were considered combat forces; and there was only one immediately available division in reserve in the United States. General Marshall described American military power at that juncture as a "hollow shell."[19] The trump was the atomic monopoly, but there were few bombs on hand[20] and delivery capabilities were minimal. The Strategic Air Command at the end of 1947 had only sixteen bombardment groups, and these were neither fully manned nor fully operational.[21] Its heavy armament was still the B-29, which could not reach the central Eurasian land mass "from bases on or near the North American Continent."[22] Britain was the key to the application of American air power.

After some hesitation and misgivings, occasioned by fear of British public reaction and the hazard of "provocative" action, the United States raised the question of positioning B-29 bombers in the British Isles. To Washington's surprise, London's response was immediate and affirmative. It was actually precisely what Bevin had hoped for:

[17] See Neal Stanford, *Christian Science Monitor*, April 27, 1948.

[18] The Labour left wing's suspicions about a "secret pact" with the U.S. at this time were reminiscent of Roosevelt's troubles with congressional isolationists in 1940-1941. Attlee replied to such charges by saying, "There are no defence arrangements [but] relations between the services and staffs are, of course, close and cordial" (*Parliamentary Debates* [*Commons*], 5th Series, Vol. 452, col. 1996 [June 29, 1948]).

[19] See Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York 1951), 375; and Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times*, March 29, 1948.

[20] President Truman remarks in his *Memoirs* (speaking of the spring of 1949), "We *now* had a stockpile . . ." (*Years of Trial and Hope* [Garden City 1956], 304).

[21] See Alfred Goldberg, ed., *A History of the United States Air Force, 1907-1957* (New York 1957), 122.

[22] From testimony of Secretary of the Army Royall, quoted in the *Manchester Guardian*, March 27, 1948.

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an American involvement that would preclude second thoughts about the blessings of isolation. By the end of July two B-29 groups had begun arriving, and three groups were operating out of seven bases in Britain by the end of 1948.[23]

This momentous step was explained in the House of Commons in this casual statement by the Secretary of State for Air: "Units of the United States Air Force do not visit this country under a formal treaty but under informal and long-standing agreements between the United States Air Force and the R.A.F. for visits of goodwill and training purposes. The B-29's at present at R.A.F. stations are here to carry out long-distance flying training in Western Europe. It has not been decided how long they will stay. . . ."[24] The Secretary concluded by noting that a flight of R.A.F. Vampire fighters was at that moment on a visit to Canada and the U.S. As the editor of *The World Today* has remarked, the reestablishment of American airpower in Britain was "rather like a history of the British Constitution."[25] No formal agreement was concluded, although the British bases were, in Churchill's words, "the principal atomic base of the U.S.," and they served to place England in "the very forefront of Soviet antagonism."[26] Their use was governed only by "the spirit of Quebec." No atomic bombs actually arrived in 1948: the stockpile was too small and England too vulnerable.[27] But symbolically the bomb had arrived from the New World to redress the balance of the Old. Britain welcomed it, while, as Joseph Alsop wrote, the "plain truth" was that "all American higher strategy" was "based on the existence of an unwritten but highly effective Anglo-American alliance."[28]

II

In July of 1949, with the *modus vivendi* soon to expire, atomic energy negotiations were resumed. Britain was by this time well into its own program: two plutonium piles at Windscale were being readied and work soon would begin on a low-separation diffusion plant at Capenhurst for production of enriched uranium.[29] Thereafter, the next step in a national program would be a full-scale high-separation plant for the production of weapons-quality U-235. The costs, however, would be substantial.

[23] On these developments see *Forrestal Diaries*, 454-57.
[24] *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, 5th Series, Vol. 454, col. 123 (July 19, 1948).
[25] "U.S. Bases in Britain," 319. [26] Quoted *ibid.*, 321.
[27] On American worries on this score, see *Lilienthal Journals*, II, 266, 465.
[28] *New York Herald Tribune*, July 22, 1949.
[29] Owen, 24.

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THE 1949-1950 ATOMIC ENERGY NEGOTIATIONS

British negotiators presented an extraordinary series of proposals to the Americans during negotiations that extended into January 1950. London hoped that Congress would understand that there was no way to keep the "nuclear secret" from Britain. The question was not whether Britain would have an atomic capability. The question was whether that capability would be developed unilaterally or in partnership with the United States. London proposed the latter alternative.

The plan was that the British would forego their high-separation diffusion plant and a third pile at Windscale, and would send the bulk of their nuclear scientists to work at U.S. installations. There would be complete pooling of nuclear information, and Britain would contribute to the American U-235 production effort. The U.K. would gain further knowledge about the U.S. gaseous diffusion plant, while the plutonium from the Windscale reactors would be sent to the United States for processing and enclosure in the bomb envelope. In return, bombs would be allocated to Britain, stored in Britain under British control, but used in accordance with joint strategic plans. Britain would not formally abjure the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, nor would it withdraw from future nuclear research and development.[30] In fact, however, the great bulk of British atomic efforts would be concentrated in the U.S., and all bombs would be manufactured there. While certain British officials were reluctant to put the security of their country so directly into the hands of the United States, particularly since Britain was shortly to achieve its first quantities of military plutonium from Windscale, most of them saw the great advantages a single effort would have in speed, efficiency, and concentration of resources. The Soviet explosion in August 1949 made haste the more necessary, and the plan would have given Britain an atomic bomb well in advance of the target date specified in the U.K. national program (late 1952).

There were major mutual benefits to be derived by the United States from a bilateral nuclear program, but influential minority opinion, which possessed a *de facto* veto power, reacted negatively. On the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss was an adamant opponent of information or hardware exchange with the British, and on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senators Hickenlooper and Vandenberg argued vaguely that it meant giving to Britain the weapon

[30] It was anticipated, as James Reston wrote at the time, that research would continue "into the possibility of developing new atomic weapons" (*New York Times*, January 4, 1950).

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that was the peculiar American contribution to Western security and world peace. Despite repeated attempts by David Lilienthal, George Kennan, and others to point out that the British knew the essential secrets, and that their national nuclear program would soon reach fruition, the opposition did not retreat.[31] Some senators thought the British would be vulnerable in war, and that the Russians would be that much nearer the secret of the bomb. Even the Soviet detonation that summer failed to eradicate this apprehension. The opponents of the scheme were unable to grasp the fact that in its absence the British would certainly have their own bomb, and that the proposed arrangement could actually obviate an independent British nuclear capability. President Truman reluctantly concluded that to press the case might endanger the entire NATO edifice, and in January 1950, when Klaus Fuchs was arrested, the ensuing doubts about British security finally dissolved any chance of a significant information exchange.

Nevertheless, major access to British-controlled ores was still essential—even more so in view of the projected increase in weapons production after the Soviet explosion. In a temporary arrangement late in 1949, Britain again conceded U.S. requirements. Then, when South African ores became available, Britain acquiesced in a shift of the basis of division from roughly 50-50 to 80-20 in favor of the U.S. Again the British consciously refrained from playing their high cards; there is no evidence that ore supplies were used to extract concessions on information exchange. The British noted, however, that the ore agreements were quite inconsistent with the policy of the McMahon Act, so tirelessly cited by opponents of information exchange. Under these strictures the U.S. was not to enter into international accords for the disposition of uranium ore, short of the kind of control scheme envisaged in the Baruch Plan.

KOREA, REARMAMENT, AND THE BOMB

Even the nuclear issue within the Anglo-American alliance was soon overshadowed by the Korean War. It is difficult to overstate the cumulative impact of that limited war on the psychological and military assumptions in both nations. Britain initially reacted slowly and hesitantly because of its straitened financial circumstances and the need to allow the 1949 devaluation to take full effect. By December 1950, however, Whitehall acknowledged a major world crisis. "Here we go again" expressed the new mood, and preparations began for a third great war. The Labour Government feared a conflict in Europe;

[31] *Lilienthal Journals*, II, 443-52.

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it knew that Europe could not be defended without U.S. troops; and it was worried that Korea and the Chinese intervention might draw U.S. strength and interest away from Europe. For Britain decisive interests were at stake, though it had few resources to cement the American connection. In the words of one minister: "None of us was taking the American alliance for granted."[32]

The result was a rearmament program that had been exceeded only in world war. By January 1951, London had accepted a gross program of £4.7 billion over a three-year period without knowing what it might receive in U.S. aid. Defense spending was expected to rise to fourteen percent of the GNP. British officials seemed almost to be convinced that the effort should be greater than they could really afford.[33] With Senator Taft challenging the dispatch of more divisions to Europe, the President holding back on the appointment of a Supreme Commander for Europe, and ex-President Hoover advocating a "Fortress America" policy, Whitehall would not gamble on a small effort.

The sacrifices made by Britain had high political costs. In endorsing the £4.7 billion program, Attlee explicitly accepted consumer shortages, and an expected deterioration in the balance of payments followed. In the second quarter of 1951 the balance worsened by $304 million and in the third quarter it reached $638 million. Bevin resigned from the Government during that spring, and around him there gathered a powerful Labour opposition group that complicated Attlee's task and helped lose him the election in October. But up to the time it left office, the Labour Government held fast to the £4.7 billion program. It was a high price to pay for fidelity.

Korea had meanwhile provided the decisive impetus for the creation of SHAPE, for German rearmament, and also for agreement on the use of the atomic bomb. When U.S. negotiators had put forward the "package deal" in September 1950, it had been assumed that a U.S. troop commitment in Europe and the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander were to be offered only in return for allied agreement to German rearmament. When planning for this rearmament lagged in the autumn, Washington temporized on the other counts. It was not until Attlee's visit to Washington in December that his

[32] Another minister remarked, "You can always do anything, if you want to badly enough. Look at what we spent in the war" (cited in Richard Rose, "The Relation of Socialist Principles to British Labour Foreign Policy, 1945-1951," unpubl. diss., Nuffield College, Oxford [1959], 334).

[33] *Ibid.*, 333-35.

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American allies agreed to proceed with General Eisenhower's appointment.

It was the bomb, however, that brought the Prime Minister across the Atlantic in December of 1950. His visit had been arranged in about half an hour's time after the President, at a press conference, had refused to rule out the use of the bomb in Korea. Attlee tried to get Truman to agree that it would not be used without first consulting the nations providing troops to the UN Command. Truman refused, conscious of the repercussions of Quebec. But though the communiqué did not indicate it, a form of consultation with Britain was agreed on, and Attlee declared himself "perfectly satisfied."[34] There was, however, no British power of veto.

Just before the election in Britain in October 1951, Attlee also tidied up the completely informal arrangements governing the use of British bases by U.S. strategic bombers. The terms agreed to, and later confirmed by Churchill in January 1952, provided for "joint decision" by the two governments "in light of circumstances prevailing at the time."[35] Again there was no indefeasible British right of veto. British security depended in the final analysis on American possession and ability to use the bomb, and London was not anxious to face the risks of imposing conditions.

III

Three factors brought changes in British strategic thinking after Churchill's return to power in the fall of 1951. The first was the economic burden imposed by the £4.7 billion program. Almost immediately the Conservative government concluded that Britain could not pay the bill, and in its first defense white paper it pointed to the "grave worsening of the United Kingdom's balance of payments."[36] Second, there was a loss of incentive to meet the stringencies and sacrifices involved in the £4.7 billion program. The post-Korea fear of a Soviet military assault in Europe, and the fear of an American transfer of its interest and its resources on a grand scale to the Far East, had been dissipated by events. Finally, the international military environment was changing with the growing nuclear capabilities of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the attainment of nuclear status by Britain. Economic and political constraints called for a new departure, while military developments suggested an alternative.

[34] See James Reston, *New York Times*, December 9, 1950.
[35] "U.S. Bases in Britain," 322.
[36] *Statement on Defence, 1952*, Cmd. 8475 (London 1952), 2.

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BRITAIN'S "NEW ASSESSMENT"

The bleak economic outlook led Churchill to order a "new assessment" of the strategic situation in the spring of 1952. This began with a global strategy paper prepared by Lieutenant General Sir Ian Jacob and the Chiefs of Staff which was subsequently approved by the Cabinet and became the basis of every defense white paper until 1957. The new British policy drew attention partly because of its enunciation of "broken-backed" warfare, first referred to publicly two years later. This notion depicted the onset of general war with a massive nuclear and thermonuclear exchange, after which, "*if no decisive result were reached* . . . the opposing sides would seek to recover their strength, carrying on the struggle as best they might."[37] How seriously this doctrine was taken is open to debate. It may have been, primarily, a measure of political bargaining which ensured the agreement of all the services to the policy changes projected in the global strategy paper.[38] The real significance of the new British approach was its explicit dependence upon a doctrine of strategic nuclear deterrence as the basis of military planning.

From their inception, NATO and the Anglo-American alliance were predicated upon a World War II–style strategy for the defense of Europe. This was clear in the rearmament programed in 1949-1950, which under the pressures of the Korean War ultimately produced the 96-divisions goal approved by the NATO Council in Lisbon in 1952.[39] "Not a single politician in Europe," one German commentator has remarked, took this massive commitment seriously.[40] It would be more accurate to say that none regarded it as necessary or as politically feasible. What Britain began to do in the spring of 1952 was to look for an alternative, again acting as the catalyst on American thinking and reconciling the divergent aims and capabilities of the members of

[37] *Statement on Defence, 1954*, Cmd. 9075 (London 1954), 5, emphasis added.

[38] See the analysis by Bernard Brodie in *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959), 160ff. American "new look" doctrines also embraced the "broken-backed" idea. President Eisenhower said in January 1955, "Our first objective must therefore be to maintain the capability to deter the enemy from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes—by a combination of effective retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing effectiveness. . . . Thus we can assure that our industrial capacity can continue throughout a war to produce the gigantic amounts of equipment and supplies required" (quoted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956*, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. [1956], 4).

[39] See Roger Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security* (Princeton 1959), 16-22.

[40] Helmut Schmidt, *Defense or Retaliation: A German View*, trans. Edward Thomas (New York 1962), 14.

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the alliance. This was the importance of British strategic planning in 1952.

Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor visited Washington that year to acquaint the American Joint Chiefs with London's "new assessment," and to urge upon them the wisdom and necessity of retreating from the Lisbon goals and accepting a new role for nuclear-armed air power.[41] He made little headway, but there were interesting evidences of change in Washington. The Truman Administration was having budgetary problems, leading to the imposition of a "stretch-out" on the service programs to achieve their projected force levels.[42] Technological changes of enormous significance were also in the offing. A fusion device was exploded in November, while at the other end of the spectrum tactical nuclear weapons were soon to become available. This last development led General Collins, Army Chief of Staff, to speculate that such weapons would not immediately reduce NATO's force goals, but that they would "result ultimately in the ability to do the job with a smaller number of divisions."[43]

THE "NEW LOOK" AND THE NATO DECISIONS OF 1954

Britain in the meantime began following through the implications of its doctrine. In October 1952, it had tested its first atomic bomb. That same year Churchill agreed, at Slessor's urging, to reequip Bomber Command, despite fiscal strains and "shortfalls," and the first production orders for the V-bombers were placed.[44] Two things are noteworthy about this decision:

First, the reasoning behind the decision was *not* based on the building of an *independent* deterrent. British policy was still following in the pattern established in the 1940's. Nuclear status was not sought with the intent of following a course of action separate from that of the United States. Rather, the dominant conception was to secure the ability to deal with targets that were of primary importance to Britain. In the years of a small U.S. stockpile, America might not have been able to deal with all Soviet targets on the basis of equal priority.

[41] See Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Warner R. Schilling and others, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York 1962), 388-89.

[42] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York 1961), 227-28.

[43] Quoted in Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago 1962), 105.

[44] On the building of the British deterrent force, see Alfred Goldberg, "The Military Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent," *International Affairs*, XL (October 1964), 600-618.

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Second, the reequipment of Bomber Command represented a logical, sequential step in U.S.-British joint military planning, the policy of American nuclear monopoly notwithstanding. American nuclear striking power was still heavily dependent upon its British bases, while cooperation in tactics, training, and operations between the two air forces had continued since the 1946 agreements. Under the military assistance program, the R.A.F. had been supplied, starting in March 1950, with seventy B-29 bombers that provided Britain with a long-range bombing force capable of nuclear strikes, with American-supplied weapons, in the event of war with the Soviet Union.[45] In rebuilding and modernizing Bomber Command, the R.A.F. was able to draw upon the experience and procedures of SAC, and evidently upon its encouragement.[46] British bombs, and British bombers, certainly made joint war plans a necessity even if U.S. dependence on British bases was waning by the mid-1950's. The way to be consulted is to make consultation necessary, and this Britain had managed.

As the British deterrent was being built, major changes in strategic doctrine were similarly taking form in Washington. At the time Eisenhower came into office in 1953, Walter Millis observed of American military policy that it was "at bottom, a system for a large standing, regular military establishment to be expanded swiftly, in time of crisis, from the prepared reserves of plant capacity and manpower, to a mass mobilization of the 1942 pattern."[47] Like London, Washington found the force levels of that "standing" establishment costly beyond its willingness to pay, and, like London, it found the resolution of its problems in the new technology of nuclear weapons.

The resulting "new look" policy, like the British "new assessment," consisted, first, of an increasing reliance upon strategic nuclear deterrence. Dulles put the case in his "massive retaliation" speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1954, while the fiscal-1955 military budget sent to Congress that same month, though making across-the-board reductions in all the force levels set under the Truman administration, was most distinctive in its explicitly greater

[45] *Ibid.*, 608.

[46] At Bermuda late in 1953, Churchill told Eisenhower and Lewis Strauss that the R.A.F. would certainly assist in bombing operations during a war, even though, he complained, it could not then under the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act learn the weight, dimensions, or ballistics of U.S. bombs. This understanding of the role of the R.A.F. was evidently never questioned. See Strauss, 372-73. Eisenhower was by then expressing hopes for amendments to the McMahon Act.

[47] *New York Herald Tribune*, January 21, 1953.

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reliance upon strategic air power as the American contribution to free-world security. Additionally, and consistent with this, the administration changed the basis of its planning for the defense of Europe. Nuclear weapons, said the President in January 1954, create "new relationships between men and materials. These new relationships permit economies in the use of men as we build forces suited to our situation in the world today."[48] The "new relationships," specifically the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, became the basis for the new charter for military planning in NSC 162/2, approved in October. This new charter assumed that both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons would be used when militarily desirable. The President retained his power to authorize such use, of course, but the implication clearly was that such authorization would be forthcoming.[49] Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made this clear. "Our policy," he said, "is to use atomic weapons if it were to our military advantage to do so, and we would have to decide that at the time."[50]

Very quickly, NATO planning was brought into line with the new doctrines. The North Atlantic Council, meeting that December, called for "further improvements in training, equipment and effectiveness" of forces, but it did not ask for any major increases toward the Lisbon goals. Europe welcomed the changes, and the accompanying authorization for NATO's military commanders to devise plans on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used.[51]

The Eisenhower administration had in the meantime obtained from Congress the necessary amendments to the Atomic Energy Act to permit the alliance to carry the nuclear strategy into effect. The 1954 legislation authorized, under carefully prescribed safeguards, the transmission of information about nuclear weapons necessary to the development of defense plans, to personnel training in the use of such weapons, and to the evaluation of the nuclear capabilities of a potential enemy. Such information was not to reveal important in-

[48] The remark was made in the State of the Union Message on January 7. See *New York Herald Tribune*, January 8, 1954.

[49] Snyder, 433-38.

[50] Quoted in the *New York Herald Tribune*, March 13, 1954.

[51] Osgood, 110. The new policy had been succinctly described by Field Marshal Montgomery the preceding month: "I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our own defense. With us it is not longer: 'They may possibly be used.' It is very definitely: 'They will be used, if we are attacked.' In fact, we have reached the point of no return as regards the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot war" (in a lecture to the Royal United Service Institution in London, quoted in Osgood).

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formation concerning the design or fabrication of the nuclear components of weapons.[52] It did make possible, however, the positioning of American tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. There they remained under the physical custody and control of U.S. forces, but available for use by other NATO forces in the event of war. And the legislation also made possible a large measure of cooperation with Britain in the technology of nuclear propulsion which immensely benefited the Royal Navy.

The American "new look" of massive retaliation and nuclear sharing were consistent with the principles that London began refining with the global strategy paper in 1952. U.S. policy changes were not, however, a direct result of British influence. They were a response to the same technological and political changes that had influenced Britain and Europe, and the same weariness and concern with the magnitude of military spending. Although British precedents were available, the "new look" was primarily a domestic product, formulated out of grim determination to reduce the defense budget and finding its justification in the changed political and technological context. And if thermonuclear weapons raised a tantalizing possibility of a really independent deterrent, that same technological advance, and others related to it, even more clearly pointed to a decline in that dependence upon Britain which had characterized American nuclear retaliatory power at the end of the 1940's.

IV

The years 1954-1957 were a period of growing estrangement between Washington and London. In Europe, differences arose in connection with German rearmament. The U.S. criticized British unwillingness to join the European Defense Community, and Dulles may have allocated part of the blame for French rejection of EDC to previous British hesitancy. When Eden sought to repair the damage by a reformulation of the Brussels Pact, Dulles was at first lukewarm because of the lack of supranational features. In the end, the two governments stood together and the Paris Agreements prevailed, but in Congress and in other quarters Britain was under criticism for its continuing refusal to associate more closely with the Continent.

[52] See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, As Amended*, H. Rp. 1849, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1958), 8; and the summary of nuclear-sharing policy in Raymond H. Dawson, "What Kind of NATO Nuclear Force?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 351 (January 1964), 30-39.

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THE INDOCHINA DISPUTE

Of greater importance were the frictions that arose between the two allies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In the latter area, Britain despaired of a successful outcome in Indochina while Washington, determinedly hostile to China and expecting to become residuary legatee of the French, explored the possibility of direct intervention to prevent a debacle. Churchill and Eden adamantly opposed this, and refused even token participation. Thereafter, the U.S. did little to facilitate a negotiated settlement. When agreement was reached at Geneva in July 1954, Dulles told Eden that American opinion would never tolerate "the guaranteeing of the subjection of millions of Vietnamese to communist rule." Nor would the U.S. agree to sign the final declaration.[53]

SUEZ: THE NADIR OF THE ALLIANCE

In the Middle East the alliance faced its most severe challenges. While the Far East had not been a major focus of British concern since World War II, London still looked upon the Middle East as vital. By contrast, the American concern in that area was peripheral, and Washington felt little incentive to support British interests. Indeed, it was increasingly interested in promoting friendly connections with the Arab nations.

London's frustrations in the area steadily increased. In 1951, faced with the alternative of using force or withdrawing from Abadan, the Labour Government had chosen the latter. The Conservatives deplored this, maintaining that "our authority throughout the Middle East had been violently shaken";[54] they came to power resolved upon a more assertive course. Problems multiplied, however, and Washington seemed to compound them. In October 1954, Britain agreed to vacate the Suez base, after no little American pressure, and when the Baghdad Pact saw the light of day in 1955 America refused to join. Eden's comment is revealing: "Having played a leading part to inspire the project, the United States Government held back while Britain joined it, alone of the Western powers. Worse still, they tried to take credit for this attitude in capitals like Cairo, which were hostile to the pact. Then, by a series of hesitant steps, they drew nearer the pact, sending an observer and spending money, but still not joining it. An ounce of membership would have been worth all the havering and

[53] Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle* (London 1960), 139.
[54] *Ibid.*, 198.

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saved a ton of trouble later on."[55] In this context of resentment, the Suez imbroglio came. It did not precipitate new conflicts, but it dramatized and ratified old ones.

It is surprising in one way that the British should have been so willing to deal with the Kremlin and Peking and yet have remained so suspicious of Nasser. Yet it is probably true that Nasser and his predecessors had given the British more diplomatic trouble than any other national leaders since the war, and this in a realm where Britain had historic vital interests. In these respects, at least, there was an analogy between Nasser and Hitler. It is also true that if the Egyptian leader had been permitted to regulate Canal traffic (one third of which was British) according to political whim, he would have been in a position to alter Britain's position as an industrial power. As long as Nasser's aims on this crucial question were in doubt, Eden could expect sympathy and perhaps even support. Domestically, Labour initially took a grave view of the nationalization of the Canal, while one informed observer has remarked of the state of external opinion that "had [British] armed forces been in a position to act at a few days' notice, they could have occupied the Canal Zone with little more than transitory protests from the United States, the United Nations, and the Commonwealth." He adds significantly, "The opportunity was lost primarily through British unreadiness to enter into a hurriedly planned operation in which France would be the predominant partner by virtue of superiority in arms."[56]

As a result, Britain was not ready to act until mid-September, and Eden insisted on a longer delay. His strategy was to propose internationally legitimized solutions that Nasser could not accept. The U.S. would promise benevolent neutrality or moral support, and Britain would then operate with an international mandate. The Prime Minister temporized, believing he could secure a warrant for action that America could both understand and acknowledge.

This is not what happened. Dulles and Eisenhower believed that the longer British action could be postponed, the less likely it would be undertaken. If the U.K. would accept America's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis it would delay any Anglo-French action.

[55] *Ibid.*, 336.

[56] Terence Robertson, *Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy* (London 1964), 76-77. Much of the following account rests on the presumed accuracy of the Robertson version of the Suez affair. While the present authors have not been able to confirm its veracity in every detail, they are convinced that it contains a generally valid narrative of the unfolding of the Suez operation. It seems, moreover, to be correct on certain crucial events affecting Anglo-American relations.

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If the "solutions" proposed did not stick because of Egyptian intransigence, at least time would be gained. The major miscalculation by the British (not shared by the French) was that Dulles could eventually be brought to stand aside. Dulles's tactics were confused with his strategy.

When the Suez operation began on November 1, it therefore confronted the worst of both worlds. The Americans had been neither neutralized nor pacified, and the rest of the world had been alarmed. Domestic opinion in Britain (in contrast to July) had turned against Eden; Nasser, moreover, had managed to recruit the necessary pilots and was on his way to proving that the Canal could be insulated from domestic politics under Cairo's management. The invasion plan posed other imponderables. Since there was no naval base at Cyprus, the fleet had to proceed from Malta, but it could sail only after the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt had expired. At the same time, the Egyptian air force had to be hit at its bases forthwith. The result was an irreducible five-day lag between operations. The bombing took place on November 1, but not until dawn on November 6 did the invasion fleet arrive.

By this date opposition to the venture was well-nigh decisive. Late in the evening of November 5, London time, a note from Bulganin warned, "We are fully determined to crush the aggressors . . . through use of force."[57] Eden and Mollet were not intimidated but agreed to seek nuclear reassurances from the U.S. The State Department's reply early the next morning merely observed, "The Government of the United States will respect its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements. . . ."[58] Since the Middle East was not part of the North Atlantic area defined in the treaty, the reply was dangerously ambiguous. Eden tried to reach Eisenhower by telephone, but could not get through. He then sent a personal message to the President "asking for immediate assurance that the United States would retaliate if Britain and France were attacked,"[59] but no reply was given. Inquiries made through the U.S. Embassy in Paris had the same result, while in Washington top British military officers found they could not contact the American Joint Chiefs. The silence was all the more momentous since Soviet overflights of Turkey were being reported from NATO headquarters on the morning of November 6, and later in the day the Russians asked permission to move a cruiser and three destroyers through the Dardanelles.[60]

[57] *Ibid.*, 252.
[58] *Ibid.*, 253.
[59] *Ibid.*, 254.
[60] *Ibid.*, 260, 263.

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In the meantime, the U.S. was harassing the combined invasion fleet. U.S. aircraft continually tested its air defenses and compelled frequent British takeoffs to determine the identity of intruders. American submarines suddenly were detected all over the ocean. Finally the Commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet had to ask his Sixth Fleet counterpart to bring them to the surface. There was a distinct possibility that the British might inadvertently destroy an American submarine. There seemed little doubt that the Sixth Fleet had orders to obstruct the operation by all peaceful means.

Economic sanctions were also in train. The greatest pressure on the pound stemmed from speculation in New York, and even the Federal Reserve Bank was involved in off-loading sterling at a discount. These pressures cost the Bank of England $300 million on November 5; over even a short period such "dumping" would have forced devaluation. The British Treasury had applied for backing from the International Monetary Fund, but the U.S. was using its influence to block the transaction. As the British Cabinet was meeting just before noon on November 6, Harold Macmillan, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, received a call from Washington which pledged a U.S. loan of $1 billion if a cease-fire was effected by midnight.

When the cease-fire was conceded on November 6, it was clearly the result, more than anything else, of pressure from the United States. If the British had proceeded, even for the forty-eight hours the French believed sufficient to occupy the Canal (the British estimate was four to five days), devaluation might have been required. Eden is undoubtedly right in rejecting the view that the U.S. attitude would have been modified by a *fait accompli*. "The United States Government [he has written] had engaged their authority in the lead against us and would not have been appeased had Anglo-French forces occupied more of the Canal or even the whole of it. In all probability they would only have been more indignant."[61]

Suez demonstrated that diverging interests between Britain and the United States could have drastic military conquences. For Britain, the logical conclusion was that its strategic force might have to be used "independently" and the consequences of Suez began overtly to unfold in Sandys' defense white paper of 1957. It was announced that service manpower would be slashed, conscription ended, and conventional forces in Europe reduced. The compensating element would be increased reliance on nuclear weapons, and elaboration of the "independent deterrent" began. It was conceded that the

[61] *Memoirs*, 559.

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West was "mainly dependent" on U.S. deterrent power, that the United Kingdom could make only a "modest contribution." "Independent" was not meant by the Ministry of Defence to characterize the potency of British nuclear capability: it meant that British force, however powerful, might be used by Britain alone. And the Minister of Defence went on to say, in the Commons, "So long as large American forces remain in Europe, and American bombers are based in Britain, it might conceivably be thought safe—I am not saying it would—to leave to the United States the sole responsibility for providing the nuclear deterrent. But when they have developed the 5,000-mile intercontinental ballistic rocket, can we really be sure that every American administration will go on looking at things in quite the same way?"[62] The doctrine of nuclear fragmentation appeared confirmed. The Anglo-American alliance was coming apart.

V

RESTORATION

These initial post-Suez responses were in fact grossly misleading. With remarkable speed, both London and Washington moved to restore the alliance. Prime Minister Macmillan made this the cardinal aim of his policy, before which all else had to give way, and he found Washington fully responsive. Early in 1957, hard on the heels of Suez and in the midst of the talk about "independence," President Eisenhower was searching for a means of actually broadening nuclear collaboration with Britain.

Opposition to nuclear sharing in the U.S. was still formidable, and continued to rest upon diverging, albeit complementary, arguments. The crisis generated by Sputnik in October 1957, which violently shook American and NATO confidence, provided the administration with a means of overcoming this opposition. Its response to Sputnik was to appeal to the collective strength of NATO, and Britain, by virtue of its nuclear capability, was the fulcrum in the lifting operation. Eisenhower and Macmillan immediately called for the "collaboration of scientists and engineers" from their two nations and "other friendly countries," and they pronounced "national self-sufficiency . . . out of date."[63] It was "wasteful in the extreme," the President remarked in his State of the Union Message in January 1958, "for friendly allies

[62] Quoted in Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's: The Implications of Interdependence*, rev. ed. (New York 1963), 80-81.
[63] *New York Times*, October 26, 1957.

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to consume talent and money in solving problems that their friends have already solved—all because of artificial barriers to sharing."

The outcome was an amended Atomic Energy Act in 1958 which vastly expanded the authorized areas of information exchange, and permitted the transfer of various categories of nuclear materials for military purposes. The intent was not really to broaden sharing with NATO, however; it was to assist Britain's national nuclear program, virtually along the lines that London had sought during the years 1946-1950. The Joint Committee altered the amendments to make this explicit, by laying down the canon of "substantial progress" and then making it clear in the report that "only Great Britain can meet the standards set forth" to benefit fully from the new law.[64]

The United States was in the meantime going far beyond this nuclear support in shoring up the British deterrent. At Bermuda, in March of 1957, Eisenhower and Macmillan reached agreement for the sale by the U.S. to Britain of sixty Thor IRBM's. The R.A.F. would operate the missiles, which would be fitted with British warheads, and fired under a double key system requiring the assent of both Downing Street and the White House.[65] Three years later, when the Blue Streak was canceled and it was clear that Britain could not, alone, maintain a place in the front rank of the arms competition, the U.S. agreed to supply the British with the Skybolt ALBM, extending the life of the V-bomber force as a credible—although dependent—deterrent into the late 1960's or early 1970's. Finally, when Skybolt was canceled, President Kennedy made the amazing offer to Macmillan to sell Polaris missiles to Britain, an unambiguous underwriting of what the 1960 white paper had called Britain's "contribution to the Western deterrent." Suez had not undermined the traditional Anglo-American connection; its lessons had reinforced it.

AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND NATO

Washington's response to Macmillan's policy of restoration, and its own movements in this direction, were in part related to the fact that the British nuclear capability had come to be a potentially significant element in managing the divisive issues which began, late in the 1950's, to beset NATO. These were the issues of credibility and proliferation, which were related at least in the sense that the one was a rationale for the other.

[64] See Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Amending the Atomic Energy Act*, H. Rp. 1849, 2-4.

[65] William Lawrence, *New York Times*, March 25, 1957.

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By mid-1957 Washington was growing concerned about both, as signified in Dulles' suggestion that nuclear weapons be stockpiled in Europe under NATO, rather than U.S., control. Not even the shock of Sputnik would budge the Joint Committee from its adamant opposition to this proposal,[66] but it is clear that, months before Sputnik, U.S. planners were beginning to worry about the impact upon NATO of a Soviet missile capability. Washington very likely had this problem in mind when it reached the Thor agreement with Britain, permitting the deployment of a missile system years ahead of an operational ICBM. The stormy passage through a credibility crisis that began late in 1957, however, for all the talk about "sharing" with "friendly allies," was still pegged upon a posture of an Anglo-American nuclear "trusteeship" for the entire alliance. Obviously, this did nothing to discourage France from pressing its national nuclear program. For De Gaulle, it was an added spur to the effort.

Emphatically, De Gaulle was not interested in the U.S. offer made at the NATO meeting in Paris at the end of 1957 to position IRBM's in France, unless the warheads would be under French control. Washington thereupon began turning to other remedies for the proliferation-credibility problem. In the last year of the Eisenhower administration, at the NATO Council meeting in December, Secretary of State Herter advanced the "concept" of a NATO deterrent force of five Polaris submarines, supplied by the U.S. on condition that the European governments work out an accord on the control of such a force.[67] Matters then languished for a time, as a new administration came to power and was for some months preoccupied with a threatening crisis in Berlin. But two years later, at Ottawa, President Kennedy followed up with an announcement that the United States would assign a force of Polaris-armed submarines to NATO command, and pledged that careful consideration would be given to the development of a "NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control."[68] This was followed by far more than mere "consideration" by Washington: the United States actively pressed for the MLF during the ensuing two years, terminating its diplomatic offensive only in the fall of 1964.[69]

In this process, a pointed attack was mounted against the French nuclear program, which just as pointedly exempted the British de-

[66] On this point, see Osgood, 220.
[67] Drew Middleton, *New York Times*, December 20, 1960.
[68] Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times*, May 12, 1962.
[69] See R. N. Rosecrance, "The Choice Before President Johnson," *The Listener* (January 21, 1965), 91-93.

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terrent from the strictures of the Ann Arbor doctrine.[70] The pattern of cooperation between SAC and Bomber Command was by this time almost habitual, and certainly well-entrenched, and joint planning was detailed and firm. But the British force, now dependent upon U.S. subsidy in its race against obsolescence, also provided the U.S. with an entering wedge in its attempts to limit national proliferation through multilateralization. The V-bomber force, and the nuclear submarine force under construction to carry U.S. missiles, provided a European, or at least a non-American, nucleus around which an Atlantic, as opposed to a purely European, nuclear force might be structured. The currents of British domestic politics, and the currents of American strategic doctrine, were again compatible. As the Tories found the concept of an "independent deterrent," or any kind of deterrent at all, subjected to mounting criticisms, a palliative congenial to both Washington and London was the encapsulation of the British force in some form of NATO container. At Nassau in October of 1962, the Anglo-American Polaris agreement was joined to an agreement that the V-bombers would be "assigned" to NATO, along with three U.S. Polaris submarines. London attached an escape clause specifying that the bombers could be withdrawn when "supreme national interests are at stake," but this did not bar the establishment of a "NATO nuclear force" which Washington felt so important as a step in the restraint of proliferation.[71] For its part, Britain made it clear, in Prime Minister Douglas-Home's words, that no British government could accept any military plan "designed to exclude the United States from Europe."[72] The Labour Government that came to power in October of 1964 has fully confirmed this proposition as a pillar of British policy.

VI

It is perhaps paradoxical that a left-leaning Labour leader has ascended to power at the very time when his country is believed to be more dependent on the United States than ever before. Certainly Prime Minister Wilson's government recognized that Suez had taught contradictory lessons: the first was that the U.S. could not always be relied on to support British interests in a crisis; and the second was that, barring a connection elsewhere, Britain could not sustain her positions without the support of the United States. It is

[70] See the remarks of Henri Pierre, *Le Monde*, June 19, 1962.
[71] Timothy W. Stanley, *NATO in Transition* (New York 1965), 167-68.
[72] Drew Middleton, *New York Times*, May 22, 1963.

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the second of these which has commanded the greater attention of the Labour Government, in the face of left-wing opinion which, despite its ideological preferences, has not been able to burke the new relationship.

In the years immediately preceding Labour's return to office, there had been, first of all, a sea change in Anglo-American nuclear relationships. Then, the termination of Blue Streak, the Nassau Polaris agreement, and finally Labour's own cancellation of the TSR-2 underscored with indisputable clarity the growing British dependency. Britain, unable to afford the development of her own strategic nuclear systems, might opt for joint efforts with countries other than the United States, simply scrap its strategic weapons, or devolve them on NATO. Combinations of these alternatives to the American connection have been canvassed, and there has been some mild surprise in America that Labour's nuclear deductions have not been more radical. Since Wilson campaigned against the "independent deterrent" in 1964, why should he proceed with the U.S. Polaris deal in 1965, thereby confirming De Gaulle's worst suspicions?

Wilson's motives were considerably oversimplified by those who believed he sought merely to divest Britain of nuclear potency. A considerable sum had already been spent on the first three Polaris boats when he came into office, and the cancellation costs for the fourth were not insignificant. Nor was there any realistic prospect of turning them into hunter-killer submarines. Beyond this, Wilson partly accepted the Conservative thesis that Britain might have partially separate strategic interests to defend, and that they should be defended by a British strategic force if that force could be feasibly developed, purchased, or equipped. In Wilson's calculations, however, the need for even a conditional nuclear independence had to be balanced against its costs. A small Polaris force might be rationalized economically as a useful strategic instrument for the next ten years; that did not mean, however, that Britain had an inexorable requirement for strategic systems into the indefinite future. As Alun Gwynne-Jones (now Lord Chalfont) pointed out, neither the Tory nor the Labour party had any plans for a second-generation strategic system following the Polaris.[73] At some point, therefore, if present intentions are followed, British strategic policy will come to consist explicitly of reliance on the United States.

In the meantime, British strategic independence (in the sense of a physical capability to unleash nuclear force unilaterally) is small but

[73] See the leading article in *The Times* (London), October 14, 1964.

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not insignificant. In his Atlantic Nuclear Force proposal, Wilson was willing to concede "permissive action links" on the British-contributed warheads. It would be possible, however, to retain national warheads outside the force to which withdrawn delivery components could be fitted, if the U.K. wished to act independently at some future time. Such action would have to be in response to challenges well-defined in advance; there would scarcely be time to withdraw delivery systems, fit new warheads, and then execute a strike in the context of a sudden emergency. Wilson has also hedged against the possible failure of NATO in the future. The commitment of British strategic weapons would endure as long as the alliance lasted; any *de facto* rupture in alliance guarantees, however, would release Britain from its Atlantic Nuclear Force obligations. Moreover, the ANF plan envisaged a pledge of only a part of Britain's V-bomber force to the collectivity. The remainder would be kept outside as a guarantee to India against a Chinese nuclear attack.

These qualifications acknowledged, the trend since 1960 at least has been toward a continuing and deepening reliance upon the United States in nuclear matters. Some months ago the British gaseous diffusion plant at Capenhurst ceased producing fissionable-quality U-235 for hydrogen bombs. Now Britain depends completely on U.S.-provided U-235 in exchange for British plutonium. Even after 1968, if the Atlantic Force proposal does not materialize, the British will not possess a fully independent Polaris system. Fissile components for the warheads will have to be renewed from the United States. The longevity of the Polaris system, moreover, will depend on whether Washington is willing to furnish Poseidon as a successor.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that strategic questions are not the only matters in which practical British dependence on America has increased. In economic terms, Wilson has been at the mercy of international financial rescue operations organized from the United States. If strong American support had not materialized in the autumn of 1964, British devaluation would certainly have followed; the fate of sterling as an international currency still depends upon American goodwill. Since the British balance-of-payments problem has become chronic, the Anglo-American financial alliance may grow in importance.

In addition, for perhaps the first time in the postwar period, there has been a real accord on policy east of Suez. Britain has given up trying to reduce the U.S. commitment in the Far East, while the United States has been much more sympathetic about the British role

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in the Middle East. America no longer oscillates between past extremes of demanding British participation in the Indochina struggle or favoring British withdrawal from Asia. Britain's involvement in Malaysia and Singapore is an activity for which the U.S. is, in fact, profoundly grateful. And despite his left wing, Wilson has supported U.S. policy in Vietnam. The differences in attitude toward the Middle East and Asia which existed between Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles are unthinkable today.

Economic considerations, it should be noted, underpin this confluence of interest. If British defense spending is to be held to £2 billion annually for more than five years ahead, Britain will have to depend even more on the U.S. for performance of essential defense tasks than she does now. A full agreement with the U.S. on military dispositions in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, over the next ten years, may turn out to be the only road to British financial salvation.

Consistent with this, British policy toward Europe has reflected a new awareness of Anglo-American interests. London has resisted the very notion of a purely European deterrent, and it has been equally unsympathetic to Gaullist designs for a continental bloc opposed to the United States. British concern has been to involve the United States at each new stage of European cooperation. Thus the Atlantic Nuclear Force proposal included an inalienable U.S. veto on the use of the force, and eliminated the danger of new fingers on the trigger. British Labour would probably be prepared to join the Common Market at some future time, but not to see it evolve into a federal polity. U.K. connections with the United States would be a principal consideration in shaping this attitude.[74]

VII

In retrospect the Anglo-American connection seems solidly founded in the respective national interests of the two states, and in explaining its vicissitudes we have stressed those factors that have been "real" determinants of its course. Seeing it in the short run, one can scarcely believe that its outcomes could have been different. And yet, there is a broader sense in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, in which the complex of individual decisions does not explain the major direction and force of the alliance. Americans and Britons have believed they were merely responding to impulsions of concrete interest in forming and maintaining the bond. But it is as relevant to

[74] See Rosecrance, "The Choice Before President Johnson," 92.

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ask why they believed the connection was "logical" and "necessary" as it is to learn that they deemed it so.

The alliance took form in World War II as a direct response to conflict elsewhere in the system. The hostility between Britain and Germany on the one hand, and the U.S. and Germany on the other, helped generate the harmony of Anglo-American interests. In the immediate postwar period, the disappearance of the Nazi menace was succeeded by the Russian threat, and very soon again the two nations closed ranks. Even during the short postwar interim that preceded the cold war, they maintained close, although informal, military relationships, and neither seemed to doubt that in a future war they would fight in tandem.

The wartime and early cold-war alliances were explicable on balance-of-power principles and conventional interpretations of interests. Hitler was strong, the rest of the world divided and weak. Then the Soviets were strong, Europe and the United States weak. To oppose a strong antagonist, the weak states banded together.

From 1949 on, however, the relationship began to develop in ways not explicable in terms of conventional alliance theory. In that year Britain, one of three world powers, offered to concentrate its nuclear effort in the United States and to content itself, *de facto*, with a stock of bombs furnished through U.S. manufacture. In one sense at least, the offer was an act of self-abnegation, a willingness virtually to abandon a national nuclear program that was near fruition. If the British offer had been accepted, today in all probability there would be no separate British bomb. Moreover, Britain abstained from using its control over ore supplies as a means of bringing a favorable outcome. Despite the American refusal, Britain continued to support a national American program.

Conventional alliance theory explains neither of these results. The U.S.-British accord should have been related directly to fear of the Soviet Union; in fact it had a largely autonomous momentum. The British did not decide to develop bombs for fear of the Soviets, and their offer in 1949 was not confined to a period in which Russia would represent the main threat to peace. It represented an act of faith in long-range Anglo-American solidarity, difficult to understand in traditional power terms. The offer did not materially strengthen the U.S. effort as it might be directed against the Soviet Union; it did not add to the credibility of Anglo-American deterrence by creating a new center of nuclear might in the Western alliance. Neither country

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gained greatly from its provisions; only the Anglo-American alliance benefited.

The Suez crisis created another imponderable for traditional explanations of alliance politics. If any conflict of interests ever seemed certain to destroy the bases of alliance, that over Suez might have been expected to do so. The U.S. not only failed to support Britain in the Suez intervention; it resorted to decisive political and economic sanctions to thwart British purposes. Eden pleaded in the face of Russian threats for a reaffirmation of the American nuclear guarantee, but Eisenhower kept silent. Despite recent revelations of the extent of American opposition, we may never know how deep a breach was created between British and American decision-makers. The wound in private must have been far greater than has ever been acknowledged in public. For all the recriminations that inevitably followed Suez, however, British deductions have been largely on the side of placing even more emphasis upon the alliance and sacrificing an independent British posture in the bargain. Macmillan and Wilson were and are partisans of the alliance in a way that even Churchill would not have understood. Traditional theory would have us believe that where interests are contradictory, alliance must give way. In the Suez instance, since the alliance was primary, British interests had to yield.

This is all the more difficult to understand in the light of the moderation of Soviet policy in recent years, the growing power of the West, and the advent of nuclear abundance. As Western military strength has prospered, the requirement—in power terms—for a cohesive Western alliance has become less necessary. British dependence on U.S. military guarantees has also decreased. Suez, then, could well have provided a justification for the fragmentation of the alliance. It did not. From another point of view, the relative shift in the power positions of the U.S. and Britain could have occasioned a reorientation in British thinking about its alliance. When the alliance was forged, both countries were weak militarily; now the United States is enormously stronger. But that power has not repelled—Britain has not sought ties elsewhere to offset American predominance.

Nor is it true that there has been no alternative to an American connection for Britain. Europe has always represented such a choice; but it has been one Britons have been reluctant to select. In economic, military, and other realms, Europe, or even several individual European countries, might offer Britain what it now obtains from the United States in military terms. A European demarche would also be more consistent with the diminution of Soviet hostility and

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the growth in the autarchic power of America. Yet Labour, for all of its left-wing credentials, has been a more fervent proponent of the alliance than have its Conservative colleagues. Britain now seems likely to "go into Europe" only if Europe is outward-looking. It still wants the United States to exert a strong influence in European political and economic evolutions. This scarcely smacks of a British desire to offset or dilute American strength; rather it is an almost transparent effort to augment it.

Nor can the durability of the alliance be attributed to British fidelity alone. The United States has also made powerful contributions to its solidity. The Marshall Plan was an act of unparalleled generosity, even if it also reflected manifold American interests, and Britain has never forgotten it. Even more interesting, however, was the 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act. As we have seen, the revision of the McMahon Act occurred in the context of Sputnik and the need to reinforce Atlantic guarantees. What eventuated, however, was an agreement to give the United Kingdom what had been refused almost a decade earlier: a free exchange of nuclear information. Though the result certainly bolstered NATO, the United States got no significant countervailing benefit from the British. The United Kingdom no longer offered to merge her program with America's or to center her future work in the United States. What the United States did in 1958 was to aid a British national nuclear program. The administration seemed bent on devolving power on its most trusted ally, determined to restore British strength within months of decisive U.S. opposition to the Suez venture.

At present the U.S. continues to provide U-235, presumably for British H-bombs, and at Nassau in December 1962, it offered its most sophisticated strategic weapons system to Great Britain at moderate cost. No one could believe that the U.S. would make such an offer: the French did not believe it, hence the solidarity of Rambouillet. Even influential British officials, after soundings in Washington, refused to believe it. In many respects the Nassau Agreement must represent President Kennedy's personal monument to the strength of the Anglo-American accord. Less directly, it is a final tribute to the alliance policy of Harold Macmillan.[75] According to conventional alliance theory, world powers should not endow lesser states with the

[75] Macmillan had to muster all his persuasive powers to win U.S. agreement on provision of Polaris missiles. See the accounts in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston 1965), 862-66; and Theodore C. Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York 1965), 565-66.

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attributes of strategic independence. Theory dictates otherwise, and thus the Anglo-American relationship again underscores an interconnection that extends far beyond the merely political.

Suez should have been the end of the U.S.-British tie; in fact it was the amphitheater of its rebirth. Britain should not now rely even more heavily on the United States than before; she should be more skeptical and neutral than ever before. On the U.S. part, it is scarcely conceivable that little more than a year after the cleavage of concrete British and American interests was demonstrated for the world to see, the United States should act on the assumption that there could be no difference on fundamental questions. America's 1958 concessions were the sort that one gives only to a proven ally. But at the end of 1956 the U.S. nearly treated Britain as an enemy. On both sides, Suez was not a landmark of failure; it was the beginning of even greater success. All of which goes to prove that between friends the balance of power does not mean very much. Neither the unilateral nor the bilateral possession of nuclear weapons has fragmented the alliance; neither has divided the policies of the two governments. History, tradition, affinity have been crucial to the alliance, rather than peripheral. The relationship is special in one notable sense: the theory of alliances does not explain it, but policy must take account of it.

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GOVERNMENT, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POOR LANDS

By WILFRED MALENBAUM

I

SELF-sustaining economic growth remains a tantalizing and remote goal for the world's poor nations, whose populations comprise some seventy percent of all the world's people. Now halfway through its "Development Decade," the UN has observed that a continuation of past development trends is not something that can be looked upon with favor. There has in fact been a large expansion in industrial production and in overhead capital facilities in these poor lands over the past decade or two. In these years, perhaps for the first time, the percentage growth of the poor lands' total output has significantly exceeded the percentage growth of their population, and this while population growth rates attained record levels. Indeed, the annual rate of expansion of gross domestic product averaged above four percent, not too far from the UN target for the Development Decade.

Why then is there a need for a change rather than for continuation of past trends? One reason is that growth in the poor lands seems to be losing momentum. The rate of increase of total product has declined in successive five-year periods since 1950. Moreover, it now appears ever less likely that these nations will catch up with levels of living in richer lands. Per capita product has increased only about one percent each year in poor lands during 1960-1965; it expanded by four to five percent a year in the economically developed nations. A reversal here—the prerequisite for catching up—cannot be foreseen in any projection of recent development trends.

Recognition of the need for change is spurred by the fact that over the past decades our understanding of the very process of economic development has been changing. Ongoing action programs for growth may simply not be able to generate the expanding growth rates that promise the attainment of self-sustaining growth.

Most of the programs now in operation give priority to finding the resources, knowledge, and skills for modern overhead sectors (power and transportation) and modern industrial sectors (especially heavy, capital-goods industries). In the years since 1950 many poor lands

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have in fact experienced a dramatic expansion in these modern sectors, an expansion achieved with greater ease than had been anticipated. Rapid growth in such modern activities has been expected to induce change in the more traditional activities. Given this spread effect, the entire economy presumably moves ahead, with modern activities permeating the agricultural, extractive, and traditional pursuits dominant in the poor economies. The actual record, however, shows limited spread effects. The poor economies have maintained an unbalanced structure: the old dualism of modern and traditional appears to have been aggravated.

Newer views on the nature of economic development in poor countries hold that such patterns of internal change are not compatible with the continuous expansion of a nation's growth rates. The core development task must be to assure change in the traditional parts of the economy. The program must stir those forces that govern the use of labor and other productive resources in the long-unchanged parts of the nation. The program must serve to integrate traditional and modern parts of the economy. New capital and other resources will continue to be needed, especially in the modern sectors, but action to achieve these has lower priority and indeed may even be a subsidiary of the actions focused on indigenous change in the traditional sectors.

Government has a central role in these new actions, as it must have in any effort to move a long-static economy and society toward modernization. But the nature of government's involvement is different in the two different approaches to economic growth. In most countries, development programs have signaled an extension of the public investment role. Government makes more and more investment directly; it constructs and operates large modern enterprises. In diverse ways it substitutes for what private capital usually does, or what private interests might do were the conditions appropriate. In most poor countries today government has been deliberately expanding the scope of its business activities, in place of private alternatives, because it believes such action best serves the nation's development objectives.

Newer views on the growth process call for a venture by government into generating a more intensive use of the nation's resources. In contrast to the direct and extensive involvement characterized above, indirect influence is stressed. Through imaginative leadership and direction, greater output is to be stimulated in the traditional parts of the economy, which are primarily composed of private enterprises. The aims of this approach are to expand the degree of utilization of resources in these sectors and to tie these large and backward compo-

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nents more closely to the smaller and more modern parts. These tasks of generating greater efficiency and closer integration can be encompassed by the economic function of entrepreneurship. Only government can fill this entrepreneurship role: alternatives in the private sector do not exist to any significant extent.

Can governments in poor countries meet this challenge? The more familiar types of governmental activity for initiating growth have given rise to many questions on the suitability of government for such ventures. In the past, however, inadequate recognition has been given to the central position that change in the traditional sectors has in the overall growth objective. Accepting the new view, government may rise to the challenge.

Without this acceptance, it can be expected that present policies will only continue to aggravate the dualism within poor nations—a development with adverse political as well as adverse economic dimensions. Nations whose leaders can operate only with omnipotent central authority, with limited diffusion of political power, may be able to persist in their preoccupation with modern sectors. Where broad economic and political progress is desired, however, a shift of concern to the problems of the mass of the population may become inevitable.

This article concludes on this theme (IV below). Its primary objective is to establish the need for new approaches to the growth process (II) and for the attendant entrepreneurial role for government (III).

II

What conditions prevail in non-growing economies in contrast to those with a continuous, self-sustaining, upward trend in per capita product? It is the task of growth theory for poor countries to identify these conditions and to indicate the changes that can bring economic expansion. From the literature on this subject, it is possible to distinguish three categories of theory. These three are treated below as transformation, precondition, and interrelation models, respectively.

The transformation model puts primary emphasis on the shortage of factors of production in the poor society—a shortage best expressed as a relative: limited capital, land, skilled workers, or entrepreneurship as against an abundant labor force. This factor imbalance persists because of the vicious circle in which poverty limits savings and any marked growth in capital, which in turn limits training and the supply of skilled workers. In this model, non-growth is characterized as a low-

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level equilibrium position. Resources are being used in the most efficient way, given the prevailing technology and the supply of input factors. Marginal productivity of the relatively abundant factor, labor, is very low, perhaps zero, but this is the economic consequence of the supply position and of the state of technology. In this body of doctrine, it does not signal a significant misuse of resources.

Over time, the nation's own potential will at most permit expansion of output to match population growth; there will be stationary if not declining levels of per capita product. To eliminate the basic cause of non-growth, and to start the trend of per capita product upward, there must be a transfer of resources (capital, knowledge) into the nation from outside, so that factor balance is improved. Indeed, it is often argued that not only must there be such an increment from abroad but there must be one of at least a (calculable) minimum size. This last requirement arises from basic discontinuities that characterize the key dynamic relationships in a poor nation: the capital-output relationship, and the income-savings and the income-demand functions. It also has support from the laws of population growth pertinent to these poor lands. Transformation models—"the big push," "the minimum effort," and "balanced growth"—embrace the most familiar of accepted growth theories.[1] This type of model provides the prime intellectual support for current international programs for development. A good illustration is the large program of foreign assistance to India, a nation considered to need only supplementary capital (of a calculated order of magnitude) in order to be transformed from non-growth to self-sustaining expansion at a rate politically acceptable to its people.

This interpretation of non-growth (factor imbalance, low-level equilibrium) permeates the transformation program for change. Thus real gains in output tend to be identified with the contribution of the limited resource (capital): the development programs emphasize new and modern overhead facilities, new and modern industrial activities. Also, since non-growth is not due to the economic misuse of resources, foreign assistance can be supplied with but minimal conditions upon resource use. With higher levels of supply of capital or technical knowledge, the economy will adjust to a new and higher level of equilibrium.

[1] Many references can be given here. Specific mention needs to be made of P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan's "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," *Economic Journal*, LIII (June 1943), 202-11; and R. R. Nelson's "A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap," *American Economic Review*, XLVI (December 1956), 894-908. W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (London 1955), gives a comprehensive discussion of balanced growth as well as an important analysis of rural-urban interdependence.

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At an appropriate (calculable) time, the economy will have a high enough level of product per capita to be able to escape the vicious circle. Consequently, there is little if any justification for research facilities (in AID, say) devoted to resource use by the recipient country. More supplies and better techniques from abroad will themselves assure that the new product in fact be a maximum product. Of course, much foreign assistance is provided for specific purposes, and thus with some conditions for use. International agencies frequently feel able to impose extensive economic conditions on national budgetary and exchange policy or on specific policy for the particular facility financed. On the whole, however, such economic conditions are best interpreted as consistent with the assumptions of transformation theories.[2]

Notwithstanding the simplicity of the assumptions on which transformation models rest and the convenience of these assumptions for operating purposes, their relevance to today's poor countries can be exaggerated. In fact, the low level of average product in these countries is part of an economic low-level *disequilibrium* position. Capital, labor, and management skills are actually used in a less efficient manner than they could be even with the limited technological knowledge available in the poor country. For reasons that might be identified in the historical evolution of each poor nation, individual and institutional pressures for better allocation of available resources do not emerge clearly in the society. Output is below what it could be even with existing supplies of input factors. Tradition in production techniques, custom as an allocating device, sharing as a consumption criterion, and the like, persist in large parts of the economy. The non-growth conditions are neither inadequate facilities nor inadequate knowledge. Rather, they are psychological and institutional factors, peculiar to each poor nation, which together serve to impede the exercise of the basic economic processes—production, consumption, and investment.

Identifying these factors as the prime conditions of non-growth, precondition models call for changes in these noneconomic elements so that economic factors will be employed in a manner that yields an economic equilibrium with optimum returns. Encompassed here are

[2] The true role of such conditions in the development program is not easy to categorize and is frequently exaggerated. Perhaps it is best to note here that in many respects the various theories of growth can be considered a continuum: one type merges with the next. Even where categories blur on the margins, categorization is helpful.

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stages-of-growth theories with emphasis on a historical, evolutionary sequence of development. Also important are theories in which sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and political scientists—among others—spell out the special conditions these disciplines impose upon expansion.[3] Insofar as the historical sequences or other conditions can be influenced by deliberate action, the need is for programs of training and education, and programs for modernization of outlook on the part of the mass of the population.[4] In these, social gain far outweighs private return; rewards demand long-term horizons. Clearly, here is a type of action in which government plays the leading role. The programs are geared initially to noneconomic ends—to community development in which the focus is on change in the individual; to land reform, not for any short-period expansion of product (which may not in any event occur) but as a spur to incentive and as a symbol of the establishment of a new social order; to monetization, because implicit in it is a new dimension of individual choice. Precondition models do not seek progress through imposing conditions on deficit financing, or on competitive bidding, or on foreign exchange trading, and the like. They focus, again, on noneconomic change.

In marked contrast to the transformation category, precondition models offer small comfort to operating officials in either developing or wealthy nations. Foreign aid is relevant only as it will accelerate the movement away from traditionalism in each poor nation. Its effectiveness may demand extensive involvement by the donor nations in many aspects of the life of poor nations, noneconomic more than economic. This scarcely presents a welcome invitation to either side. Precondition ideas seem to have influenced the formulation of the Alliance for Progress. In some measure, the slow beginnings under that program provide an index of the difficulties of international cooperation aimed at easing fundamental social and institutional deterrents. The pressures of international politics have prompted compro-

[3] Most familiar to economists are W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge 1960); and D. C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton 1961). See also *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 358 (March 1965), *New Nations: The Problems of Political Development*, ed. Karl von Vorys.

[4] A recent report on the progress in rural education and literacy in parts of India provides an interesting illustration of the importance of preconditions themselves in coping with preconditions: ". . . The creation of educational opportunities has not been followed up by their effective utilization. . . . There is now a growing realization among planners in India that the creation of opportunities is not by itself a sufficient condition for development" (P. C. Joshi and M. R. Rao, "Changes in Literacy and Education: Study of Villages in U.P. and Punjab," *Economic Weekly* [July 3, 1965], 1061).

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mise, and for some countries (in some years) capital was provided with essentially no conditions. On the whole, however, resource transfers under the Alliance have served to encourage better use of resources through greater economic efficiency (especially in the tax field but also in foreign trade). There may thus have been some contribution to greater per capita income (notably in 1964 and 1965) but how much social and institutional change—the precondition for self-sustaining growth—has taken place remains still to be seen.[5]

We should note that precondition assumptions, as presented, seem to characterize the entire nation. A more realistic and precise description may facilitate action for social and institutional change. Today's poor countries manifest a wide range of economic organization—from the most modern jet airline to an ox-cart trucker, from an enterprise producing modern synthetic fibers in an air-conditioned factory to spinners with *Ambar charkhas*. The dualism is not only economic and technological; there are social and cultural splits between modern and traditional parts of the society. While the modern is a symbol and perhaps even a symptom of progress, dualism has long persisted in these countries. Indeed, the evidence is that the spread from the modern sector to the much larger traditional sector has been increasing even as the modern sector makes progress.

Recent writings on the problems of bifocal dualistic economies emphasize the gains from greater interdependence of the two components. A successful program for growth must exploit the interrelations within the economy and society. To that end interrelation models point up the role of lead sectors, created imbalances, high linkages, and the like. Their aim is to point to specific development paths in which the right action leads inevitably to a series of related actions, through more-or-less spontaneous reactions. The right action may involve greater use of primarily indigenous resources or the provision of new foreign resources, or both. Or it may be a new law or a new policy on the part of the government. However, the development paths are not obvious ones. They must be discovered in the dynamics of these non-growing economies and societies.[6] Where a large traditional sector seems to

[5] The International Development Bank's *Annual Report of the Social Progress Trust Fund for 1964* (March 1965) states that the majority of the countries had initiated "important legal and institutional improvements," but that the limited results "represent only the first stage of the great task that must be carried out . . ." (p. 91).

[6] In much of the literature on what we here term interrelation models, the interdependence of input-output tables is presented as a classic illustration of sequences of actions and reactions. Unfortunately, the matrices for poor countries provide poor guides. The economies are in a state of disequilibrium, so that the coefficients do not

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persist even as the modern sector grows, theory now suggests that overall progress can be achieved only after the two parts of the economy have somehow become integrated.

Little progress of this sort has been taking place in today's developing lands. Consonant with the ideas of transformation models, initial emphasis has been placed on new activities of a modern type. After all, these are the critical and difficult areas. There has been marked and fairly straightforward progress in modern activities, but there has been only limited progress toward self-sustaining growth in the overall economy. The traditional sector has lagged badly—at times even with declining output per man. This has detracted from progress in the modern sector. In most of the poor lands, the nation's overall economic structure has become more unbalanced and the outlook for continuous growth remains uncertain. The major need, therefore, is now increasingly being identified in the lagging traditional component of the economy, including what is usually its largest part, agriculture. In general, this means that interrelation models are the appropriate tools for overall development. Action for growth must seek out development paths that will succeed in bringing the modern and traditional components of the economy more closely together.

On logical grounds, the opportunities here seem large. One might expect that an agriculture with low levels of productivity would soon respond to the need for greater agricultural product elsewhere in the economy. On the one hand, there appear to be indigenous techniques that could contribute to higher per acre yields, frequently at lower costs per unit because of the availability of abundant labor inputs which from an economic point of view seem to be "free." On the other hand, there is modern industry which does not utilize its fixed capital fully because of limited demand for its product. A more efficient agriculture could, it would seem, provide raw materials and additional markets. Soon there could be further complementarities through demands for additional labor outside the rural areas and additional product from industry. Perhaps less obvious but equally real are the opportunities to expand output in the traditional sector for greater consumption in that sector where levels of living are very low. More food, more clothing, more household equipment, cleaner water,

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measure functional relations. This is true in some degree within the modern industry sector; it is particularly true for the modern-traditional interdependence. The best single reference here is, of course, A. O. Hirschman's *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven 1958). Basic as this outstanding study is to the idea of interrelations within an economy, it does not emphasize the chasm between modern and traditional parts of a poor nation.

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cleaner villages are all products of traditional activities in villages; their output can be expanded with available knowledge and resources, if villagers would strive toward new consumption horizons. Related also are often-noted opportunities for the expansion of local overhead facilities, such as better roads, better irrigation, better power. In many cases these can be expanded even from available knowledge and resources; over a period of time they can contribute to output not only in the traditional sectors but in the modern parts of the economy too. Villagers who consume more and a greater variety of goods will eventually become better customers for products of the modern sector.

Yet despite the logic of such interdependence, the gains do not materialize in any significant degree; dualism persists. Even where there are marked year-to-year variations in crop output as a result of weather, surpluses and shortages are absorbed without stimulating the logical economic adjustment. Similarly, poor countries with large export sectors experience marked changes in foreign purchasing power without long-time adjustment in their dualistic structures. The underlying reasons are complex. They are rooted in a psychological and institutional pattern that serves to negate what appear to be strong economic stimuli; ways of life long accustomed to shifts between abundance and scarcity do not change easily. The marginal propensity to consume may actually differ little from the average; changes in year-end stocks (savings) show more marked variations than does consumption. Where moneylenders have long provided the channels of collection, exchange, distribution, and financing, the stimuli of one sector upon the other are dulled as they are transferred through the moneylender with his interest in the entire composite of these varied functions. Nor should it be surprising that, in these circumstances, the provision through foreign aid of additional goods or foreign exchange does not spark great change—nor that the long-time patterns of poverty are apparently little responsive to programs of social reform.

What are needed are more specific programs in the traditional parts of the economy, directed at the social and institutional deterrents to economic change, but with constant attention to changes that will expand the ties to the modern sector. Interrelations, not preconditions alone, must be stressed. The point of action in most cases will be directly in the traditional parts of the economy, with changes that will push outward to the modern parts. The reverse sequence may be effective for some types of action in the modern sector (new processing facilities for agricultural products, say) but broad pull effects from

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modern to traditional are not very promising given the deterrents to change in traditional parts of the poor economies.

The process of generating economic expansion over the next decade is not essentially mechanical nor automatic nor preordained. Transfer of resources from the wealthy to the poor nations, with accompanying technological information, will not generate a course of continuous growth. There is no straightforward evolutionary path that the poor nations can mount, nor any general government policy on non-economic matters, which will bring a popular and organized response for growth. Rather, the modern tasks of growth are first tasks of research and discovery: What action patterns promise the largest spread effects over both sectors of poor nations? There are then tasks of implementation in which proposed actions are made relevant to the old and traditional patterns. The means of binding the dual components of a non-growing economy remain elusive, but they are nonetheless essential. Somehow or other, the planners and the doers in poor lands must see that these tasks are accomplished.

III

The objective for the planners in today's poor countries is clear: the dual nature of the economy is to be shifted toward a greater unity in which stimuli for economic change have impact throughout the structure. There is also a clear guiding principle for action: programs in the traditional sector warrant special attention. Under present conditions new development in the modern parts of the poor economy exercises limited pulls upon the extensive traditional parts of the nation. In the economic disequilibrium of the poor economy, resources can be better utilized to produce more goods by familiar as well as new methods. Insofar as possible, this expansion in the traditional sectors should enhance opportunities for closer ties with the modern parts of the economy.

There is little that is automatic in this assignment. The premium is on imaginative approaches; preliminary results need constant appraisal as guides to further policy and action. In this regard one should recall that the literature of economic growth has long identified such novel discontinuous changes with an entrepreneurial function. More than half a century back, Schumpeter formulated the entrepreneurial role as an essential economic element in any explanation of a real dynamic world.[7] While the rigorous tools of neoclassical general theory

[7] J. A. Schumpeter's *Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung* was published in 1911. In his preface to the first English edition (*The Theory of Economic Develop-*

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might suffice to explain "mere growth of the economy as shown by the growth of the population and wealth," the entrepreneur alone could serve the real world's need to live with major "changes in the mentality of economic men, and in the area of the civilised world, in social organisation, in political constellations, in productive technique, and so forth."

Schumpeter himself was preoccupied with the growth problems of the rich West: backward societies seemed beyond his purview.[8] And he tended to identify his entrepreneur with the private sector of the economy. To him, the expanding role of the public sector after 1945 signified a reduced role for his entrepreneur. For whatever reasons—the importance of public activity in the modern development problem, the extent to which technology can now be borrowed from the advanced countries—Schumpeter's entrepreneur has scarcely found a central position in the doctrines and programs for economic change in today's poor areas.[9] Where primary emphasis is placed upon the shortage explanation of persistent non-growth as in transformation models, or upon the need for evolutionary change as in precondition models, the entrepreneur may indeed have a minor role. But this is not the case if development tasks in fact require interrelation models.

Two attributes of Schumpeter's concept are of particular relevance in this regard. First, the entrepreneur functions primarily through the better use of existing resources, bargained away from their present commitment in the circular flow of the pre-growth, albeit moving, equilibrium. This function emphasizes the role of indigenous bank- (or government-) created credit; it does not depend on loans and grants from abroad, used for purchases abroad to supplement in-

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ment [Cambridge, Mass., 1934], trans. Redvers Opie), Schumpeter states that "some of the ideas . . . go back as far as 1907; all of them had been worked out by 1909." In *The Schumpeterian System* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), Richard V. Clemence and Francis S. Doody observe, "His youthful vision, first reduced to a comprehensive model in 1911, has since been elaborated and refined, but it has been altered in no essential respect" through his lifetime.

[8] Nonetheless, he does refer to the case "seen to-day [*circa* 1910] in the economic life of those nations . . . whom the development of the last century has not yet completely drawn into its stream, for example, in the economy of the Central European peasant. This peasant 'calculates'; there is no deficiency of the 'economic way of thinking' in him. Yet he cannot take a step out of the beaten path; his economy has not changed at all for centuries. . . . Why? Because the choice of new methods is not simply an element in the concept of rational economic action, nor a matter of course, but a distinct process which stands in need of special explanation" (*Theory of Economic Development*, 80, footnote).

[9] Douglas Rimmer, in "Schumpeter and the Underdeveloped Countries," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXV (August 1961), 422-50, is concerned with precisely this problem. He argues the appropriateness of Schumpeter's analysis to the modern problem.

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digenous supplies. Schumpeter did have in mind that the change was imposed upon a state of equilibrium, with optimum resource use. His argument would be strengthened in the actual state of disequilibrium, where better use of resources would in itself bring change. Second, the entrepreneur himself arises from the existing society. The entrepreneur is a deviant, one who pays a social price for bringing change to old and accepted ways. He confronts opposition "in groups threatened by the innovation, then in the difficulty in finding the necessary cooperation, finally in the difficulty in winning over consumers; . . . surmounting this opposition is always a special kind of task which does not exist in the customary course of life. . . ." Where the customary course of life tolerates the persistence of a dual structure despite the gains from greater integration, Schumpeter's view that "development consists primarily in employing existing resources in a different way" is particularly relevant.[10] It is just these tasks that Schumpeter felt his entrepreneur could meet.

From Schumpeter's social order, the necessary individuals emerged conveniently at the appropriate time. In his view of history, the social and psychological state of a nation—and its political order—yielded the right individual when he was needed to spark a discontinuity in the old pattern, and to establish the new level to which the old adapts. Today has the kernel of tomorrow, for it yields "at every instant that state which will of itself determine the next one. . . ."[11] Professor Schumpeter subscribed to the conditions assumed in the classical multidisciplinary economics of Smith and Marx, rather than to those in the neoclassical economies of Walras and Pareto. In the dynamic process of economic development it is less the supply and demand for goods and services than the pressures and drives of the social order, and the dynamics of interpersonal and group relations, which constitute the basic source of economic foresight and leadership.

Unfortunately this is not the real world, and especially is it not the world of today's poor countries. If this entrepreneurial role is to be filled, some individuals must be alerted to the task. Who? And how? Entrepreneurial talent is well rewarded in the private sector even of poor countries. Moreover, contrary to what is frequently assumed, the supply of this talent has actually not been so meager as to constitute a deterrent to the expansion of industries and of various services. Where opportunity exists, indigenous businessmen appear—able, apparently, to cope with the appropriate scale of effort. The scope for such "in-

[10] *Theory of Economic Development*, chap. 2, *passim*.
[11] *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 43.

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dustrial" entrepreneurs remains large in poor countries, yet we have seen that industrial expansion is not meeting today's development needs. Modern sectors grow apace, in poor country after poor country; for this growth, the private entrepreneur deserves a considerable share of the credit. But industrial progress is itself contributing to greater dualism in the economic structure. Integration of the dual components needs to be fostered. Private entrepreneurs find ample scope and ample returns for their efforts without assuming this goal. Indeed, there is little inducement for them to devote energy and resources to change in the traditional sectors. If this is to be done, only government can assume responsibility with whatever cooperation it can elicit from private entrepreneurs.

The entrepreneurial role is different from the business-type role government has been playing in poor countries. As is well known, the latter has been expanding. Beyond the usual public activities concerned with assuring a reasonable amount of stability and providing social overhead capital, the public sector now operates business enterprises in steel, cement, chemicals, and machinery, among many others, as well as utilities for transport and power. In addition to ideological pressures to this end, there has also been the basic economic philosophy of development through transformation models. This holds that sufficient expansion through new investment in modern activities will spread its influence throughout the nation. While this modern effort has been considered to be the main instrument for change in the traditional parts of the economy, government has also been engaged on a large scale in agriculture, and frequently in small-scale service and manufacturing enterprises. On the whole, however, these latter categories have been justified primarily on social grounds as relief measures. The commitment of scarce capital and other resources to them—however necessary for humanitarian and political reasons—has constituted a diversion from the economic, more efficient, allocation of these resources to modern activities. Direct programs in the traditional sectors have thus not been considered as essential economic ingredients for the emergence of a self-sustaining state of growth.

This bundle of views and programs can be considered as falling within the expanding business-type role of government. In this role, basically the government believes the scope of its economic operations must be enlarged, especially through their extension into directly productive ventures. The role can be measured by the growth of public investment, absolutely and relative to the growth of private investment. This extensive role of government can be contrasted with an

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intensive role, in which public officials are to be primarily concerned with resource use throughout the economy, with whatever specific actions this calls for on the part of the public or private groups.[12] To fill this intensive role, government needs leadership, devotion, and ingenuity. Ways must be discovered to mesh implicit complementarities of traditional and modern parts of the economy and the potentials of both government and private institutions. Expansion occurs through new efforts and new inputs primarily elicited from resources already committed in the economy. In this intensive activity, government plays an entrepreneurial role.

In recent years, governments in poor nations have been criticized for overextending their commitments in the economic areas. The tasks assumed have exceeded the capacities of the governmental bureaucracy; activities have been extended in directions that could have been pursued, at least as successfully, through nongovernmental channels.[13] Whether governments will fare better in the intensive types of action cannot be foretold. There is little operational experience. It will come only when there is recognition that change must be initiated in traditional sectors, and that only with such change can sustained progress in the modern sectors and in the overall economy be anticipated.

The specific tasks that will be required of government are certainly very different from those required under business-type operations. At the minimum there will be need for many kinds of actions that are now familiar—in the provision of education, of various types of technical training, and of efficient conduct of familiar services of supply. But the much more important addition is imaginative and committed leadership. Government needs to convince the people in the traditional sector that they and their economic activity are of fundamental importance to the national effort, that leadership at all layers throughout the land is identified with their efforts. In the constant search for new ways to expand output per man, for new opportunities to tie traditional and modern together, government needs flexibility to embark on alternative courses of action, and objectivity to appraise actual performance as a guide for new types of action.

The appropriate model for economic growth requires this posture and performance on the part of officials. While private activity plays

[12] For an elaboration of these two approaches in one country, see my "The Role of Government in India's Third Five-Year Plan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VIII (April 1960), 225-36.

[13] See, for example, Andrew M. Watson and Joel B. Dirlam, "The Impact of Underdevelopment on Economic Planning," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXIX (May 1965), 183-94.

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an important role in it, there can be no private alternatives to government leadership, especially in the early years. A prerequisite for government's doing well in this entrepreneurial function is the conviction on the part of government that this is the route to self-sustaining economic growth.

IV

Will leadership for economic affairs in poor lands recognize this challenge? Elite groups in poor lands tend to identify with their intellectual peers in rich lands. Both prefer to wrestle with the complex problems of a modern economy and society, where traditional patterns and institutional deterrents play a minor, or at least a different, role from that which underlies the dualistic structure of poor nations. The recent emergence of the United States "poverty" programs has spurred a new interest in backward sections of our nation on the part of intellectual and imaginative leadership. New actions are being taken both directly to expand output from the resources in these areas and to create improved linkages to the more dynamic parts of the country—basic tasks of interrelation models. Such programs are being pursued by government in the United States, despite the fact that poor-area problems have a relatively small place in the total economy. From a psychological point of view, it seems easier for elite groups in the wealthy lands to shift to a direct preoccupation with problems of mass poverty than it is for the relatively small elite groups in underdeveloped areas to do so. This may help explain the effectiveness abroad of the Peace Corps. One might perhaps also observe that, rather than the domestic bureaucracy, foreign organizations (the Ford Foundation, the Agency for International Development, and other rich-nation development groups) seem to have played a leading role in programs for change in traditional sectors of poor nations. By and large, the drives for rural change remain foreign; national leadership continues to be preoccupied with the tasks of growth directly in the modern sectors.

Will the developing situation in poor lands in itself encourage some shift in leadership attitudes toward a new type of program? One would think that actual economic growth experience in most poor countries would spur such a shift. Existing programs do not seem to be moving the countries to self-sustaining growth. Even relatively wealthy underdeveloped lands, as in Latin American, have long continued to expand their average output per person without achieving paths of growth that sustain themselves. Also, one might give credit for Communist China's achievements in economic growth to its recog-

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nition of the need to pursue an interrelation model for development. This was the government's policy in the early years of its plans; after the abortive drive for industrialization during 1958-1961, policy now seems again to be stimulating traditional activities and integrating them more closely with the modern. There is thus both experience and theory to support the view that a persistent dualistic structure is inimical to economic progress, that it must be changed by pertinent action in the poorer parts of the nation.

Be all this as it may, the truth remains that change in the modern sector is marked and dramatic. In many ways the entire day-to-day preoccupation of governmental elites can focus on new devices and installations of a modern type. The failure of these changes to spark broad-based growth can go long unnoticed. Growth in the modern sector easily gives the illusion of overall progress. At best, then, however much reality supports the basic proposition that a shift in emphasis is necessary, economic events may themselves fail to bring that lesson home. Or they may do so only after a long time.

Political forces in the poor country can provide greater compulsions for change in leadership views. Where popular elections play a role in the political process, and especially where the spread of education has raised literacy rates, it becomes more difficult for government to devote its development efforts primarily to modern parts of the economy. This, plus growing pressure from rich nations, explains the new emphasis now being placed upon plans for agricultural improvement in underdeveloped areas of the world. How real these efforts are remains to be seen. Moreover, the plans emphasize a relative shift of new investment into agriculture and, in lesser degree, into other rural activities. Apart again from occasional foreign-inspired operations, they reflect little recognition of the need for the entrepreneurial role. "Orderly" political processes may thus be moving leadership away from its earlier concentrations in development programs, but there is little evidence of the consequent emergence of effective action programs in traditional parts of the economy. On the other side, there is much evidence today of discontinuity in political change. The growing disparities within poor nations, the extreme hardships of the bulk of the population—even as average output per person expands—contribute to dissatisfaction with existing leadership. This dissatisfaction, boiling over into political change, brings new regimes but scarcely assures a sound development effort.

A nation's state of economic progress serves as an index over time of its state of political development. Action by government is neces-

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sary if economic growth in poor lands is to be achieved. But only the right action program, one in which government assumes an entrepreneurial role in an interrelation model for growth, will suffice to that end. Thus, both political progress and economic progress ride upon the readiness of leaders in poor countries to accept new types of responsibilities for growth.

Where political progress is sought along democratic lines, parallels should be noted between economic gains from closer integration of the economy and political gains from broader participation of different sectors and groups in the overall political process. On the other side, those underdeveloped nations where government has no democratic pretensions and can be unmindful of popular will can still afford to accept present trends toward more accentuated dualism. However, with continuation of these trends such nations can have economic growth only insofar as they have continuous foreign assistance. This may serve as an alternative to the domestic measures for basic change in the economy. But continuous foreign aid and continued dualism mean no self-sustaining economic development.

Altogether there are many reasons for nations, developed and developing, to encourage new approaches to the tasks of progress in poor nations. Modernization can take root only where the traditional sectors are stirring. Governmental programs must disturb—and bind.

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Research Notes

THE LOGIC OF COMPARISON

A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems

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DURING the last ten years the study of comparative politics has undergone a methodological revolution. Reacting against the static, formalistic, "country-by-country" approach of earlier students of foreign governments, numerous contemporary political scientists have endeavored to create a more dynamic, empirically interpreted, and truly comparative method of analysis.[1] This group of political scientists makes three general assumptions concerning the new approach. First, it assumes that contemporary political analysis must confront the problem of developing cooperative research and, in some cases, a shared conceptual framework. This assumption sometimes manifests itself as a self-conscious interdisciplinary concern. Of course, the rubric "cooperative research" covers a wide variety of specific proposals and is intended only to summarize the general problem that these proposals raise.[2] Second, this new school of analysis, with its heightened consciousness of the demands of scientific method, exhibits

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[1] General surveys of the extensive literature which are not directly concerned with the logical issues discussed here but which document this revolution may be found in Sigmund Neumann, "Comparative Politics: A Half-Century Appraisal," *Journal of Politics*, XIX (August 1957), 369-90; Neumann, "The Comparative Study of Politics," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, I (January 1959), 105-12; Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York 1963), 3-32; and in the perceptive, critical article by Leslie Wolf-Phillips, "Metapolitics: Reflections on a 'Methodological Revolution,'" *Political Studies*, XII (October 1964), 362-69.

[2] See Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 391; Almond, "Research in Comparative Politics: Plans of a New Council Committee," Social Science Research Council, *Items*, VIII (March 1954), 2; Almond, Taylor Cole, and Roy C. Macridis, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (December 1955), 1048; H. B. Jacobini, "The Study of Comparative Government," *Social Science*, XXX (January 1955), 25; Gunnar Heckscher, *The Study of Comparative Government and Politics* (London 1957), 48, 51; Douglas Oliver and Walter B. Miller, "Suggestions for a More Systematic Method of Comparing Political Units," *American Anthropologist*, LVII (February 1955), 118-19.

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a special concern for the problem of concept formation. More specifically one notes in many of its articles an attempt to develop concepts that would (1) facilitate systematic comparison across cultures, (2) permit more abstract analysis, the kind of analysis that avoids mere description and ambiguous commonsense usage, not only across but within a given culture, and (3) apply to all, or almost all, extant polities.[3] Third, the group assumes that there is such a thing as a political system, and that it is possible to make comparisons among abstract types of political systems.[4] What is involved in the term "system" has been explicated by Bergmann, who uses it to refer to a group of entities sufficiently close to each other to affect each other's motion or behavior, and sufficiently far away from all others not to be so affected by them. These "objects" must be in a limited area and must remain identifiable as a group through an appreciable length of time.[5] Another way of putting it is that a set of phenomena can be considered as constituting a system "when it can be shown that certain of their properties or their inter-relationships (1) vary independently, and (2) vary within definable limits."[6]

Proponents of this third assumption also tend to view "structural-functional analysis" as an integral element of the "systems approach,"[7] and it is obvious why this should be so when Bergmann's definition

[3] For the advocacy of cross-cultural generalization, see Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," 391-92; Almond, "Research in Comparative Politics," 2; Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review*, LII (March 1958), 281; Neumann, "Comparative Politics: A Half-Century Appraisal," 383, 384, 387; Oliver and Miller, 118-20; Dankwart A. Rustow, "New Horizons for Comparative Politics," *World Politics*, IX (July 1957), 546; Gideon Sjoberg, "The Comparative Method in the Social Sciences," *Philosophy of Science*, XXII (April 1955), 107. This last article is valuable in its stress on the necessity of establishing operational procedures to relate abstract categories to empirical reality. Sjoberg emphasizes that both Kluckhohn and Parsons, fountainheads of the new approach, failed to do this and as a result their concepts have been subject to various interpretations. See also Roy C. Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (New York 1955), 3; Almond, Cole, and Macridis, 1043; and esp. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 3-64; and Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), 43-76, in which a conceptual framework and some related methods of cross-cultural, systematic comparative inquiry are made explicit. A growing concern for the inclusion of developing systems is evidenced in Almond's "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 183-214.

[4] See Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," 392; Almond and Coleman, 5-9; David Easton, *The Political System* (New York 1953); and Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), 384.

[5] Gustav Bergmann, *Philosophy of Science* (Madison 1957), 92, 94-95.

[6] T. M. Newcomb, "Communicative Behavior," in Roland Young, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston 1959), 246.

[7] See Almond, "Comparative Study of Interest Groups," 270, 281; Almond and Coleman, esp. 7, 9-17; David Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (November 1958), 221-37.

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of "system" is kept in mind. The term "functionalism," so often used by proponents of "systems analysis," originally had a mathematical meaning—that is, it meant that if one element in a given system varies, a second element varies along with it. The second element is then a "function" of the first. However, many political scientists, like anthropologists, use "function" merely to refer to the "job" or "activity" performed by a given institution in a particular society. The "formal function," for example, of a political party may be to nominate and campaign for candidates, while the "informal, or latent, function" of the party may be to reduce the tensions of class conflict or improve the social mobility of particular immigrants. This second interpretation of "functionalism," then, need not imply any attempt to discover systematic functional variations in the mathematical sense.[8]

Aside from these three general assumptions concerning the new approach to comparative analysis, the only common denominator these writers share which makes it possible to speak of them as a new school of thought in comparative studies is their common rejection of the older, country-by-country, formalistic approach to the study of foreign politics. However, most members of the school, such as Jacobini, MacKenzie, Neumann, Heckscher, and Rustow, do not seem to be interested in going on from this point actually to develop a systematic conceptual framework for more adequate comparative analysis. They are not concerned with methodology *per se*, but with such matters as practical proposals for the organization of interdisciplinary research teams.[9]

The specific problem that interests us in this research note is an aspect of the problem of concept formation, the problem of developing concepts that would facilitate systematic cross-cultural comparison. Only a few members of the "new approach" to comparative studies, such as Almond, Apter, Coleman, and Verba, seem to be concerned about moving ahead actually to construct conceptual frameworks suitable for truly comparative analysis. In this article we refer to their works for illustrative purposes; but it is not our intention to develop full-scale critiques of their respective frameworks. Our primary concern is to clarify the basic logical requirements of classification and compari-

[8] See Almond, "Comparative Study of Interest Groups," 270; Apter, 221; Almond and Coleman, 3-64.

[9] See Jacobini, "Study of Comparative Government," 23-25; W. J. M. MacKenzie, "Pressure Groups: The Conceptual Framework," *Political Studies*, III (October 1955), 247-55; Neumann, "Comparative Politics: A Half-Century Appraisal"; Heckscher, *Study of Comparative Government and Politics*; Rustow; and Macridis, in which a full-scale critique of the traditional, formal approach is developed.

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son, on the assumption that clarity and simplicity on this level of abstraction can do nothing but further the development of comparative methodology in general, regardless of which substantive framework may appear most fruitful.

I. Conceptual Frameworks, Theories, and Classification: Their Relationship to Comparison

Phrases such as "decision-making," "interest groups," and "functionalism," which are so commonly found in general social analyses, all refer to basic "approaches" to the study of social and political phenomena; that is, they are expressions symbolizing alternative foci of scholarly interest. They are not terms that refer to any of the procedures (logical or operational) basic to scientific method. Their purpose is to represent research interests, not to serve as conceptual tools in methodological analysis.

Furthermore, in general scientific methodology the phrases "conceptual framework" or "frame of reference" are used, if they are used at all, to refer to "a set of more or less interrelated definitions."[10] Referring to a specific and coherent set of concepts, a "conceptual framework" is more significant than the above "approaches," but it too is not a method. It should be stressed that a "conceptual framework" contains only definitions. As Zetterberg points out, this is what distinguishes a "frame of reference" from a theory. A theory is a system of interrelated definitions *and empirically interpreted hypotheses*. The entire corpus of literature produced by the "social action theorists" is a "frame of reference" rather than a theory, and the derivative efforts of some of the political scientists under discussion suffer from the same defect. What is needed is a set of hypotheses expressed in a testable form and a series of verifying studies designed to test those hypotheses. Too much emphasis on definitions only leads to sterile verbalism, to the production of "conceptual frameworks" as opposed to theories.

Comparison, however, is a basic methodological concept, not merely a convenient term vaguely symbolizing the focus of one's research interests. Comparison, that is, is a form of measurement, a method. It is directly related to, and just two steps beyond, the most primitive scientific method—observation. Science seeks to know what exists, and to know the relationships among the innumerable elements of what exists; and for that purpose it must know what is not, or what is not

[10] This usage follows Hans L. Zetterberg, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology* (New York 1954), 10.

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this but that—in short, science must first of all discriminate. This is the ultimate ground of all scientific measurement, from the simplest procedures of empirical classification based on observation, to comparison, and finally to the complex constructions of quantitative theory.

Thus, perceptual discrimination can be thought of as the most primitive type of measurement and its result is some kind of classification. Classification is the basic type of concept-formation in science. Neither comparison (nonmetrical ordering) nor measurement proper can take place without it. A significant point about Almond's analytical efforts is that he consciously takes up the problem of classification and deals as well with some specific criteria of comparison. Thus, his ideas provide useful illustrations of the general logical requirements of adequate classification and comparison.

II. The Logical Criteria of Classification

According to Hempel, a classification of the objects in a given domain D (such as human societies, chemical compounds, or, let us say, "all political systems operative in the world today") is accomplished by laying down a set of two or more criteria such that every element of D satisfies exactly one of those criteria. "Each criterion determines a certain class, namely, the class of all objects in D which satisfy the criterion. And if indeed each object in D satisfies exactly one of the criteria, then *the classes thus determined are mutually exclusive, and they are jointly exhaustive of D.*"[11]

Let us apply this to Almond's classification of political systems in order to see what this principle entails. Here, D equals all operative political systems; and these are divided into the Anglo-American (including some Commonwealth states), the Continental European (excluding the Scandinavian states and the Low Countries), the preindustrial or partially industrialized systems outside of the European-American area, and the totalitarian systems.[12]

Even on a *prima facie* basis this is a confused classification. The first two categories are based on criteria of geographic location and area.

[11] Carl G. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago 1952), 51, italics added.

[12] The seven broad classes of political systems which Almond has utilized in his writings since 1960 are an expansion of this earlier four-part classification. Furthermore, the underlying criteria of the earlier classification have never been explicitly rejected. Indeed, the earlier categories have been recognized by Almond as the basis or source of the later framework ("Political Systems and Political Change," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VI [June 1963], 10, n. 7). Nevertheless, in actuality the seven-class framework is more suited to support adequate comparative analysis. See footnote 16 below.

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The third is apparently based on economic criteria and is ambiguous in including the term "partially." This term is a "more or less" concept that should be used in comparison rather than the "either/or" type of concept that is used in classification. At the classificatory stage in scientific analysis "more or less" concepts have no place. The last category—totalitarian—is apparently based on political and social criteria that are only hinted at. Now Almond does not come out and specify that these *are* his criteria of classification; we have to infer them from the titles and descriptions he gives of each of his groups of states. This is of no great concern, however, since our purpose is to explicate the requirements of the principle rather than to criticize Almond's early framework as such. But if our inferences are correct, it is obvious that the criteria utilized for classification are of different dimensions—each class is discriminated from the others on the basis of varying criteria.

Basing a classification of "objects" in a given domain upon a series of criteria that vary in this manner fails to satisfy the logical requirements of classification, for it fails to produce a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of classes for the domain under consideration. The existence of what we might call artificial qualifiers (e.g., the exclusion from the Continental European class of Scandinavia and the Low Countries) in Almond's classification scheme is probably a symptom of this inadequacy. *Logically*, of course, a political system in the Continental European *area* might well have a totalitarian *political structure*. The logical criteria manifestly do not exclude each other. And, again at least logically, both a European *area* system and a totalitarian *political* system might have a partially industrialized economy, although Almond uses the economic dimension to isolate a distinct type of political system.

Because in any empirical science the first step (after observation) that must be taken before comparison or measurement can be made is classification, and this classification is logically an "either/or" procedure, we may conclude that Almond is *not comparing* the Anglo-American political system, with, say, the totalitarian on this level of his conceptual framework. All he is doing is attempting to classify properly "all political systems operative in the world today" (the domain of "objects"). Adequately done, this is the correct *initial* step to take in developing a conceptual framework that is eventually to be made suitable for comparative analysis. In taking this step, however, one should ensure that the basic categories measure up to the general standards of classification as outlined.

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III. The Logical Criteria of Comparison

Comparison can only be made after classification has been completed. Hempel has pointed out that "a classificatory concept represents . . . a characteristic which any object in the domain under consideration must either have or lack; if its meaning is precise, it divides the domain into two classes separated by a sharp boundary line. Science uses concepts of this kind largely, though not exclusively, for the description of observational findings and for the formulation of initial, and often crude, empirical generalizations." He goes on to say that "with growing emphasis on a more subtle and theoretically fruitful conceptual apparatus, classificatory concepts tend to be replaced by other types, which make it possible to deal with characteristics capable of gradations. In contrast to the 'either . . . or' character of classificatory concepts, these alternative types allow for a 'more or less': each of them provides for a gradual transition from cases where the characteristic it represents is nearly or entirely absent to others where it is very marked. There are two major types of such concepts which are used in science: comparative and quantitative concepts."[13]

Now the idea of "more or less" of an attribute may be expressed in quantitative terms, but such a distinction may also be made without the use of numerical values, and this is the problem of special concern to us.

The distinction is made, for example, in mineralogy "when the classificatory terms 'hard,' 'soft,' etc., are replaced by . . . the expressions 'x is as hard as y' and 'x is less hard than y'—both of which are defined by means of the scratch test. These two concepts allow for a comparison of any two pieces of mineral in regard to their relative hardness, and they thus determine an ordering of all pieces of mineral according to increasing hardness; but they do not introduce or presuppose any numerical measure of hardness."[14]

Keeping in mind the basic nature of the nonmetrical ordering that is essential to comparison in general, as illustrated in the example taken from mineralogy, let us outline the logical criteria of comparison using the concept of political consensus, which is similar to Almond's notion of a homogeneous political culture. Now, in order to establish

[13] P. 54. It has been suggested, however, that in some cases a "nominalist typology" rather than a proper classificatory scheme might satisfy certain research needs. While in practice this may be adequate in the earliest stages of inquiry, logically it cannot serve as the basis of truly comparative analysis. Ultimately, an adequate scheme of classification must be developed. See Michael Haas, "Comparative Analysis," *Western Political Quarterly*, XV (June 1962), 297-98.

[14] Hempel, 55.

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a comparative concept of consensus so that we may use it in comparing two or more states of the class D (a certain number of political systems or states), criteria must be used which specify for any two elements or objects of D (i.e., states) whether they have an equal degree of consensus, and if they do not, which of them exhibits less consensus. That is, we must arrange *all* the elements or political systems in D in an order of *precedence* and *coincidence* (P and C, respectively) in order to achieve the nonmetrical ordering of true comparison.

This may be logically formulated as follows:[15]

x, y, and z = any elements of D (i.e., any of the objects—in our case, political states—to which the comparative concept—consensus—characterized by C and P is to be applicable).

C is transitive	(whenever x stands in C to y and y stands in C to z, then x stands in C to z)
C is symmetric	(whenever x stands in C to y, then y stands in C to x)
C is reflexive	(any object x stands in C to itself)
P is transitive	(whenever x stands in P to y and y stands in P to z, then x stands in P to z)
P is C-irreflexive	(if x stands in C to y, then x does not stand in P to y)
P is C-connected	(if x does not stand in C to y, then x stands in P to y or y stands in P to x)

It must be stressed that the last two conditions together amount to the requirement that any two elements of D must be comparable in regard to the attribute under consideration; that is, they must either have it to the same extent, or one must have it to a lesser extent than the other. In short, *two objects being compared must be of the same class*—they must either *have* an attribute or *not. If* they have it, and *only* if they have it, may they be compared as to which has it more and which has it less.

Some of the difficulties in applying these logical criteria of comparison can be illustrated through partial reference to Almond's first and last types of political system, the Anglo-American and the totalitarian. Now according to our analysis thus far, the particular elements that make up these variations of the class "political system" should share, to a greater or lesser extent, common attributes. This is

[15] This is in accord with Hempel's more general and complex analysis (p. 59).

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what makes them comparable. And all of the systems together should be mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive, of the domain "all operative political systems."

The primary logical weakness of Almond's early attempt to move to the truly comparative level of analysis lies in the fact that his defined types do not have such common dimensions. In terms of the explicit and implicit definitions underlying his typology, the totalitarian type does not exhibit the same attributes as the Anglo-American systems. Because they do not have the same dimensions we cannot say that they have "more or less" of any particular dimension.[16]

A specific illustration of this point may be found in Almond's use of the criterion of "cultural homogeneity," which he states is characteristic of Anglo-American political systems. In discussing totalitarian political culture, Almond asserts that there is only apparent homogeneity. "Since there are no voluntary associations, and political communication is controlled from the center, it is impossible to judge in any accurate way the extent to which there is a positive acceptance of the totalitarian order."[17] True, he does suggest that no political culture can be completely nonconsensual; however, totalitarian consensus is conceived in terms of apathy, whereas Almond defines consensus in Anglo-American political culture in terms of the existence of voluntary associations and political communication.

Thus we are still apparently left with two distinct dimensions. The last requirement of the logic of comparison (P is C-connected) does not hold if we try to compare the totalitarian and the Anglo-American systems in regard to consensus. That is, in terms of Almond's scheme, logically it would not be possible to conclude that if the Soviet Union does not have coincident consensus with Great Britain, it is either greater or less than Great Britain in respect of this dimension. He does not specify the criteria, *which can be found in both countries*, by

[16] This is true of the early system only, which we are using for illustrative purposes. Under the influence of functionalism, Almond has developed a framework actually, though not consciously, based on the assumption that political systems, to be compared, must have characteristics in common. See Almond and Coleman, 11-17. All political systems are assumed to have input functions, such as political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication, as well as output functions, such as rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication. The functional categories are discussed more fully on pp. 26-58. A summary analysis by Coleman of the modal characteristics of, and range of variations among, the non-Western political systems treated in the book indicates clearly how comparison in terms of common dimensions might actually be carried out. Note particularly the way in which ordinal ranking is utilized for comparative purposes in the tables on pp. 541, 542, 563-67.

[17] "Comparative Political Systems," 403.

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means of which consensus is to be defined. Almond wants to compare the systems but, in effect, cannot, for his classificatory scheme is incomplete and the systems he would compare within the domain of extant political systems do not have common characteristics or dimensions in terms of which it might be said that one system is "more or less" like another in respect of those common dimensions.

IV. The Logic of Conceptual Application

There is no point to the development of truly comparative concepts unless those concepts ultimately are given empirical interpretation—that is, unless the conceptual framework of which they are a part is turned into a theory in the proper sense of that term. This means giving operational definitions for the criteria that define the basic concepts.

All of the basic notions in Almond's conceptual framework such as "cultural homogeneity," "multi-valued culture," and "autonomy of roles" *could* be developed and used according to the logic we have outlined. Thus, on the logical level alone his early four-part and later seven-part typology of political systems could be redefined in such a manner that the classificatory scheme would be complete and, being complete, would therefore permit truly comparative analysis in respect of common dimensions. But, no further claim could be made that even such a complete and internally consistent classificatory scheme would be adequate to exhaust the *actual* characteristics of a given domain of political systems. This can only be discovered by empirical inquiry. And operational definitions are the means used to apply concepts to empirical reality. The point here is that in the process of developing an adequate comparative method we are led naturally and "logically" toward recognizing the necessity of empirically interpreting our comparative concepts. To insure the adequacy of our method even on the abstract level, in other words, we must determine whether our internally consistent theory also corresponds to reality and exhausts that part of reality which is of interest to us.

The introduction of comparative concepts must follow the logical criteria discussed in the preceding sections. Then, to apply these concepts to empirical reality, their actual *uses* must be specified in terms of the procedures or "operations" performed in executing experiments or other empirical inquiries. For example, a comparative concept of mass might be based on the following (abbreviated) criteria: "Of any two objects, x and y, in D_1 we will say that x *outweighs* y if, when the objects are placed into opposite pans of a balance in a vacuum, x sinks and y rises; and we will say that x *balances* y if, under

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the conditions described, the balance remains in equilibrium."[18] Similarly, the "scratch test" determines a comparative concept of hardness in mineralogy. In both cases, concrete physical procedures are described to give material interpretations to the definitions involved.

Now for the sake of brevity let us take advantage of accepted procedures in the social sciences and simply assert that the several attitudes mentioned by Almond (and they may or may not be adequate to characterize the specific political systems completely) must be defined in terms of the *techniques* involved in using such things as attitude scales, and that roles must be defined in terms of, let us say, sociometric measures. These techniques would then be the operational definitions for the concepts introduced.

Other concepts, such as one representing the existence of a multiplicity of values, might be studied from the evidence of historical documents or simple observation, however. Such concepts, if carefully defined and used according to our logical requirements, could prove very useful. Rank orders based on such evidence—often established by the intuitive judgment of one or more observers—are frequently used in the early stages of concept formation in psychology and sociology. Sheldon's typologies of physique and of temperament are rather rigorous examples, in part, of this type of technique.[19]

There is nothing logically wrong with using the intuitive judgments of qualified observers in establishing criteria of comparison. When this is done, "those observers play a role analogous to that of the balance in the definition of the comparative concept of mass. The use of human instruments of comparison has various disadvantages, however, over the use of nonorganismic devices such as scales, yardsticks, thermometers, etc.: interobserver agreement is often far from perfect, so that the 'yardstick' provided by one observer cannot be duplicated; besides, even one and the same observer may show inconsistent responses. In addition, it appears that most of the concepts defined by reference to the responses of human instruments are of very limited theoretical import—they do not give rise to precise and comprehensive generalizations."[20]

Sjoberg makes a similar point. He argues that questionnaires, though standardized, do not permit us to infer anything about "the mechanics of large-scale, complex social systems—e.g., a governmental bureauc-

[18] Hempel, 60.
[19] W. H. Sheldon, *The Varieties of Human Physique* (New York and London 1940) and *The Varieties of Temperament* (New York and London 1942).
[20] Hempel, 62.

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racy."[21] He recommends in addition the standardization of the techniques used by participant observers and the procedures used to make inferences from various records as, for example, in content analysis. He makes no concrete procedural suggestions except to suggest that we employ less stereotyped methods of standardization of observations, but he is right in accepting this type of thing as a legitimate means of furthering empirical inquiry. Participant observation, of course, together with historical research, has always been the backbone of the study of comparative government, and these methods can still be most useful if more thorough work is done with the materials already available and if we are willing to learn from sociologists and anthropologists about the standardization of observations and techniques.

We might once again use the concept of consensus as an example of what might be done. It would seem to be quite possible to establish a kind of "index of consensus" on the basis of a variety of techniques. One important ingredient, if available, could be a series of scales getting at the dimensions that seem to form a part of consensus. A series of attitude surveys could show the extent to which a society is broken up into different "value sectors," as well as the extent to which its members share values concerning a basic commitment to "the political rules of the game" or "the constitutional order." These surveys could be combined, much like the various SES (socioeconomic status) indices, and used to set up a nonmetrical rank order consisting of ordinal numbers (which are not measures and which show only relative position).[22]

After this had been done, two or more systems could be compared—in the consensus dimension—by a very simple process of comparing rank orders. In fact, such a careful attention to operational definition would—in the process of carrying out an empirical study—almost automatically force the resolution of the problems connected with the logical criteria of comparative concepts in general. For example, if the consensus index (based on a series of attitude surveys) were represented by a nonmetrical rank order of ordinal numbers—say, 1 to 10—and if Great Britain ranked 9, the United States 8, France 7, Italy 6, and so on, then all the logical criteria would be satisfied also, providing the empirical procedures necessary to create the index were adequate in the first place.

[21] P. 113. For a discussion of some of the problems associated with sampling in comparative studies, see Haas, 298-301.

[22] See Hempel, 61.

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In this case, the last two logical requirements for comparison (that P is C-irreflexive and P is C-connected) obviously would be satisfied. For, if Great Britain does not rank the same as the United States, then it must either exceed the United States or rank lower (P is C-connected: if x does not stand in C to y, then x stands in P to y or y stands in P to x). As Hempel says, these last "two conditions jointly amount to the requirement that *any two elements of D must be comparable in regard to the attribute under consideration*; i.e., they must either have it to the same extent, or one must have it to a lesser extent than the other." This is what such an attempt at scaling *could* accomplish. And this, as he says, "clarifies further the strict meaning of the idea of comparative concept."[23]

V. Conclusions

The primary intention of this research note has been to clarify the logical requirements of classification and comparison in the context of selected aspects of recent developments in comparative political analysis.

The first requirement that must be kept in mind by students of comparative politics is the necessity for carefully distinguishing between classification and comparison. A defect of Almond's scheme is its confusion of the two, with the result that his typology is only in part a set of dimensions which could serve as the basis for comparisons among political systems. The second requirement is the need for properly defined comparative concepts. Truly comparative concepts, it has been pointed out, can only be developed after classification has been completed. Classification is a matter of "either/or"; comparison is a matter of "more or less." Two "objects" being compared must already have been shown to be of the same class. Properly defined comparative concepts, it has been shown, must make it possible for specific states, within a given class, to be ranked along various common dimensions. To achieve the nonmetrical ranking that must necessarily underlie adequate comparison, a logical formulation has been presented which shows precisely how all the elements of any domain being studied should be arranged in the required order of precedence and coincidence. The third requirement of a conceptual framework, which is necessary in order to permit adequate comparative analysis, is the specification of operational definitions of the criteria or dimensions utilized in the framework. These definitions, as in the example of the "scratch test," must be in terms of explicit and concrete procedures. In fulfilling this re-

[23] *Ibid.*, 59-60, italics added.

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quirement, it has been pointed out that what began as an internally consistent conceptual framework becomes a proper theory whose correspondence to reality is verifiable. In this development, classification, comparison, logical coherence, and empirical interpretation find their fruition as stages in the formulation and establishment of a general theory of politics.

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THE EFFECT OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

By GABRIELLA ROSNER LANDE*

DAG Hammarskjöld not long before his death called attention to the mainspring propelling the successful operation of the United Nations. The growth of the United Nations into an increasingly effective organization, he declared, will be dependent upon the cooperation extended by its Member nations in making the Charter "a living reality in practical political action as it is already in law" and in giving enhanced respect to United Nations decisions.[1]

If one acknowledges that the effectiveness of the United Nations is indeed a function of Member States' cooperation in these two ways, an examination of the factors that may increase or diminish such cooperation becomes of immense importance. We suggest, however, that since Member States in the United Nations system constitute both subject and organ, the cooperative process is mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing between the Organization and its Members—that is, the character and action of the UN surely bear a direct relation to cooperation among its Members, but the Organization itself heightens their cooperation in various ways and affects their behavior and character. This two-way process, then, might be usefully viewed in the light of the United Nations' authority, influence, and legitimacy.[2] It is indeed possible, to paraphrase Haas,[3] that the position of the United Nations system in the total scheme of national ideologies and international politics might be summed up convincingly if—at any one time—its legitimacy, together with the authority and influence it enjoys, could be specified and stated.

* This note outlines the conceptual framework of a study-in-progress of the United Nations General Assembly. The author is grateful to the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, for research support.

[1] "Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1960—15 June 1961," General Assembly, *Official Records* (16th Session), Supplement 1A, 1-8.

[2] In other words, one might speak of its "political potential," in the sense defined by Harold and Margaret Sprout "as the total, or aggregative, attraction, pull, pressure, or simply effect that one political unit . . . exerts on others" (*The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* [Princeton 1965], 22).

[3] Ernst B. Haas, "The Comparative Study of the United Nations," *World Politics*, XII (January 1960), 308-9.

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"Authority" here denotes the United Nations' power or right to make decisions, take action, and enjoin obedience. By the "influence" of the UN is meant its ability to affect the interest or behavior or action of others, without the exertion of coercive physical force. Its "legitimacy" is taken to mean its state of being sanctioned by law or custom and being possessed of rights and abilities that are perceived, respected, and accepted by Member governments as just and reasonable.[4] We suggest that a clearer view of these concepts as they relate to the effectiveness of the UN in solving the political problems brought before it may be obtained operationally by a study of the outcomes or consequences of the resolutions of the General Assembly.

The decisions of the General Assembly can serve as a core of concentration because in a number of significant ways the Assembly has become both the political pivot and the institutional pith of the entire United Nations system. Developments in world affairs during the postwar years have transformed the respective roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly in the Organization. The architects of the Charter clearly envisaged the Security Council as the UN's major political instrument. They differentiated the functions of the Assembly and the Council by giving the latter organ primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council was empowered to take action, including enforcement action, in the event of a breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Assembly was merely endowed with the power of recommendation, and the planners assumed that it would concern itself for the most part with the formulation of principles to promote peaceful adjustments and friendly relations among nations. The chairman of the responsible committee at San Francisco declared, "The Assembly, as the supreme representative body of the world, is to establish the principles on which world peace and the ideal of solidarity must rest; and, on the other hand, the Security Council is to act in accordance with those principles and with the speed necessary to prevent any attempted breach of international peace and security. In other words, the former is a creative body and the latter an organ of action."[5]

The General Assembly, however, has functioned as both a creative body *and* an organ of action. The profound disagreements that arose between the great powers after the adoption of the Charter led in-

[4] Legitimacy provides a presumption of "repetition or expansion of peaceful change procedures . . . ," whereas mere authority does not. For discussion, see Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford 1964), 133.

[5] *The United Nations Conference on International Organization: Selected Documents*, Department of State Publication 2490 (Washington 1946), 706.

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creasingly to deadlock in the Security Council and to use of the Assembly for initiating action to advance the Charter's aims, and a gradual breakdown of the lines of functional separation between the two organs followed. A great number of the important disputes and situations brought to the United Nations have been handled by the Assembly and it has been in this forum that the most pressing issues of the postwar years have been examined: the international control of nuclear weapons, the prevention of their wider dissemination, the reduction of international tensions, the regulation of great-power conflicts, the termination of colonialism, the advancement of political, economic, and social development, the uses of outer space—the list is long. Many Member governments have come to perceive the Assembly as a more suitable body than the Council to foster their interests. They have extended the Assembly's role on questions involving the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and have delegated to this organ executive power to act on behalf of the Organization. Assembly resolutions, moreover, while technically only recommendations, have been viewed by several Member countries, with regard to certain matters and within certain limits, as legally binding decisions.

Changing UN procedures also reflect the transformation in the Assembly's stature. The inability of the Security Council to deal with the Korean question after August 1950 impelled Members to pass the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, wherein they categorically affirmed the General Assembly's competence to recommend the use of military measures. Stressing the Assembly's "residual responsibility" for maintaining peace, Member States resolved that if the Council is prevented by the veto from discharging primary responsibility in the security field when a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression occurs, the Assembly itself "shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed forces when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security."[6]

These developments indicate that the interpretation of the Assembly's authority, function, and jurisdiction and the recognition of its claim to certain rights have altered with time. What have these changes meant for the Assembly's ability to modulate the political activities of states? The basic unit in the United Nations remains the state: the Assembly, strictly speaking, cannot legislate; in most

[6] General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), November 3, 1950.

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political matters, it can only recommend action that states themselves should take. Its resources are those of its Members, who are united neither in political agreement on "fundamentals"—on the essential postulates and premises underlying the Organization—nor in an implicit willingness to come to terms on basic problems. In order, therefore, for the Assembly to translate the Charter into practical political action, it must deal with these limitations. An examination of the record of the outcomes of Assembly resolutions should yield a number of patterns and clues that are significant for an evaluation of the possibilities of the United Nations' growing into an increasingly effective organization.

The resolutions of the General Assembly can be examined with respect to two focal points:

I. The *compliance* of Member States with resolutions concerning specific disputes and situations and the *effectiveness* of these resolutions in achieving their objectives. What are the salient factors promoting deference to the Assembly's political decisions? What are the key constituent elements contributing to the success of resolutions in attaining their purposes? How have the resolutions been viewed and acted upon by Members? Does the record indicate that effectiveness and compliance are correlative?

II. The *ancillary and secondary outcomes* of resolutions concerning both specific disputes and general principles of international political cooperation. How have the resolutions molded or moved the policies or behavior of states? In which areas have they succeeded in realizing the repetition or expansion of peaceful change procedures? What, if any, impact have the resolutions had on changing the standards and norms accepted by national decision-makers? Has the Assembly through some of its resolutions come to form and express a real community interest?

I

The General Assembly functions under the strain of a severe handicap: composed of states with innumerable separate interests and aims, it might be expected to require potent resources of compulsion to unite Members in achieving the common purposes of the Organization, but these resources are in fact so decentralized that Members must be directed more by inducement than by coercion. Operationally, the Assembly must rely for the most part upon encouraging states to undertake joint action, urging moderation and moral restraint, enlightening national self-interest, and developing recog-

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nition of the interests and needs of others. The Organization must lean on these methods not only to induce compliance with its decisions, but also to foster the cooperation of states in making the decisions themselves most productive in fulfilling the Charter's central objective—the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.

Compliance with and cooperation in making effective the UN's decisions are, of course, not solely dependent upon the efforts of the Organization. Roger Fisher suggests, for example, that governments are constrained by various sources to comply in both their domestic and foreign relations with accepted standards of behavior, and one may find that the constraints he discusses operate as well when it comes to conformity with United Nations decisions. Fisher identifies four sources of pressure: the possibility of retaliation by the governments directly affected by the issue at hand; the likelihood of an adverse reaction among allies, the uncommitted nations, and world public opinion; political criticism from a government's own constituents; and the deeply rooted moral nature of the individual decision-makers, the "law habit."[7] Moreover, a leader's respect for rules, norms, and accepted standards in the international sphere may stem from perceptions of national interest or from the fact that a rule has become intertwined with the governmental fabric of the country. Hence, even in the absence of powerful international organizational resources to compel obedience, a government in the General Assembly will neither easily ignore the conduct and attitudes of the states with which it must do business nor easily act in defiance of a prevailing norm.

We submit, however, that a number of additional important variables bear upon the changing effectiveness of Assembly resolutions and Member States' compliance with them: (1) the *time* at and *circumstances* under which the resolution was adopted; (2) the *nature* of the resolution and the fundamental *issues* to which it relates; (3) the *methods* and *means* used by the Assembly to implement the resolution; (4) the characteristics of the *vote* taken on the resolution; (5) the *attitudes* and *expectations* of Members in regard to the resolution; (6) the *legal status* of the resolution; and (7) the *language* of the resolution.

The outcome of principal Assembly resolutions concerning specific disputes and situations can be analyzed in terms of these variables.[8]

[7] "Bringing Law to Bear on Governments," *Harvard Law Review*, LXXIV (April 1961), 1134-35.

[8] The following disputes and situations, then, form the research background of the framework here presented: (1) The treatment of peoples of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa; (2) The relations of Members of the United Nations with

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Compliance can be determined by the implementation of the resolutions by the composite majority of UN Members and, more particularly, by the parties concerned. Effectiveness can be determined by the extent to which the specific objectives of the resolution have been met and the general political purposes of the Charter have been furthered. The analysis is designed to bring forth the relative importance of each of these variables in the achievement of the goals of the UN Assembly through its resolutions.

1. *Time and circumstances.* The Charter system for the maintenance of international peace and security was based on the assumption that the great powers would cooperate through the United Nations in keeping the peace and settling differences among the other powers. This assumption was to prove invalid. The profound and revolutionary changes that have occurred in the world since the Charter was drafted—the deepening conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, the developments in nuclear weaponry, the bipolarization of power, the upsurge of Asian and African demands for political and economic development, and the contest between the cold-war antagonists to win the support of the emerging states—have strongly influenced the entire nature and functioning of the United Nations.

The General Assembly's role in peacekeeping has at different times been developed and strengthened. The nature of the political questions which it has handled has varied at different periods. Voting alignments and bloc formations have altered with time. The attitudes of Members toward the UN have been modified, partly in answer to developments in the international environment, partly in response to changes in the United Nations itself. The hinges upon which action turns continue to be national self-interests; but these interests have changed and at certain times and under certain circumstances have converged on the international forum.

Spain; (3) Threats to the independence and territorial integrity of Greece; (4) The question of Korean independence; (5) The future government of Palestine; (6) The observance in Bulgaria and Hungary of human rights and fundamental freedoms; (7) The disposal of the former Italian colonies; (8) The question of an international regime for Jerusalem; (9) The holding of free elections in Germany; (10) Intervention of the People's Republic of China in Korea; (11) The racial situation in the Union of South Africa; (12) The question of Morocco; (13) The question of South West Africa; (14) The status of West New Guinea (West Irian); (15) Intervention by Israel, France, and the United Kingdom in Egypt; (16) The question of Hungary; (17) The question of Algeria; (18) The question of Jordan; (19) The question of Lebanon; (20) The future of the Togolands; (21) The situation in the Congo; (22) The situation in Angola.

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Since the United Nations has shown itself to be a dynamic instrument strongly responsive to changes in the international scene and to the changing attitudes and purposes of Members, its decisions, too, mirror these changes as do Member States' acknowledgment of them. Hence, General Assembly resolutions must be studied with respect to the time at which they were passed and as a function of other factors operating over time in order to determine whether and how their effect has varied with the years and with changes in the state of the world "outside." Particular attention should be given to the evolution of state behavior as the Member nations "learn" from the UN encounter. National aims and expectations may be reconstituted and Members may take into their reckoning what is considered legitimate by the international community, or what the effect can be of United Nations pressures and interventions.[9]

2. *The nature of the resolution.* The resolutions of the Assembly have been concerned with a great variety of political situations and disputes. The nature of the problem or the functional area to which a specific resolution pertains may well be connected to the response the resolution elicits from Member States. Have the Assembly's resolutions dealing with one type of dispute or situation been more successful than those dealing with another? We can consider three types of political problems to which Assembly resolutions have been directed: (*a*) situations that have not developed into actual disputes between states nor assumed the form of immediate threats to peace but which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute; (*b*) disputes between nations which endanger, or the continuance of disputes which might endanger, international peace and security; (*c*) threats to or actual breaches of the peace.[10] Put in terms of the major political functions that the United Nations can be called upon to perform, one can distinguish resolutions concerning (*a*) peaceful change; (*b*) pacific settlement of disputes; (*c*) collective action in the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.

The number and nature of the party or parties to which a resolution appeals and the fundamental issues lying at the root of the resolution are further dimensions of interest. Some resolutions are aimed at the entire membership of the United Nations and even at nonmembers; others may speak to one state alone; frequently two or

[9] See Haas, "Comparative Study of the UN," 304-10. Haas's schematization has been extremely useful in formulating a number of the variables outlined here.

[10] For a discussion of terms, see Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Washington 1955), 225-32, 354-60.

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more parties are addressed. The countries appealed to may be great powers or small states, former colonial nations or newly independent ones, members of an alliance or "uncommitted" states, countries which are geographically distant or which constitute one region. The resolutions may concern, most fundamentally, issues pertaining to (*a*) the cold war; (*b*) colonialism, independence, or political development; (*c*) territorial claims; (*d*) human rights and fundamental freedoms; and (*e*) the government of a state, or intervention in its domestic affairs. One might relate these distinctions among resolutions to their varying outcomes.

3. *Methods and means.* The nature of the various policies, methods, and means used by the General Assembly to give effect to its resolutions and the response of Members to these methods are also significant in evaluating the "whys and wherefores" of the Assembly's successes and failures. Which methods have proven particularly effective in resolving disputes and promoting compliance? Is the Assembly moving ever closer toward providing teeth for its recommendations?

In terms of broad policy, the Assembly may adopt, on the one hand, what Stanley Hoffmann calls a policy of "pure coercion": through injunctions, threats, or instruments of collective action, it may seek to oblige transgressor states to surrender any gains acquired in violation of the Charter, and may try to uphold a return to law above an accommodation by concession. On the other hand, Assembly resolutions may reflect a policy of "pure conciliation": here, "it treats all parties to a dispute as equals and tries to reach a compromise through accommodation without any pressure being put on either side."[11] And, of course, there is a third policy, the middle road between the paths of pure coercion and pure conciliation, a "mix" of both ingredients.

More specifically, the means utilized by the Assembly to promote its aims fall under the following rubrics: (*a*) investigatory procedures; (*b*) instruments and procedures of pacific settlement; (*c*) terms of pacific settlement; (*d*) collective measures.[12]

a) At the initial stage of the consideration of a question, the General Assembly may deem it desirable to collect information or clarify issues before proceeding to further action. It may solicit reports from Members, from other UN organs, or from special fact-finding and surveillance committees and commissions. A commission endowed with

[11] Hoffmann, "Sisyphus and the Avalanche: The United Nations, Egypt and Hungary," *International Organization*, XI (Summer 1957), 452.

[12] For details and discussion, see Goodrich and Simons, Parts 3, 4.

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a watchdog function of international surveillance may be used both as an information agency and as an instrument for making the Assembly's interest felt on the spot, "mobilizing world public opinion and making it articulate to the point at which it becomes a factor in the power situation."[18]

b) When examining a dispute between states, the Assembly may merely issue a general appeal for a settlement without any indication of the methods to be followed. In some cases, the Assembly will urge the disputants to engage in negotiations between themselves. Pressure may be exerted upon the principals to undertake negotiations by requesting them to submit progress reports, by declaring an intent to review the question again, or by making manifest that auxiliary action will be taken in the event of the failure of the parties to agree between themselves. The Assembly may decide to help the parties in arriving at a settlement of a dispute by making arrangements for good offices, mediation, or conciliation. The Secretary-General plays a central role in implementing almost all such recommendations, and the Assembly has strengthened his hand in this regard during the last few years.

When faced with the need to avert or end armed hostilities between disputants, the Assembly has often brought into play procedures known as "provisional measures," which range from a general appeal to the parties to prevent an aggravation of the situation to a call for a cease-fire. In order to implement provisional measures, the Assembly may be obliged to recommend that the Security Council consider enforcement action under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter or that truce supervisory organs be established for the purpose of coordinating the actions of the parties and checking on compliance.

c) In its preliminary efforts to work out agreements, the Assembly has sometimes utilized formal recommendations in the name of the United Nations or general overtures for support. These may be resolutions of publicity, appeal, or admonition wherein Members are reminded that they assumed certain solemn obligations when they ratified the Charter. The resolutions may be those of principle in which the Assembly declares its general position on a rather broad issue.

Occasionally, however, the Assembly will go beyond these general appeals to recommend the specific action Members should take to adjust a situation or resolve a dispute peacefully, thus advising specific terms as distinct from procedures of settlement. It may go still further

[18] Philip Jessup, "The United Nations Begins to Show Power Against Power," *New York Times Magazine* (October 23, 1949), 12.

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and express its opinion on the substantive issues of the dispute and the merits of the respective positions of the parties. It may point out how, between whom, and on what subjects negotiation or mediation or conciliation should be conducted, and what the basis for a settlement should be.

d) If other measures have failed to settle the dispute or if hostilities are in progress, the Assembly may advocate the use of stronger measures of collective action—political, economic and financial, paramilitary, or military. Political measures might conceivably include a formal determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression; collective denunciation; severance of diplomatic relations; nonrecognition of changes brought about in violation of the Charter; nonrecognition of the credentials of a representative; and suspension or expulsion from the United Nations or the Specialized Agencies. The possible economic and financial measures that might be recommended include the complete or partial blocking of commodity trade; the total or selective banning of financial transactions; the interdiction of physical communication; and the blocking or vesting of accounts.

The General Assembly has never recommended the application of coercionary collective military measures against a state, although its resolutions during the Korean crisis sustained Security Council action to this end. However, international paramilitary forces have been created or supported by the Assembly to help implement, with the consent of the states concerned, UN objectives during important crisis situations. This has been the case particularly in recent times, when the Assembly has utilized or supported techniques involving peacekeeping mechanisms for removing elements of violence in disturbed areas, preventing the expansion or escalation of conflict, and allowing belligerent states to withdraw military forces without loss of face. These operations have not entailed enforcement action but have come far nearer to being preventive and protective police actions under international auspices.

4. *The characteristics of the vote.* The nature and composition of the vote—reflecting as it does national positions in agreement or conflict—may suggest the sources of influence and pressure that are vital to a resolution's successful denouement. From which nation or bloc of nations did the resolution spring and gain support? What were the objectives of these nations and their influence? Did a nation's response to a resolution after its passage differ from its vote?

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The quantity, intensity, and quality of the community support behind a resolution may determine what impact it will have. The response by the interested parties to resolutions receiving vigorous and extended support may well be different from the response to resolutions mustering a weak majority. Strong support of a resolution by the more powerful states in the Assembly may increase the possibility that the resolution will be implemented and effective. Dag Hammarskjöld, in his statements on the principles and practice of preventive diplomacy, implied that the UN's resolutions in the political and security field would not be effectual in the absence of agreement between the superpowers. Does the record uphold his judgment?

When evaluating the vote, it is also important to specify the ingredients of the compromise in each resolution. Haas identifies three types of decision-making processes or recurrent patterns of outcome: accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator, pleasing only the least cooperative bargaining partner; accommodation by splitting the difference; and accommodation "on the basis of deliberately or inadvertently upgrading the common interests of the parties."[14] One might postulate and consequently verify that the effects of decisions of the "minimum common denominator" sort are unlike those that upgrade the mutual concerns of the interested states.

5. *Attitudes and expectations.* Closely allied to the dimensions of time and vote is the question of the expectations entertained and the satisfaction or disappointment experienced by national decision-makers in respect to a resolution. These feelings and reactions may in turn bear upon the effect given to the resolution and to subsequent decisions.[15] Ultimately, a government's evaluation of an Assembly decision is tied to its general estimation of the UN itself and the prominence it gives the Organization in the formulation of foreign policy. Does the government conceive of the United Nations primarily as a dynamic instrument of governments or as a passive conference machinery? Does it view the expanded activities of the General Assembly as a desirable or a dangerous development? Evaluation is intimately affiliated with a government's general anticipation of successful action by the Organization. There is evidence to testify that in reacting to

[14] *Beyond the Nation-State*, 39.

[15] Of course, not all governments will consider and review all resolutions with equal care, and some may never review one or another at all. A government's capacity to give attention to Assembly resolutions is sometimes limited by its state of political development, by the administrative machinery at its disposal, or by other factors. National attitudes and reactions may, however, be discerned from the UN record and, in the case of the parties concerned, there is a strong presumption that the resolution will receive some attention.

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the UN's work, many nations have passed through distinct phases: a phase of "faith, hope, and expectation"—approximating the years 1945-1947; a phase of "disappointment and indifference"—1948-1950; a phase of "self-reliance, distrust, and retreat"—1951-1955; and a phase of cautious and limited "confidence," beginning in 1956.[16]

Although a detailed analysis of these attitude dimensions is a project too extensive to undertake in our study, a summary of opinion may be gleaned by noting the attitudes both of the parties particularly concerned and of the composite majority toward the respective resolutions under consideration. Is the resolution in question widely viewed as an important and credible decision that bids fair to contribute to a solution of the problem at hand? Is it seen mainly as a weak or unrealistic palliative unlikely to achieve its aims? Critical dissection of Members' expectations and attitudes on the nature of the resolutions, the measures or means applied to give them effect, and the legal status of the resolutions may clarify the interdependence between concepts of the United Nations entertained by Members and results obtained from its decisions. National reactions are likely to influence the survival, modification, or vitiation of a decision subsequently, and may provide valuable clues to the possible effect of resolutions that might be approved by the Assembly at some future time.

6. *Legal status.* Two legal questions may have direct relevance to the implementation and effectiveness of General Assembly resolutions. Is the Assembly competent to deal with the matter with which the resolution is concerned? Does the resolution possess binding force?

The former question has most frequently been raised in regard to matters involving either threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, or the concept of domestic jurisdiction of Member States. The latter question has been raised in regard to the obligatory effect of those Assembly resolutions containing recommendations to the Member States under Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter. Since presumably a resolution of the Assembly which appears to be proper and legitimate may influence the views of others as to what is legitimate, the General Assembly's political power depends in part upon its acting within an area where it is understood to have competence. Moreover, when a resolution is generally regarded as legally just, attempts to hide nonobservance behind claims of illegality and lack of authority are counteracted.

a) The rights and duties of the Organization and its Members are

[16] See the series of twenty-four *National Studies on International Organization* prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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delineated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter,[17] and the functions and powers of the General Assembly bearing upon political matters are designated for the most part in Articles 10 to 14,[18] but the interpretation of these articles and their applicability in particular instances have been matters of intense controversy. The Charter does not specify how its provisions are to be interpreted or which agent is to assume the interpretative task.

Who is responsible for realizing the United Nations' primary and overriding purpose of keeping the peace? Is it the collective Organization or its individual Members, and if the former, which is the responsible organ? Is the General Assembly to be excluded from "action" on a question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security *after* the question has been referred to the Security Council and the latter organ has been unable to take action? The basis upon which the Assembly is to decide the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression has been hotly debated. The guidelines to be used in deciding whether or not a state has exceeded the legal limits of the use of force, or indeed whether the Organization in its operations itself has exceeded the legal limits,

[17] Article 2 states that the Organization and its Members shall act in accordance with a number of stated principles. All Members shall (1) fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter; (2) settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security, and justice are not endangered; (3) refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the UN's purpose; and (4) give the Organization every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action. The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members. It shall ensure that states which are not Members act in accordance with the above principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. It shall not intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state nor require Members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter, although this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures.

[18] The General Assembly is granted authority under Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security and to make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both. It is to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purposes of promoting international cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and of assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Assembly may make recommendations on any matters within the scope of the Charter and on measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation that it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, except while the Security Council is exercising in respect to any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the Charter. Subject to the same proviso, the Assembly may discuss and make recommendations on any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, although any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council either before or after discussion.

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have been disputed. And the interpretation and application of the concept of domestic jurisdiction is perhaps the most controversial subject of all. It has been raised time and again in cases involving issues of colonialism and self-determination, contested territory, a state's denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms to its subjects, the government of a state, and UN peacekeeping operations.

By implication, the Members voting for a resolution regard it as falling within the Assembly's competence and conforming to the Charter. The resolution then expresses the collective interpretation of the organ. The report of the Committee responsible for drafting articles on "Judicial Organization" at the San Francisco Conference declared that "in the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs of the Organization, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions."[19] However, as Rosalyn Higgins points out in a discussion of the interpretation of the concept of domestic jurisdiction which is equally applicable to other disputed questions involving Charter interpretation, "It is essential that this interpretation be in accordance with a well considered policy based on desirable objectives, and not merely in accordance with political convenience, propaganda purposes, and habits of bloc voting." While "interpretation should be in favor of rendering states accountable to the organization for their behavior in areas of international concern," the general consensus of nations must be taken into account, the confidence of Member States must not be forfeited, and the efficacy of the Organization must be furthered.[20] Our concern is to explore the relation between the outcome of Assembly resolutions and interpretations of the Assembly's competence, and to review this relation as a function of time. Member States' views are fluid and susceptible to change, and the collective view may well be associated with such change. Continuous implementation of legal and authoritative decisions, then, may provide indicators of a changing international law and of the Organization's legitimacy.

b) An equally controversial and complex subject is the legal force of Assembly resolutions that concern recommendations addressed to states. What are the obligations of Members and of the Organization in considering and carrying out such resolutions? Under certain cir-

[19] *UN Conference: Selected Documents*, 668.

[20] *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations* (London 1963), 62.

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cumstances, are Assembly resolutions addressed to Member States legally binding?

The authority granted to the General Assembly in Articles 10 to 14 of the Charter does not go beyond that of "recommendation." The Assembly's powers and functions as delineated in these articles include the right to recommend, discuss, study, and call the attention of the Security Council to certain matters. None of the articles of the Charter directly imposes upon states the obligation to accept recommendations of the Assembly similar to the prescription in Article 25 to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council.

But the Charter does not specifically deny such an obligation, and the question is by no means a clear-cut one. Certainly, a number of governments and eminent legal experts have deduced obligations from the Charter as a whole and from the will of the international community. It has been submitted, for example, that under the following conditions an Assembly recommendation addressed to states may indeed be binding or impose legal obligations: when the resolution involves the binding principles of the Charter and of international law; when Member States have explicitly agreed to accept the resolution as binding; when the resolution embraces a principle that is generally agreed to and consistently respected by Member States (consensus, custom); when the resolution regulates areas and matters concerning which sovereignty is not vested in a Member State and the Assembly acts as the agent of the international community; when the resolution involves financial assessments, including assessments for peacekeeping activities.

The views of governments on the legal force of a resolution and their behavior pertaining to it may well be interrelated. The Assembly's decisions, as Hammarskjöld said, "introduce an important element by expressing a majority consensus on the issue under consideration. Naturally, such a formula leaves scope for a gradual development in practice of the weight of the decisions. To the extent that mere respect in fact is shown to General Assembly recommendations by the Member States, they may come more and more close to being recognized as decisions having a binding effect on those concerned, particularly when they involve the application of the binding principles of the Charter and of international law."[21]

7. *Language.* The language of a resolution is a seventh variable to be considered when analyzing compliance and effect. The verbal formulas incorporated in a resolution may represent pressure devices,

[21] "Introduction to the Annual Report, 1960-1961," 3.

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indicators of majority opinion, or dictums with legal implications, and each of these may bear upon the resolution's outcome. In examining Assembly resolutions, moreover, one may wonder whether constant repetition of certain phrases and formulas, and the choice of either moderate or severe language, appertain to deference or intransigence of response. Since each draft resolution that comes before the Assembly is carefully scrutinized not only for substance but also for style and wording, and since considerable care is taken by delegates to find a verbal formula that will satisfy a majority of Member governments, sensitivity to language is certainly displayed by UN decision-makers, and presumably the resolution's addressees are alive to it as well.

Conceivably, language in itself is not a negligible element in the resolution of disputes and the reconciliation of conflicting purposes and interests at the United Nations. In the diplomacy of the international forum, where measures must be presented in terms acceptable to a two-thirds majority of the membership, the diction and terminology employed may result in moderating opposing policies. The divergence of interests in a political body representing over one hundred states is reflected in the course of negotiation and debate and must somehow be accommodated. Hence the necessary search for a common denominator often transforms a measure from what had been originally intended by the sponsor. Most frequently, a resolution will in the end fall short of the maximum objective desired by its originator. Morgenthau summarized the situation in these terms: "The constant use of a certain terminology not only for the purposes of propaganda, but in the give and take of political transactions, may well exert a subtle influence upon the substance of the transactions themselves. . . . It may well result in the blunting of the sharp edges of a national policy, in its retreat from an advanced position, its formulation and adaptation in the light of the supranational principles embodied in the language of the resolution."[22]

II

The influence and legitimacy of the United Nations General Assembly may be sought not only in the specific implementation of its decisions, but also in their more extensive, generic, or indirect effect on (1) Member States, (2) the United Nations Organization, and (3) the international system. Resolutions of the Assembly concerning

[22] "The United Nations and the Revision of the Charter," *Review of Politics*, XVI (January 1954), 13.

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general principles and issues that affect its entire membership, as well as those pertaining to specific disputes, may well be examined from this perspective. The most important Assembly resolutions on the general principles of international political cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security fall within the following categories: (*a*) the regulation of armaments and the international control of atomic energy; (*b*) the measures required to avert world war and strengthen conditions conducive to international peace and security; (*c*) the rights and duties of states and of the Organization; and (*d*) the strengthening of UN procedures and practices.[23]

An Assembly resolution in a particular instance may have either negligible or significant results, a positive or negative sequel. Its consequences may be either beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the majority of Members, to the health, vitality, and efficacy of the General Assembly, and to the stability of the international system. Of course, the great discrepancy between the stakes of political conflict in the world and the means at the disposal of the Assembly necessarily limits that organ's impact on world affairs. An exploration of the general effects of the Assembly's resolutions, however, should identify the types of decisions and their component elements which have resulted in putting some restraints on those who make national policies, have advanced to some degree the aims and purposes of the United Nations, and have contributed, if only marginally, to the felicitous operation of the international system.

1. *Effect on Member governments.* The instances in which and the extent to which national leaders have responded to General Assembly resolutions with changed perceptions and actions might be scrutinized. The decision-makers' anticipation and understanding of the number and nature of desirable strategies available to them to promote par-

[23] More specifically, resolutions on the following matters are pertinent: (*a*) The regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments; The suspension of nuclear weapons tests; The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; The denuclearization of Africa. (*b*) Condemnation of propaganda against peace; Peace through deeds; Peaceful and neighborly relations among states; Appeals to the great powers to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace. (*c*) The promotion, achievement, and observation of human rights and fundamental freedoms; Permanent sovereignty over natural resources; The duties of states in the event of the outbreak of hostilities; The legal principles governing activities of states in the use of outer space; The granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; The elimination of all forms of racial discrimination; The principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states; The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. (*d*) Voting procedure in the Security Council; Admission of new Members; Representation of Members; The implementation of Article 43 of the Charter; Uniting for peace; The financing of peacekeeping operations.

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ticular interests may alter to the extent that a resolution mobilizes domestic or international support for a given policy, sets standards that define the rights and duties of states, commits governments to certain courses of action, or changes the means available to states in their relations with one another. The decision-makers may choose to participate actively in a matter for which they perceive little national interest. They may apprehend that a resolution addressed to their country puts it into a position of losing or gaining (depending upon whether or not they decide to defer to its provisions) the political friendships of those governments that supported the resolution. They may find that "in a world made interdependent by the ideological, military and economic clamor which does not respect national frontiers, unilateral action entails even more painful consequences than deference to unpalatable organizational decisions."[24] Thus, as a result of an Assembly decision, they may occasionally modify their arguments in support of a particular national policy or modify the policy itself.

Has the tradition of responsibility and accountability which has been established at the United Nations affected leaders in their actions or only in their justifications of action? When decision-makers are regularly constrained to adopt postures dissimilar to their actual behavior, does their behavior eventually merge with their postures? Most governments have felt it necessary to defend their behavior as conforming to the Charter's purposes and principles. When failing to comply with a resolution that recommends a modification in their policy, they have sought to demonstrate publicly the error or unfairness or illegality of the collective decision and, when accused of breaching a rule that has been upheld consistently in the international forum, a government will go to vigorous lengths to persuade the Assembly that the accusation is unwarranted.

There is little doubt that national decision-makers give some attention to the Assembly's recommendations: witness the considerable efforts made to muster the requisite majority for a draft resolution they support, to prevent a draft resolution they oppose from coming to a vote or from being adopted, to bargain with states by vote-trading, or to form blocs in order that the weight of their views will be enhanced. Witness, too, the concern sometimes manifested by a leader that his government will find itself in a minority in the Assembly, that the international organ will act "irresponsibly," or that the one-state-one-vote system will not adequately acknowledge the powers and attendant obligations of nations. "We must recognize," said a former

[24] Haas, "Comparative Study of the UN," 321.

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United States Assistant Secretary of State, "that there is a United Nations angle, presently or prospectively, to every major subject of foreign policy."[25] The impact of that "angle" on foreign policy in particular instances is, however, unclear.

Events in the internal affairs of states may also be touched indirectly by the Assembly's decisions. Several resolutions have narrowed the range of those matters viewed in the past as falling within the exclusive realm of the national sovereign, and have widened the international jurisdiction. Operations initiated or bolstered by the Assembly have helped to prevent or restrain civil strife and have contributed to peaceful changes in the domestic affairs of states. Indeed, national expectations may have been affected in response to UN action in particular instances, and national loyalties modified.

The specific effect of a resolution upon national policy and behavior is, of course, singularly difficult to analyze because, apart from the empirical question of determining the pressures and influences upon particular governments that may have come from the General Assembly itself, there is the question of whether in the absence of Assembly action the course taken would have been substantially different.[26] One must rely on a series of views from the national statesmen concerned, accounts of outside observers, and clues available in both national parliamentary debates and UN discussions. The weight of the evidence will often indicate when a resolution has had a strong influence. At the very least, determination of certain patterns of effect may be made when there is agreement between the intent of the resolution and the actions of the states in question.

It is also difficult in some cases to ascertain whether the content of a resolution derives from a particular national policy or whether the reverse holds true. Frequently, it is only the effect of a combination of components that one can observe. However, since there is always a significant degree of interaction and interplay between the governments and the international organization when a matter is brought before the United Nations—or, in some instances, governments will react to each other outside the UN, but with reference to it—one might assume that in many instances the interaction itself will affect the question. For instance, a government may find it easier to have a particular program of action received with favor on the domestic front

[25] Harlan Cleveland, in Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., eds., *The United States and the United Nations* (Baltimore 1961), 147.

[26] For a discussion of this problem, see Max Beloff, "National Government and International Government," *International Organization*, XIII (Autumn 1959), 541-42.

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if it can count on support from an international body, and it may therefore bring the matter before the Assembly. An Assembly decision on the matter, then, might conceivably have the effect of mobilizing public opinion to uphold a national policy; but this sustenance may result not only in the policy's adoption at home, but also in subtle alteration of the policy itself.

Hence, an examination of the effects of Assembly resolutions may yield some evidence of the circumstances and fields in which changes in national policy recommended by the Assembly have been accepted. One might assess whether these changes have put some restraint on governments in their relations with one another and have contributed to peaceful changes in both the domestic and international affairs of states.

2. *Effect on the United Nations.* The substance of many resolutions constitutes interpretations of Charter articles and principles and the legal rights and duties of the Organization, which clarify the aims, purposes, and status of the United Nations and its organs. When a widened interpretation is given to an organ's authority, it may, if consistently accepted by Members, result in an indirect transformation of that organ's autonomy. The changing purposes to which resolutions are addressed may admit an enlargement of the functional areas—"the world tasks"—to which the United Nations applies itself. Indeed, according to Haas, "the proof of an organizational impact lies in the appearance of a new set of general interests that command respect among the members—in short a new world task."[27] By creating new institutional machinery, the Assembly provides the Organization with additional, and sometimes increasingly effective, tools with which to perform its functions. The Assembly's concerns at particular times may establish priorities in agenda items on which the United Nations bestows particular or urgent attention. Have these effects of the Assembly's actions contributed to the UN's influence and legitimacy?

A number of resolutions may clearly entail negative consequences. By passing irresolute and weak directives that inspire little confidence, or by expressing admonitions to which a powerful state or bloc of states is unalterably and unremittingly opposed, the Assembly possibly harms its own and the Organization's prestige. Its resolutions may serve to perpetuate certain fictions contradictory to the realities of international politics, and this may increase the resistance of defiant governments and diminish the influence of the Organization. (One might, for example, explore such dictums as the equality of states and

[27] *Beyond the Nation-State*, 111.

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nonintervention in their domestic affairs in this light.) When the Assembly, rather than coming to grips with the underlying issues occasioning a resort to force by a disputant, preoccupies itself excessively with the procedures and techniques of peaceful settlement, the smothering of the fire, or the right degree of indignation, concern, and exhortation to be expressed against the transgressor, the consequence may well be intensified bitterness between the parties and a series of new explosions. Likewise, an attempt by the Assembly to handle an important problem with insufficient or inadequate means may give rise to violent and acrimonious reactions and weaken the Assembly as an instrument for the solution of disputes—particularly if the attempt appears to menace what a state adjudges to be a vital interest.[28]

3. *Effect on the international system.* The Assembly through its resolutions may affect the international system by contributing to a modification of the structure of the world community, the expectations of the national actors, the diplomatic and collective methods that states employ, and the principles and ideas and rules that are universally accepted and recognized. By attacking colonialism both in particular instances and as a matter of principle, exercising supervision over non-self-governing territories, and promoting political development in trust territories, the Assembly may have the effect of encouraging leaders in their struggle for national independence and hastening the creation of new national actors. The extension of the Assembly's role in the maintenance of international peace and security has promoted a subtle transformation of the international hierarchy and has given the smaller powers a far greater voice in international affairs than is commensurate with their political potential. In some cases, these states have even succeeded in frustrating the intentions or purposes of the great powers.

The great powers, moreover, are no longer the exclusive protectors of the interests of the weak. Hammarskjöld directed precise attention to this phenomenon: "The United Nations has increasingly become the main platform—and the main protector of the interests—of those many nations who feel themselves strong as members of the international family but who are weak in isolation. Thus, an increased number of nations have come to look to the UN for leadership and support in ways somewhat different from those natural in the light of traditional diplomacy. They look to the Organization as a spokesman

[28] See Stanley Hoffmann, "An Evaluation of the United Nations," *Ohio State Law Journal*, XXII (Summer 1961), 483.

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and as an agent for principles which give them strength in an international concert in which other voices can mobilize all the weight of armed force, wealth, an historical role and that influence which is the other side of a special responsibility for peace and security."[29]

Attending these developments may be disruptive effects, for the present and potential role of the UN as a partial "balancer," changing the traditional world hierarchy, is viewed with dismay by a number of governments and, as a result, the sense of community vital to world order is weakened. The pressure of national leaders for sovereign independence rather than self-government within a federation or amalgamation with other nations may serve to enhance particularism and multiply the prospects for disputes. Overindulgence in nationalist emotion may exacerbate quarrels and lead to senseless violence. The role of the General Assembly in the disruption of the status quo may provoke grave anxiety in statesmen who fear that the interests of their governments will be jeopardized by the fanning of the winds of change.

More positively, the Assembly's decisions and concerns have contributed to the revolution of rising expectations for a better life in larger freedom. The international organ has increasingly come to grapple with and promote an awareness of the political, economic, and social needs of the populations of the less developed nations. Although the discussions in and recommendations of the Assembly have not made any direct contribution to the development of a system of international regulation of nuclear weapons, they may have had some importance in forming and giving expression to international expectations on this question and in maintaining pressure on the great powers to come to some agreement. The Assembly's constant insistence that this is a matter of first priority in international affairs, and that therefore the major powers must keep talking, may conceivably have helped to keep alive negotiations and have made it possible for full advantage to be taken of any propitious circumstance or germ of consensus.

The Assembly has created new intergovernmental mechanisms for the use of states in their relations—observer groups, truce machinery, administrative authorities, peacekeeping forces, and the like. The use of these techniques in particular trouble spots may assist in the orderly operation of the international system by isolating areas of strife from the direct intervention of the superpowers and by preventing small-power conflicts from expanding into global wars. Their disposition may in fact also exercise a most important, though indirect, influence

[29] *United Nations Review*, IV (October 1960), 270.

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on great-power conflicts by narrowing the geographical and political area to which these conflicts are allowed to apply. Moreover, by its constant condemnation of the employment of force to settle disputes and its denial of recognition to advantages thus gained, the Assembly has provoked at least a partial acceptance of moderation.

A number of resolutions of the Assembly have worked out authoritatively and in precise detail standards of state behavior which have been used as a code of conduct and as a yardstick to measure the compliance of governments. Resolutions have defined principles concerning the rights and duties of states—the obligation not to use nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the duty to refrain from threats or actions aimed at impairing the independence of any state or at fomenting civil strife therein; the right to political self-determination and liberation from colonial rule; the right to economic development and independence; and so on. To the extent that these standards and principles are explicitly accepted or consistently followed, they ripen to form new international legal rules. Sometimes they are invested with an increased and increasing authority and practical importance by governments, courts, and legislatures, not as a result of a methodical legislative process but through unplanned or haphazard action. They may influence the contents of specific agreements between states, or the public opinion and legislation of individual countries—particularly at times when new constitutions or constitutional amendments are under consideration. Some principles and standards, of course, are still hardly distinguishable from general precepts of morality, but their specification and reaffirmation in the Assembly may foster a climate of opinion conducive to their survival and acceptance as new precepts of legitimacy.

The constituent elements of a global interest in the United Nations and the process furthering its growth or decline may be understood more clearly by a critical dissection of Assembly resolutions and their many effects. One may not be able to dispel with assurance the haze of mysticism surrounding the idea of a "general will," but, as Claude indicates, "no hardheaded realist can deny that a meaningful notion of community interest sometimes emerges from a society of selfish men and competing interest groups."[30] It may be possible to educe and trace the formation in the United Nations of a number of generally accepted policies, principles, and standards that meet the needs of the world community rather than the particular aspirations of a particular state or group of states.

[30] Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords Into Plowshares* (New York 1961), 168.

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Review Articles

AGGREGATE ANALYSIS

By MICHAEL HAAS

Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey*, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1963, 1404 pp. $30.00.

Norton Ginsburg, *Atlas of Economic Development*, with a Foreword by Bert F. Hoselitz and Part VIII, A Statistical Analysis, by Brian J. L. Berry, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961, 119 pp. $5.00.

Bruce M. Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, 373 pp. $10.00.

EARLY students of comparative government who followed the counsel of Lord Bryce had a most formidable task. To determine the consequences of various kinds of governmental mechanisms from one political system to another they were obliged to acquire an intimate familiarity with every independent state in Europe and the Americas, plus China and Japan. It is no wonder that as the literature in the field began to multiply the focus on broad, cross-national theory gave way to area specialization and to the noncomparative "country-by-country" approach. Theorizing became *ad hoc* and unsystematic, and the field of comparative politics stagnated.

But today most of the major innovations in political science are occurring in the field of comparative politics. One of the reasons for the "revolution" is that as membership in the state system doubled after World War II it became obvious that earlier generalizations about political systems were quite parochial in scope. Just as it would be impossible for a single scholar to obtain a comprehensive grasp of some 110 political systems or even of polities within a single culturally homogeneous geographic area, it has been considered theoretically unproductive to have specialists in the field continue to operate noncomparatively, that is, in mutual isolation. A conceptual breakthrough clearly was needed to enable researchers to proceed toward the goal of general theory on which there is substantial agreement. And the formulation since the early 1960's of several broad conceptual schemes for the comparative analysis of culturally dissimilar political systems has filled such a need for conceptual tools enabling truly global comparative statements to contribute toward comprehensive theories of political behavior. A common denominator among such theories has

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been their focus on "political development," which has been studied in a variety of ways. Through development theory it is now possible for both area and single-country experts to contribute to an ongoing theoretical discussion.

To date, however, theoretical speculation about political development remains to be tempered by empirical research. It is the purpose of this review article to comment upon three recent quantitative volumes representing the effort to improve development theory by providing elements necessary for submitting the theory to empirical testing. The authors of all three works regard their compilations as only tentative first steps in this direction, and the nontheoretical common denominator of the three books, the use of aggregate data and qualitative codings of political systems, raises in addition many basic methodological questions. For example, do intercorrelations among cross-sectional slices of a large number of countries at one point in time constitute acceptable tests of development theory? Each of the relevant issues raised is treated below. Because the authors conceive of their roles as only exploratory, it is assumed that it is fair game to engage in nit-picking and that such aspects of this review will be interpreted in the most constructive possible light as an attempt to unveil a few of the key theoretical and technical problems for which ready-made solutions are not always at hand.

I. Concepts Operationalized

The first topic for discussion concerns the type of indicators collected and the degree to which they are valid measures of general concepts used in development theory. Ginsburg's *Atlas* contains forty-seven economic indicators of various aspects of development and underdevelopment. Banks and Textor's *Survey* presents fifty-seven variables, about one-third of which code demographic, economic, and communication conditions, while the remaining two-thirds are static structural and functional political characteristics. In the *Handbook*, Russett and associates choose seventy-five indicators, which they describe as "central to several important theories of political or social change." But the statistical yearbooks published by the United Nations also contain cross-national data, so one might inquire whether the three volumes do something more than just compile raw data. Is there a theoretical rationale to explain why each indicator is chosen?

Ginsburg, a geographer, evidently has no purpose in mind in the *Atlas* except to provide a mapping of economic development. Rus-

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sett's *Handbook* makes only half-a-dozen attempts to discuss the extent to which any of its seventy-five indicators might be appropriate measures of concepts used in development theory or in any other theory of human behavior, and most of these sections are overconcise. Owing to the fact that one of the contributors to the volume is Harold Lasswell, the reader may find that the chapter headings seem remarkably similar to the eight Lasswellian values: power, respect, rectitude, affection, well-being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment have been operationalized, but without an explicit acknowledgment, and without integrating the indicators into a coherent theoretical approach.

Banks, on the other hand, has made a substantial contribution in his attempt to classify countries in accordance with several alternative typologies from development theory. Among the concepts that he operationalizes are those of Almond, Black, Dahl, Deutsch, Rostow, and Shils; he makes improvements in those of Binder, Neumann, and Wigmore; and he also includes and ingeniously explicates such long-enduring distinctions as totalitarian-authoritarian-constitutional and unicameral-bicameral. Though he admits considering originally a much larger list of possible characteristics, and discarding some for what he obscurely designates as "conceptual" reasons, he unfortunately spares the reader a discussion of why he found concepts to be workable or unworkable. The implication of Banks's exercise seems to be that in the future we should be very critical of new conceptual schemes that stop short of making a trial run to code countries along each newly proposed dimension.

II. Evaluation of Indicators

Before one can draw inferences on the basis of cross-national comparisons between aggregate data or codings, one must be reasonably confident that the indicators satisfy several customary criteria as measuring instruments. The validity criterion has been treated in the previous section, where the *Survey* proves to have been more careful than the *Atlas* and the *Handbook*, so it is now appropriate to evaluate the sensitivity, comparability, and reliability of data recorded in each volume.

Sensitivity

Indicators that permit fine discriminations in the cases under analysis are referred to as "sensitive." Ginsburg and Russett, accordingly, have sensitive measures, but Banks does not. The former give exact figures

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for each country, permitting the use of powerful correlational techniques to determine the linearity or curvilinearity, degree, direction, and clustering of relationships between variables. The latter has far too few classes in raw form, and the "finished" data are dichotomized before intercorrelations are taken, resulting in a loss in sensitivity which is restored cleverly but only partially by making provision for "staircasing" variables in the labyrinthine computer output.[1] Banks's possible justification for having a small number of coding classes is that functional and structural concepts are largely qualitative in nature, and that it would be impossible to code many countries reliably into category alternatives more precise than significant-moderate-limited-negligible. Nevertheless, his mention of a "relativism" in coding for resolving borderline decisions leads one to ask why borderline categories are not used in the first place. In one instance, Banks's penchant for oversimplification results in his use of a four-category division of extent of press freedom, despite the existence of Nixon's well-known ninefold classification.[2]

When Banks turns to data that are strictly quantitative, he proceeds again to overcollapse each distribution on the basis of some metaphysical notion that there are usually four "natural breaks" in cross-national distributions. Future users of *Survey* data undoubtedly will bypass characteristics 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14, which are collected more sensitively in the *Handbook*. In a second edition of *A Cross-Polity Survey*, increased sensitivity would result from a scaling by experts along a nine-point continuum for each qualitative characteristic, a step that Banks once apparently envisaged (p. 10).

COMPARABILITY

For indicators to be "comparable" they must have the same cultural meaning across the cases being investigated. The aim of recent functional typologies in the political development field has been to avoid equating structurally similar phenomena that play very different kinds of roles in various polities. A parallel concern in the analysis of aggregate statistical data is to express figures in percentages or rates, rather than magnitudes. For example, few suicides occur in Iceland, but in proportion to the population the rate is high.

[1] See Banks, 45-47. Very often, however, there is such a large pileup of cases in one of the initial attribute subdivisions that statistical significance cannot be attained with contingency correlation coefficients.

[2] Raymond B. Nixon, "Factors Related to Press Freedom," *Journalism Quarterly*, XXXVII (Winter 1960), 13-28; Nixon, "Freedom in the World's Press: A Fresh Appraisal with New Data," *Journalism Quarterly*, XLII (Winter 1965), 3-14.

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The authors seem fully aware of problems of comparability, the *Atlas* having the best record in this respect. The *Survey* arbitrarily excludes former Japanese and Ottoman-empire colonies from the Former Colonial Status characteristic, introducing a very minor degree of noncomparability. But the heterogeneity of five of Banks's characteristics (27, 28, 31, 42, 53) raises considerable doubt concerning comparability. In explaining how one of these items, Government Stability, was constructed, Banks states that he took (only?) three factors into account—suspension of a constitution, forcible ouster of an elected president, and frequent cabinet changes in a parliamentary system. His measure, however, is an intuitive, composite collapsing of all three (or more) items into one. There are two difficulties with this procedure. First of all, is a country without a constitution or an elected president or a parliament to be coded as unstable? Evidently Banks would place such a country into the Unascertainable category, which suggests that his indicators are parochial and in need of sharpening. The second issue, involving the vast majority of countries that do fit into a conventional Western categorization, concerns the use of intuitive indices when relevant statistical data could have been assembled instead. One indicator is easier to handle in analyzing data than three, but to collapse a set of indicators into one is to assume that there is an underlying unidimensionality among at least three measures of "stability." If the unidimensionality hypothesis is false, Banks's characteristic is noncomparable. One of the standard techniques for determining unidimensionality is factor analysis, and had Banks employed it he would have been able to report whether his three indices really are homogeneous. Given the ambiguous use of the term "stability" in political science, a multidimensional set of stability factors would be a most worthwhile advance. In Rudolph J. Rummel's recent work the existence of three empirically separate dimensions of both internal and external conflict is demonstrated by factor analysis.[8] Perhaps the time has come for political scientists to recognize that complex concepts cannot be indexed by single measures. Instead, scalogram and factor analysis will have to be employed much more frequently in the future, and we may have to join psychologists at last in regarding our major variables as factors composed of clusters of indicators, rather than continuing to reify single indicators.

Comparability is also a problem in the *Handbook*, especially with respect to indicators reporting the percentage of electorates voting for

[8] "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *General Systems*, VIII (1963), 1-50.

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particular political parties. Whether votes are used as measures of a country's general ideological orientation or the degree to which a certain kind of party's platforms are endorsed, or as a reflection of the degree of consensus in a political system, comparability will always be troublesome. It is well established that most voters do not justify their choices on the basis of party programs; degree of issue orientation, furthermore, is likely to drop considerably from the electorates of rationalistic, developed countries to those of the charisma-oriented, less developed nations. Even within economically similar countries the party programs of socialist parties differ greatly, from the relatively conservative parties of France and Western Germany to more radical elements in Italy and Japan. Similarly, while the authors seek to measure Communist strength, which is provided in yearly estimates published by the U.S. Department of State,[4] they use Communist votes instead.

What such examples reveal is a low level of sophistication in our discipline with respect to the task of selecting culturally equivalent indicators for large samples of countries. We perhaps need to develop a "political anthropology" of our own by establishing functional equivalence among various political practices in all the polities of the globe. Our present guesses or reliance on "conventional wisdom" need to be questioned and, where found satisfactory, codified in a form similar to the Human Relations Area Files.[5] Only Banks's volume has such an objective in mind, though few of his insights are made explicit.

A much more serious source of noncomparability is the time element represented. The *Atlas* figures are for 1955-1956; the *Survey* does not specify the years covered, though most sources cited bear 1959-1961 publication dates; the *Handbook* has figures ranging from 1920 to 1961! So long as the reader is aware of the dates, there is no problem, but should one wish to process the data further, a number of difficulties arise. Clearly an intercorrelation of indicators representing a large variety of years would have little meaning, since nearly all propositions requiring correlational information postulate some time-ordering in the postulated effect of one variable upon another. In addition, one should be particularly suspicious of the *Handbook*'s attempts to

[4] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of Communist Party Organizations.*

[5] See George Peter Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York 1949). In contradistinction to my use of the term "political anthropology," Easton uses it to refer to the study by anthropologists of political arrangements and processes among preliterate peoples; see David Easton, "Political Anthropology," *Biennial Review of Anthropology*, 1 (1959), 210-62.

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derive estimates of yearly change from such data. The procedure in computing indicators 10, 36, 51, 61, and 65 was to difference magnitudes between two years (not the same years for all countries), then to divide the result by the total number of intervening years. Unlike part B.6 of the *Handbook*, entitled "Projections to 1975," where a Lorentz growth-curve model is assumed, the change index of these variables implausibly assumes a linear pattern of growth, and therefore countries with steady growth in a variable over a long period of time cannot be distinguished from those undergoing very rapid changes alternating with periods of stagnation. The six change indicators, consequently, cannot be used to test propositions of mass-society theory, where rates of change are more theoretically significant than magnitudes of change. Yet another requirement of a change indicator is that it should take initial levels into account, since change that might be stressful to underdeveloped countries could in fact be absorbed routinely into the social fabric of an advanced political system.

A final comparability dilemma is whether an overall characteristic of a fully mobilized country is as useful as one representing only the political sector of a partially mobilized country. For example, radio reception is much higher in populous Manila than throughout rural areas of the Philippines, so a national figure for the Philippines could be the same as one for a country where the radio audience is negligible in a small capital city but more evenly distributed throughout the rural countryside. The two cases may be equivalent for many purposes, but if we wish to study the policy-making process, the difference is significant inasmuch as urban pressures usually are more influential than rural pressures, especially in the area of foreign affairs. It is in response to this sort of problem that Ginsburg shades densely populated regions in each of his development maps. The use of the Gini index of inequality in the *Handbook* is an impressive step in the same direction.

RELIABILITY

The reliability criterion deals with data collection, rather than with how indicators are analyzed or justified theoretically. Reliability is high when the data-gathering process is so standardized that a team of data collectors follows exactly and completely the same rules of inclusion and exclusion. It is well known that the reliability of demographic data is greater among industrialized nations, whose populations have been exposed for a long time to governmental bureaucratic regulation and to scholarly inquiry. Judging from the number of

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country codings that were ambiguous or not ascertained, Banks was most confident of data on Western, developed countries. He states that to increase reliability he conferred with several foreign-country specialists in the Boston area, though unfortunately he does not formalize his consultations by presenting coefficients of interagreement. It is difficult for the reader to check on individual decisions, buried as they are in small type on pages 1380-81.

Ginsburg and Russett discuss reliability problems more explicitly, the latter assigning error estimates for each statistic, with one important exception—exchange rates used to convert from local currency to dollars. Both the *Atlas* and the *Handbook* tend to sacrifice reliability to achieve complete coverage. Such sources as Berkeley's International Urban Research Center and the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* are not so useful in cross-sectional analysis as in longitudinal analysis, a second form of aggregate analysis, which is to be explored here in Section IV. Another source accepted too uncritically is the Statistical Office of the United Nations. My own work in this area has led me to reject all budget figures in the UN *Statistical Abstract*, where particular fiscal-year reports appear only once or twice; I rely instead on national yearbooks, where budget estimates are revised from one issue to the next.

In restricting their attention to individual indicators, however, all three volumes fail to answer the familiar criticism that aggregate data are in general notoriously unreliable. Such a view needs to be answered, insofar as it represents a blanket indictment of all uses of aggregate data. Certainly some kinds of data are more reliable than others because some agencies collecting data are more scientific in their approach, and they therefore assemble complete, objective, statistical compendia. Economic and health data usually are collected by persons with advanced professional training. Sample survey data, now used throughout the world to measure communication habits, are of first-rate quality, too. Military and police statistics, on the other hand, are likely to be distorted because the relevant agencies have an ax to grind politically. Even within a particular time period a lack of reliability means only that some systematic error exists; if figures are inaccurate by a constant amount, this may not affect the computation of correlation coefficients in any way. A much more serious problem exists if category definitions change over time, or if data collection gradually becomes more complete in scope. Demographers, however, are generally careful to footnote these situations in statistical yearbooks, whereas few such qualifications are itemized by Ginsberg or Russett.

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In concluding this section, it should be remarked that all three books focus attention on the need for an improvement in the quality of currently available aggregate data. But the main audience toward which a plea for such improvement should be directed is not the authors but, instead, national demographers and their staffs, who are asked too often to operate on insufficient funds.

III. Substantive Results

The three volumes under review are not designed simply to be depositories of information, for their data have been manipulated in a number of ways to ascertain (1) interrelations among the variables, and (2) comprehensive dimensions that underlie the large numbers of indicators. Question (1) is handled by computing correlation coefficients; question (2) by factor analysis. The *Atlas* is more nearly a completed project, whereas analyses based on the *Survey* and the *Handbook* have just begun to emerge in separate papers.[6]

Two of the problems associated with correlational analysis are to decide which results are most meaningful to report and which correlation formula is appropriate. Berry, unlike the authors of the *Handbook* and the *Survey*, does not publish intercorrelations in his contribution to the *Atlas*. (In the *Survey*, measures of independence between 199 finished characteristics occupy pages 121 through 1378.) In both the *Handbook* and the *Survey*, however, some of the correlational results are discarded. Those based on a small number of cases are wisely excluded because they may not be representative of the total number of countries, for which full data could not be collected. But the decision to exclude correlations close to zero is most regrettable, inasmuch as support for the null hypothesis (namely, that there is no relation between two variables) is very significant information. As a result of this latter deficiency, future users of *Handbook* and *Survey* data will be forced to return to the original punch-card decks. But the interpretation of the correlations depends in the first place on whether the assumptions of the correlation coefficient selected in practice conform to the nature of the data. Though in the *Atlas* Berry parsimoni-

[6] Phillip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of *A Cross-Polity Survey*," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (September 1965), 602-14; Banks and Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems: Q-Factor Analysis of *A Cross-Polity Survey*," *American Behavioral Scientist*, IX (November 1965), 3-6; Banks, "A Cross-Polity Survey: Preliminary Analysis," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1964; Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York 1966); Richard Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations* (New Haven 1966).

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ously chooses a ranking procedure "because more faith was placed in the relative positions of countries than in the precise value of an index for any country," Alker apparently attempts to boost *Handbook* correlation magnitudes by using the Pearsonian product moment formula in conjunction with logarithmic transformations of distributions that deviate from normal curve patterns. Banks and Textor do not use a measure of relationship but one, rather, of independence; their justification for using Fisher's exact test of significance fails to persuade the reader that the decision is sound: as we shall see below, the sampling question is sidestepped completely.

The use of factor analysis with each of the three sets of data is straightforward. One of the purposes of factor analysis is to locate a small number of highly intercorrelated clusters of indicators within a larger number of variables for the purpose of data reduction.[7] The R-technique of factor analysis reduces the number of *indicators* to a set of factors that are *empirically* independent. Starting with Ginsburg's forty-seven variables, Brian Berry extracts four factors (instead of Ginsburg's six intuitive chapter headings)—Technology, Demographic, Wealth/International Connectivity, and Size. Banks and Gregg, in "Dimensions of Political Systems," reduce sixty-eight codings to Access, Differentiation, Consensus, Sectionalism, Legitimation, Interest, and Leadership factors. Russett, in "Delineating International Regions," extracts five factors from fifty-four of the *Handbook* indicators—Economic Development, Communism, Size, Catholic Culture, and Intensive Agriculture. It is interesting to note that Lasswell's eight categories prove not to be empirically independent of each other.

The Q-technique of factor analysis reduces the number of *cases* in the sample to a set of *empirical* classifications; cluster analysis produces a similar result by yielding groups of countries that most resemble one another on a large set of variables. Banks and Gregg use the Q-technique to derive five classifications—Polyarchic, Elitist, Centrist, Personalist, and Traditional. The Q-technique has not been employed so far with either *Atlas* or *Handbook* data, although a cluster analysis has been performed on both *Handbook* and *Survey* data. Russett's cluster analysis isolates five regions—Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Anglo-Saxon—while Banks's cluster analysis, in his "Preliminary Analysis," reveals three major clusters—Developed Western, Communist, and African—and a number of minor clusters, such as Traditionalist and Iberian countries.

[7] For a fuller discussion of the many purposes that factor analysis may serve, see Rudolph J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston, forthcoming), chap. 2.

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The theoretical import of such efforts is low, but the result of employing the R-technique is to know which are the more powerful and homogeneous indicators of a number of general concepts, thus permitting ambiguous variables to be dropped in subsequent studies in the interest of economy without a loss of theoretically important information. One can only support very strongly the further use of factor analysis in many areas of political science where ambiguous concepts and grab-bag theoretical frameworks still stifle progress. One use of the Q-technique is to provide a set of empirically derived categories that delineate different strata among countries for sampling purposes.

Ultimately the most important use to which aggregate data will be put is in the testing of specific propositions, which will enable theory to be corrected and pyramided. For uncomplicated theories a simple correlation will suffice, but to transcend the vexing *ceteris paribus* qualification inherent in bivariate analysis, one must be prepared to use more sophisticated multivariate techniques. In two sections of the *Handbook*, Hayward Alker tantalizingly illustrates two techniques for handling correlational data—multiple regression analysis (part E.4) and the analysis of covariance (part B.5). Unlike the rest of the book these sections lack a "how to do it" tone and are more suggestive of things to come from the Yale Political Data Program.

IV. Problems of Evidence and Inference

Two basic issues posed by the three volumes are whether cross-sectional information can ever be appropriate for the testing of development theory and, if so, how far one can generalize confidently with findings derived from such data. The former problem deals with data requirements for certain kinds of theories; the latter is concerned with sampling and the extent to which poor data block definitive conclusions.

It is evident from the theoretical discussions within each book that the authors intend to use cross-sectional data to test longitudinal hypotheses, and for this reason alone the reader may react negatively at first. To study political and economic development cross-nationally, the most appropriate procedure would instead be to collect longitudinal series of data for a large number of countries; intercorrelations among variables within one country should be examined first and only then should be compared with results obtained for other countries to see whether development patterns are consistent. To correct a false impression, many data of this type *are* available and have

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been used for decades by economists. The further back one goes (especially before 1920) the more the sources of error in the data, though systematic error is a more serious problem in cross-sectional analysis than in longitudinal analysis. At least two comparative longitudinal analyses have been conduced in recent years in political science,[8] and the studies of Kuznets in economics and Durkheim in sociology remain classics. The authors of the books under review are aware that cross-sectional analysis is a second-best method, and they plough ahead fully expecting that many of their findings may be false leads that will prove embarrassing in time.

In my use of aggregate data to determine the relationship between social change and international aggression, I have found, quite unexpectedly, that there is considerable empirical similarity between the results of both kinds of analysis. With only a few exceptions the conclusions of longitudinal analysis have been identical with those of cross-sectional analysis. Since it is cheaper and simpler to conduct the latter, the additional theoretical payoff from the former may not be worth the extra labor when one is trying to build theory in a previously unexplored field. But when a substantial body of theory already has been formulated, as on political development, only accurate answers can advance the field.

An advantage of longitudinal analysis is that the comparability problem is reduced; even over long time periods it is likely that a given characteristic will have the same cultural meaning within a single political system. Comparative longitudinal studies enable one to test the "regionality" hypothesis, that is, whether variables are intercorrelated differently from one cultural area to another. In my study, for example, it was found that even within a single culturally homogeneous group of countries there is a broad scatter of correlations between suicide rates and proportions of military to total budget expenditures, whereas by stratifying the sample in terms of economic development much less scatter turned up within distributions of countries at similar stages of economic development.

Yet another reason to prefer longitudinal analysis is to surmount an old bugaboo, the "correlation is not causation" maxim. For instance, one cannot be sure that economic development is one of a set of factors responsible for declining fertility rates if it turns out that a ranking of countries by per capita gross national product in 1960 is the inverse

[8] Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," *World Politics*, XIII (January 1961), 267-99; Michael Haas, "Social Change and National Aggressiveness," in Singer, *Quantitative International Politics*.

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of fertility rate rankings in the same year. Insofar as it is impossible for an effect to precede its cause, longitudinal research can be designed to ascertain the directionality of relationships between variables. After plotting two variables for each country separately, one can observe whether trends in postulated independent variables consistently precede those in the hypothesized dependent variable. Results may be computed as time-lagged correlations between per capita GNP of year x and fertility of year $x + n$.

The problem of the generalizability of cross-national analysis, however, applies equally to both cross-sectional and longitudinal methods, and when one seeks to make statements about parameters (the universe of all possible cases), the question of sampling arises. Banks claims that his sample of 115 independent political systems is a total sample of the universe, thereby "obviating" the problem of sampling error. But dependencies are included in both the *Atlas* and the *Handbook*, implicitly contradicting his assertion. In cross-national research the total universe so far is unknown, and no conceptual tools have been supplied to stratify it into meaningful subsamples. Banks is impressed with the independent-dependent dichotomy, but in studying economic and political development does our concern with a country begin only when it has achieved independent status? One of the *Atlas* findings is that becoming fully sovereign makes very little difference economically, and, if we accept Pye's analysis, independence also makes little difference for the sequencing of actions in the political process of non-Western polities.[9] Moreover, the exclusion of smaller states, such as Andorra and Oman, appears to be justified more by temporary convenience than by theoretical necessity. A comprehensive theory of politics can ill afford to make arbitrary sampling choices indefinitely.

In evaluating the substantive results of the three volumes, one sees that a subtle sampling artifact, however, has produced an effect which weakens generalizability. When one is not interested in estimating parameters but prefers to determine relationships between variables, rigid requirements for a representative or randomly selected sample often are relaxed. But if a particular category of possible countries is systematically excluded from a sample, the correlation will be interpreted to have a more restricted meaning. Accordingly, we have noted that the least developed countries were the most difficult for Banks to code, and the same states report little data that could have been used by Ginsburg and Russett. Consequently, *Survey* and *Handbook*

[9] *Atlas*, 116-17; Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building* (New Haven 1962), chap. 2.

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correlations can be interpreted as representative only of a group of countries heavily skewed toward the Westernized, developed portion of the universe. Though it may seem paradoxical, only a smaller sample of countries can resolve the problem. Using the dimensions extracted by factor analyses as a means of establishing empirically distinct types of countries, one would pick a sample of countries randomly within each stratum; should there be no data for a country that one had selected on the basis of a random number table, one would simply select another randomly in its place. A similar pragmatic procedure is used in survey research when the individual who has been selected to interview is not at home, though a skewing toward stay-at-homes results. With a stratum of nonstatistically oriented countries established in advance, parameter estimates may be adjusted accordingly.

Perhaps the most intriguing question of all concerns the time dimension. To have a truly comparative theory must we not investigate the Republic of Venice, the American Confederacy, and the ancient states of Rome and Kiev as well? In international relations several theorists already have shared the realization that system theory can be explored much more thoroughly by studying ancient and isolated international subsystems.[10] Data are not abundant for studying these early periods, but when a theory requires an investigation where only low-quality data are available, one must proceed nevertheless. The only limit to the theoretically rich research horizon is a total lack of relevant data. One will not be inclined, of course, to allow conclusions drawn from poor data to upset those based on data of higher quality.

V. Conclusion

Ultimately the choice for or against aggregate analysis will be based on the "utility" criterion, that is, whether results of the utilization of aggregate data in the political development field are sufficient to justify the expense and time that aggregate analysis demands. The selection of any method of data collection does not take place in a vacuum but is made in comparison with other available techniques, such as content analysis, experimentation, or survey research. In development theory all four potentially could serve the same research objectives.

The use of *content analysis*, a technique for the systematic analysis of recorded communications, has been stymied so far because either

[10] George Modelski, "Comparative International Systems," *World Politics*, XIV (July 1962), 662-74; Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957); Michael Haas, "A Functional Approach to International Organization," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (August 1965), 498-517; Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston 1963).

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the need to resolve the perplexing issue of how to separate manifest from latent meaning has been ignored or efforts to resolve it have been unsuccessful. Face-value meaning may be manipulated by the communicator in such a way that quantitative procedures will lead to erroneous results, while few devices for tapping theoretically significant latent meanings have been validated. The most intriguing use of quantitative content analysis is that of David C. McClelland in comparative national character analysis.[11] Content analysis may be a convenient way to explore statements of persons who play authoritative roles in decisions concerning political modernization, since such decision-makers are often reluctant to be subjected to the other data collection procedures of social scientists. But simulation and experimental methods as well as survey techniques can be employed much more flexibly and with results that are more precise and prolific per dollar spent.

Experiments relevant to political development have only recently appeared, and a laboratory approach promises to be exceedingly fruitful in the long run.[12] Because of the difficulty of inferring from laboratory results to the outside world, one position is that equivalent effort could be spent just as well on studying actual political situations. In my view, these difficulties are exaggerated and may diminish with methodological progress in the use of political simulation. But what is needed most of all is the imagination to conceive of significant political development theories that could be tested in laboratory settings, where one can control variables and infer causality with considerable confidence, as is not possible in the outside world.

Although *surveys* have been used for several years within some developing countries, only very recently have they spread extensively throughout the world. The theoretical payoff from survey research is extremely high, since a very large number of propositions from development theory are concerned with attitudes, and both the public and elites in the newer countries often feel flattered and glib while being interviewed. Insofar as the raw data of aggregate analysis are derived from various types of surveys, usually the census, progress in survey research will go hand in hand with developments in aggregate analysis.

[11] *The Achieving Society* (Princeton 1961). For a discussion of current problems in content analysis, see Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., *Trends in Content Analysis* (Urbana 1959).

[12] Andrew M. Scott, with William A. Lucas and Trudi M. Lucas, *Simulation and National Development* (New York 1966).

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In comparison with the previous methods, to use *aggregate statistics* one does not have to travel abroad or learn a new language, except perhaps Fortran. A great deal of information can be processed quickly and cheaply, and the reservoir of available data virtually remains untapped. The level of methodological sophistication is relatively high but within the grasp of a neophyte, and the number of theories for which the data are suitable seem almost unlimited. Tightening of demographic procedures in developing countries is essential if their leaders are sincere about achieving the goal of economic modernization, so much more attention is likely to be focused on this type of analysis in years to come. Similarly, in order to run welfare states in developed countries in an effective fashion, more extensive aggregate data will have to be collected. Most governments are aware that sample surveys are less expensive and more accurate than censuses, so we may soon see the quality of aggregate statistics improve enormously. Eventually we may see the day when present scattered data collection by independent social researchers will be absorbed and standardized within governmental bureaucracies, at the insistence of social scientists. With our hands relatively free from the task of data collection in the field, we can devote ourselves more exclusively to hypothesis-testing and theory-building as confirmed practitioners of aggregate analysis.

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THE EMERGING FIELD OF NATIONAL SECURITY

By P. G. BOCK and MORTON BERKOWITZ

Davis B. Bobrow, editor, *Components of Defense Policy*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965, 445 pp. $3.95 (paper).

Dale J. Hekhuis, Charles G. McClintock, and Arthur L. Burns, editors, *International Stability: Military, Economic and Political Dimensions*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1964, 296 pp. $6.00.

E. S. Quade, editor, *Analysis for Military Decisions*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1964, 382 pp. $10.00.

Herbert C. Kelman, editor, *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, 626 pp. $12.95.

I

ONE of the most striking developments in post-World War II social science research has been the emergence of an area of inquiry commonly called national security affairs. The impetus for this development can be ascribed primarily to two major changes in the international environment: the atmosphere of urgency generated by the unremitting stress of the cold war and the emergence of a fabulous new technology of violence. This technology took the traditional military problems of strategy and war out of the hands of the military and put them into the hands of civilian experts who previously had not applied their expertise to military affairs. Furthermore, since war came to be viewed as a self-defeating policy alternative, scholars and policy-makers were compelled to pay serious and systematic attention to the development of methods of conflict containment and conflict resolution.

Once the complexity of national security affairs became obvious, new institutions and modes of administration had to be introduced.[1] The establishment of the National Security Council and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs after World War II marked the beginning of governmental concern with the new field. The National Security Act of 1947 specifically talks of providing for "integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and functions of the Government relating to the national se-

[1] Only a few highlights of this institutional growth can be given here. For a fuller description, see Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, *Schools for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs* (New York 1965).

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curity" (Section 2).[2] But governmental institutions alone were not adequate to handle all the aspects of national security, and so techniques were evolved to tap the facilities of industry and academia. Citizen committees and study groups, although by no means new or unique to the area of national security, were used with greater frequency in the 1950's. The difficult technical questions, however, needed the services of leading scientists, engineers, and other specialists on a fairly regular basis. Since only a limited number of these people can be recruited as full-time government employees, different methods of contracting began to evolve, leading, in turn, to new institutional arrangements.

Most prominent among these new institutions were the private research organizations supported largely by defense contracts and working almost exclusively in areas that interested the contract-giver. Each of the armed forces and the Defense Department established its organization—The RAND Corporation (Air Force), The Operations Research Office (Army), The Operations Evaluation Group (Navy), and The Institute of Defense Analyses (Department of Defense).

In addition, these and other agencies, as well as congressional committees, began to commission independent scholars and experts to conduct studies of various military, economic, and legal subjects related to national security. While many of these were contracted for and conducted individually, the majority were assigned to private companies (e.g., General Electric) or research organizations (such as the Brookings Institution or the Council on Foreign Relations) or to centers and institutes connected with leading universities (Harvard's Defense Studies Program, Princeton's Center of International Studies, Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies, and so on). All these institutions, in contrast to those previously mentioned, are largely financed by their parent universities, by foundations, or by other private sources.

This institutional proliferation has made an increasing number of national security experts available to the government, and the institutions have, in turn, absorbed many government experts after they left the service. This exchange of personnel and the accompanying exchange of information has not been completely free of problems, as

[2] The very titles of the institutions established by the Act, by containing the phrase "national security" where in previous periods "military affairs," "foreign affairs," or "foreign policy" would have been more likely choices, indicate an emerging awareness of the need for a new concept. Moreover, the wording of the Act suggests that national security was beginning to be considered a broad area of related policies and not merely one of many national objectives. These points will be amplified later in this article.

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the growing literature about the proper role of the scientist (or civilian strategist) in government suggests.[3] Less politically controversial, perhaps, but of greater concern to us in this article, is the body of literature that has resulted from the work of these institutions and the interaction of these specialists. For this literature indicates the progress of national security from an area of inquiry toward a full-fledged academic discipline.

Scholarly work on national security has grown very rapidly but also very erratically. Because of the highly technical nature of many of the problems, because of the many disciplines of the researchers, and because of the frequent need for secrecy, there has been no steady growth of a unified body of knowledge. Rather, different scholars have tackled separate problems in disparate ways, using a wide variety of methodologies from the various natural and social sciences. Thus far there have been very few attempts either to define the concept of national security and make it operationally meaningful (a problem we shall return to later) or to draw the boundaries of national security as a field of study. Nevertheless, there are, we feel, unmistakable signs, institutional and intellectual, of the possible emergence of a new discipline, or at least of the incorporation of national security into international relations.[4] Universities are beginning to offer courses and even programs in national security (or security studies) and books are being published for use in these programs. More important, these institutional developments suggest an intellectual awareness of the existence of an ill-defined but real framework for the hitherto completely separate subjects and approaches.

II

The four books under review illustrate these past developments and show the new directions that the discipline of national security is taking. They do so in several different ways.

First, the affiliations of the various authors and editors illustrate our point about the growth of institutions concerned with national security. The Quade book consists of lectures given by RAND Corporation personnel in "an intensive five-day course . . . to military officers and civilians associated with the armed forces" (p. v). The Hekhuis book is the result of a conference held by TEMPO (a division of General

[3] See, for example, Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., *Scientists and National Policy-Making* (New York 1964); and Anatol Rapoport, *Strategy and Conscience* (New York 1964).

[4] See Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock, *American National Security: A Reader in Theory and Policy* (New York 1965), esp. p. x and Bibliography.

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Electric devoted to national security research). The Kelman book was conceived by a "workgroup" of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues and represents the work of academic social scientists, edited by a social psychologist. The Bobrow book was edited by an independent political scientist working at the Center of International Studies at Princeton University.

Second, it is no accident that all four volumes are collections of articles by different authors. The infant state of national security studies does not encourage the formulation of general theories or the writing of extensive treatises. Rather, most attempts are on the level of articles (or even books) dealing with very specific issues. However, the mere fact that many of these studies are collected in anthologies and that some of these anthologies have rather clearly defined frameworks and criteria of selection suggests that a trend toward the consolidation of the diverse strands has begun. Each of the four books has such a framework, as will be pointed out below.

Finally, the content of these four volumes represents, in capsule form, the major features that we discern in the field of national security.[5] Most writings in this field can be grouped in two ways: either according to their approach to the concept of national security and the policies that this conception entails, or according to the level of analysis used by the writers. In the first grouping we can usually distinguish between writers who emphasize the maximization of national power as the primary goal of national security policy and those who stress the minimization of that power and the increase of international cooperation. The first believe that the only realistic approach to international problems is through the zero-sum-game view, because the international system is predominantly conflictual and, therefore, one nation's security gains are possible only at the expense of another's (or of several others'). In contrast, the writers who stress the minimization of national power feel that a non-zero-sum-game view is the realistic one, and that the security of all nations can be increased by the cooperative efforts of one (or many). In the grouping according to levels of analysis, we can generally distinguish works that deal primarily with specific, individual policies and policy problems from works that emphasize methodology and techniques for approaching whole classes of policies or problems.

It should be quite clear that these divisions are idealized; none of the books reviewed falls completely into one of the four subdivisions; in fact, there is a certain amount of overlap among them. However,

[5] *Ibid.*, ix-xiii.

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we can say that Bobrow and Quade represent the conflict approach, and Hekhuis and Kelman the cooperation approach. Furthermore, Bobrow and Hekhuis concentrate primarily on policy, and Quade and Kelman emphasize methodology. Thus, together they fill all the cells of a two-by-two table. We shall now briefly examine the specific contributions of each volume.

In the context of the field of national security, the collection of articles in Bobrow's *Components of Defense Policy* is illustrative of the approach to security characterized by the search for rational, efficient ways of mobilizing the resources of national power. The book, like the field of national security, rests upon the assumption that the social sciences, with their accumulated body of concepts and methodologies, can provide valuable inputs for defense policy analysis and can increase the possibility of generating accurate predictions about the consequences of alternative defense strategies.

The introductory essay attempts to draw a map of the social science sector of defense policy analysis, and each of the other papers offers an example of the types of questions generated by the social science approach. This topographical map is drawn around four categories of inquiry, which also form the four sections of the book:

1. The first category comprises those characteristics of the external world and its actors which are relevant to the defense policies of the nation from whose vantage point we are viewing this world. This category, in Bobrow's terminology, is "the strategic context." Particular attention in this section is paid to the policy-making process of *foreign* states, their ideological biases, and their military, political, and economic capabilities.

2. The internal characteristics of a state, its political process and its decision-makers, which affect the choice and implementation of its defense policy, make up the category that Bobrow rather awkwardly calls "defense policy making." The individual papers examine several of these characteristics from the point of view of achieving optimum mobilization of the resources of a nation.

3. The third category, which Bobrow calls "strategic alternatives," is apparently only a collection of the available military strategies from which decision-makers can choose—this despite the editor's disclaimer of a military bias and his insistence that both war and peace strategies can be included. Of the nine articles in this section, seven deal with clearly military subjects, e.g., guerrilla warfare, civil defense, limited war; the remaining two selections, while dealing with problems of disarmament, treat them, too, as essentially military strategies.

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4. The phrase "quality control" is used to describe the fourth category, because of its suggestion of accurate information, rationality in decisions, flexibility, and innovation. While these may be the recognizable stages of any quality control process in industry, as used in this book they do little more than provide chapter headings for the individual selections. The topics covered include the proper relationship between intelligence and intelligence agencies and policy-making; the means-end model as a tool for exploring rationality in decisions; the problem of flexibility in the choice of decisions designed to foreclose the least number of future options; the possible contributions of the intellectual community to the "practical administrator" in government; the psycho-societal factors determining the relationship between belief systems, image perceptions, and decision-making; and the application of systems analysis to military planning in conditions of uncertainty. These papers seem linked, at best, by a common concern for the improvement of the quality of decisions, and sometimes even this link is stretched to the breaking point.

The papers collected in Hekhuis, McClintock, and Burn's *International Stability* explore the military, economic, and political nature of the future international environment as conceived by the authors. The assumption underlying all the contributions is that changes in the environment are always potential threats to the stability of the international system, and the theme that binds together the various essays is their authors' attempt to identify strategies for coping with change.

The introductory essay attempts to define the condition of system stability and to identify the major disruptive changes likely during the coming decade. Hekhuis defines stability as a function of the absence of violent responses to change, and outlines the following areas in which potential crises may be anticipated: the rapid growth of populations and the proliferation of new states, the new military technology and the diffusion of nuclear weapons, and the behavioral effects of rapidly increasing tensions on the patterns of response by national elites. Each of the succeeding essays discusses the possibilities of formulating policies designed to deal with these identified threats to stability so as to increase the probability of nonviolent responses. Strategies of foreign aid and development, of deterrence, arms control, and disarmament, and of regional integration are all considered from this point of view.

Since stability of the system is regarded as a desirable value for all the actors within the national system, and is clearly thought of as

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simultaneously increasing the security of all actors, these studies fall among those seeking security through restraints upon national power.

We might point out that the fact that this is a study stimulated by a research organization sponsored wholly by one of our leading defense contractors warns against easy generalizations about the types of approaches likely to be taken by the different groups working within the field of national security.

E. S. Quade's *Analysis for Military Decisions* is the most tightly organized of the four books, not only because it is the result of an extremely well-organized course of lectures but also (and perhaps primarily) because its subject matter is the narrowest and the best defined. It deals comprehensively with an approach that RAND has refined for doing "scientific statistical research on problems of national security" (p. 2)—in this case, problems of military planning. The contributors to this volume would be the first to acknowledge that the approach has not yet been perfected. However, there is no doubt that The RAND Corporation deserves the most credit and bears the primary responsibility for bringing it to its present level of sophistication.

The approach is called systems analysis, and is a direct descendant of the "operations analysis" techniques developed during World War II. Variations and extensions of these methods are known as "operations research," "systems engineering," "management science," and "cost effectiveness analysis" (p. 3). In his introductory essay, Quade clearly explains these different terms and their origins, properly deplores the loose use of the term "systems analysis," and defines it in the context of RAND studies as "inquiry to aid a decisionmaker choose a course of action by systematically investigating his proper objectives, comparing quantitatively where possible the costs, effectiveness, and risks associated with the alternative policies or strategies for achieving them and formulating additional alternatives if those examined are found wanting." "Systems analysis," he continues, "represents an approach to, or way of looking at, complex problems of choice under uncertainty, such as those associated with national security" (p. 4).

The need for such a methodology became evident as soon as the complexity of national security problems began to be understood. Mathematical techniques, like linear programing and queuing theory, which were often adequate for and generally at the center of solutions to wartime operations research, no longer sufficed in the postwar context. After the war, the character of the research was radically changed; the emphasis was no longer on how to *implement* policies but on how to *make* and *select* them. In other words, a policy science was needed.

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Part Two of Quade's book examines the elements of systems analysis. These elements—objectives, alternatives, models, costs, and criteria—are all familiar in different social science contexts, but the essays in this part make their relevance to systems analysis especially clear. The articles on the scientific calculation of costs, on criteria for choosing desired alternatives, and on building models that adequately describe relationships between alternatives and costs are especially illuminating. However, when it comes to the question of selecting the objective and the alternatives to be analyzed, the articles are much less satisfactory, and one is left in doubt about the superiority of systems analysis over any other way of "hard thinking."

The book really comes into its own in the section dealing with the specific techniques that make up systems analysis. Here we find excellent and not overtechnical explanations of the use of mathematics (e.g., linear programing, Monte Carlo, and game theory), of computers, of gaming, of costing methods, and of special technological and psychological considerations.

The big question, of course, is just how useful *is* the method? We must point out at once that the editor and the authors of individual essays are constantly drawing attention to limitations and shortcomings in the method as a whole, and in its various parts. This might disarm the critic, but should not prevent an attempt at evaluation. And for that we can do no better than to look at the concrete examples provided by the authors. Nearly all have to do with rather limited military problems, ranging from the use and selection of strategic air bases (once the concept of a strategic air force is decided upon) to estimating the cost of a particular weapons system, or choosing to develop one type of missile rather than another. Within this range, on the basis of the evidence presented, the method must be declared successful; it clearly obtains results superior to those that can be achieved by other means.

But what about the application of systems analysis to broader problems? Here, although the authors make a point of being careful, they seem to claim too much. While systems analysis may be applicable to economic "development, disarmament and deterrence" and may be "adaptable to planning and analysis in many non-military fields" (p. 2), there is no evidence for this in the book. However, these essays should certainly stimulate future efforts to apply this useful method to nonmilitary problems.

Kelman's *International Behavior* is an ambitious attempt to outline a rather new area of specialization, "the social psychology of international

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relations." To the extent that this field covers the study of all "the social-psychological processes that occur when nationals and governments interact" (p. x), it is somewhat broader than the field of national security. However, since problems of war and peace are central to both areas, and since most of the recent work in both fields attempts to define "aspects of war and peace as researchable problems to which the tools of behavioral science can be applied" (p. 3), the relevance of this book to the field of national security is evident.

The most useful part of this collection consists of the introductory and concluding essays by the editor. They provide the best statement we have seen of the possible contributions of social-psychological concepts and methods to the study of some of the national security problems mentioned earlier. Kelman quite properly points to shortcomings of the earlier psychological approaches which concentrated on individual motivations and perceptions almost to the exclusion of the social and political processes that supply the environment for them. He advocates, instead, "a general theory of international relations in which psychological factors play a part once the points in the process at which they are applicable have been properly identified" (p. 7).

After delineating the specific areas where social psychology can make and has made contributions to international relations—more of these later—Kelman tries to come to grips with the question of the appropriate level of analysis for different problems. He then divides the analysis of international behavior into two major areas of concern: (1) *Imagery*: How individuals and groups conceive of their own nation, other nations, and the international system, and (2) *Interaction*: How individuals and groups of one nation interact with those of another—officially and unofficially, directly and symbolically. This division also provides the organizing scheme of the book: the first part deals with national and international images, the second with processes of interaction.

The individual essays illustrate the interdisciplinary and eclectic nature of this new field of study. Although a social-psychological framework—in the broadest sense—is used in most of the contributions, the authors are not only psychologists and sociologists; anthropologists and political scientists are also represented, and the field as a whole accommodates economists, mathematicians, and historians as well. Furthermore, the variety of methods used in these studies represents almost the full range of social science methodology. Interviews with informants, documentary content analysis, case studies of organizations, surveys, laboratory experiments, and simulation are all frequently

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used. No less remarkable, as Kelman points out, is the methodological harmony in the field. Researchers are quite willing to use a large variety of sources of data, and to switch from one technique to another when the problem changes. There is not even a split between "theory-building" and "practical application," or between "methodological concerns" and "policy issues."

The reason the essays in this collection are so representative of the whole field is that for the most part they are summaries of work done on a specific topic. They therefore eschew detailed methodological descriptions and concentrate on research findings. The topics covered in the first part range over childhood socialization in preliterate societies; international images in modern societies as determined by attitude studies and opinion polls; effects of events on international images (e.g., Sputnik); effects of tourism on images; images in the context of international conflict, specifically the cold war; and induction of change in images by governmental efforts. The second part deals with even broader subjects: international "moods" and how they might affect international actions; defining and measuring the relationships between nationalism, ideology, conflict, and conflict resolution; threat perception; decision-making; bargaining and negotiation in international politics; and the impact of personal international contacts on decision-makers and others.

In his concluding essay Kelman addresses himself to the most important problem faced by the field: the relevance of research on the international behavior of individuals. He shows, quite persuasively, that the social-psychological approach has a direct relevance to specific aspects of foreign policy, and to the broad questions of war and peace. One illustration will have to suffice here. It has become quite obvious in recent years that American deterrence strategies were from the outset based on assumptions about Soviet intentions that subsequent events belied. Studies have shown that these assumptions were based on assessments of Soviet capabilities rather than on scientific analysis of the motivations of Soviet leadership and its images. In sum, the essay shows that the social-psychological dimension is a crucial supplement to the historical-political one and an essential component of national security analyses.

III

Throughout this discussion of the intellectual origins, institutional development, and recent research in the field of national security, we have assiduously avoided the ticklish problem of exactly what is meant

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by national security. Problems of definition, of course, bedevil all sciences in their early stages of development. (Political science has, of late, been particularly preoccupied with problems of self-identity.) In the field of national security such problems are especially acute and intractable. This is so, in part, because of the haste with which investigations have been launched in response to urgent policy needs. But perhaps even more important has been the undisciplined flood of writings and speeches by journalists, independent commentators, government officials, and churchmen, all testifying to the fact that national security is a critical area of public concern. In fact, there is hardly a national policy that has not been publicly justified by an almost ritualistic appeal to some mystical "national security interest." The term has been used as a rhetorical phrase by politicians, as a specific military objective by generals, and as a promise of utopia by political evangelists. All this has served to create a blanket of smog that has made disciplined inquiry almost impossible.

It is only very recently, and largely as a result of the intellectual and institutional developments we have previously discussed, that social scientists have begun to examine the nature of national security as an analytic concept capable of organizing the field and making it more susceptible to rigorous scientific inquiry.

Such examinations have, of course, not arisen by spontaneous combustion. Certainly the origins of the concept of national security—at least in the United States—can be found in the differing historical formulations of the concept of national interest. James Madison was already aware of the existence of interests and goals, national in scope, and differing substantially from the more limited and selfish goals pursued by subnational groups. His treatment of the problem of factions, in *Federalist No. 10*, for instance, is obviously informed by this awareness. As Robert Dahl has pointed out, Madisonian democracy rests on the image of a political system successfully synthesizing a majoritarian national or public interest out of the competing interests of subnational groups.[6]

Earlier, Charles Beard, writing at a time when the process of national integration had been substantially completed, took a somewhat different view.[7] Rather than viewing the national interest as a distillation of the interests of subnational groups, Beard assigned supreme value to the self-interest of the dominant economic classes in society.

[6] *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago 1956).

[7] *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* (New York 1934).

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He pointed out that historically the use of the term "national interest," instead of "raison d'état," "dynastic interest," "national honor," and so on, coincided with the emergence of the modern, commercial, nation-state. Through superior material and intellectual resources, Beard said, the dominant economic groups in a society usually succeeded in identifying their own self-interest with the national interest to such an extent that the identification was accepted by most other groups in the society.

Under the impact of World War II and the steady growth of American leadership responsibilities in the international arena, Hans Morgenthau reacted to what he considered an excessive use of idealistic elements in determining the national interest, and attempted a more precise systematic formulation of the concept.[8] According to Morgenthau, the only clear meaning that can be assigned to the national interest is the fact that nations always act, or should act (it is never clear which), to maximize their power positions in the international system. The national interest, therefore, must always be defined in terms of policies calculated to increase the power of a nation. At first glance, Morgenthau's position would seem to be an even more simplistic explanation than Beard's. However, on closer inspection the limitations of Morgenthau's formulation turn out to be quite different. Under the term "power" Morgenthau attempted an ambitious integration of the many component parts of the national interest, resulting in a concept so broad, ambiguous, and all-embracing as to preclude any precision of meaning.

The real significance of Morgenthau's work is that his use of the term "national interest" seems to foreshadow a basic shift from what Arnold Wolfers has called the "welfare aspects" of the term to the "security aspects."[9] This was foreshadowed even earlier by Walter Lippmann. "A nation has security," he wrote, "when it does not have to sacrifice legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war."[10] A further implication of Lippmann's analysis is that national security is not simply one of many competing national interests, but that it represents an underlying interest that has served to integrate the many diverse strands of the national interest.

The development of systems theory in the 1950's led to a further refinement of the concept of national security. In his pioneering work

[8] *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York 1951).

[9] "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVII (December 1952), 481-502.

[10] *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston 1943), 51.

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System and Process in International Politics,[11] Morton Kaplan treats the national security interest as simply one aspect, albeit an important one, of the general problem of systems maintenance. The security of the national system is closely linked to the interest and values of the subsystems that make it up.

From this line of development, a rough consensus has emerged among contemporary scholars about the nature of national security. Implicitly, if not explicitly, when they use the term "national security," they mean *the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats*. And the field of national security, as it has developed, concerns itself with studying how nations plan, make, and evaluate the decisions and policies designed to protect their internal values from external threats.

It is perhaps obvious to the reader that many of the problems identified here have, in the past, fallen within the scope of foreign policy studies. The study of foreign policy, however, has generally been characterized by a certain degree of parochialism, an addiction to rigid dichotomies between domestic and foreign spheres of activity, and a lack of meaningful comparative analysis. These shortcomings can be largely attributed to serious weaknesses in the concept of national interest which provided the conceptual basis for most of the work in the field of foreign policy.

National interest in this context has usually meant nothing more than the sum of all the policies and activities of a state which might bring it some advantage. In the past, most studies of the national interest simply attempted to identify specific policies that it would be desirable to pursue in various parts of the world, or to expose the alleged enduring goals toward which states tend to move. Until recently, very little attention was paid to the general premises and values underlying this web of specific interests. Whatever attempts were made almost always equated the national interest with the quest for power. The concept of power, however, was seldom defined with any degree of precision—a lack making it almost useless as an analytic tool. Too often, power tended to be treated as an end in itself, rather than as a means for the protection of specific sets of values. In these cases, it usually was presented as a metaphysical "urge toward power" that provided the unconscious motivation of states. The few attempts to define power more precisely served only to expose its narrowness as an organizing concept. Since the increase in one nation's power can

[11] (New York 1957).

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only be achieved at the expense of a decrease in another's, the power orientation was relevant only in conflict situations.

In addition, the concept of national interest has been widely used by both policy-makers and analysts as a means for choosing "desirable" national values over "undesirable" subnational values. This entanglement in an inevitably subjective and value-laden process of choice is another important reason for the ambiguity and elusiveness of the concept.

Lastly, the national-interest focus has given the study of foreign policy a predisposition to emphasize the distinctiveness of each nation's policies and interests. This particularism has been one of the chief obstacles to the development of any really meaningful comparative analysis of foreign policies.

The question that confronts us now is whether or not the concept of national security offers a more fruitful method of structuring the traditional concerns of foreign policy studies and organizing the growing mass of empirical data in this field.

The concept of national security, while tied to specific sets of national values to be protected, does not attempt to offer itself as an aid in helping to choose among desirable and undesirable values. Rather, it accepts the prevailing values as determined by the national political processes and defined by the authoritative national decision-makers, and concerns itself exclusively with the means of protecting these values. It is, therefore, a far less subjective concept than the national interest, and the outlook for its operational definition is much brighter.

National security avoids the misleading dichotomy between internal and external policy; it joins the two by envisaging both as designed to protect the same set of values and ultimately to maintain the national, and even, under certain circumstances, the international, system. In this sense, the study of national security, while concentrating on the external aspects of systems maintenance, allows us to see them as part of the whole process.

The security orientation has also added a further dimension to the narrow concerns of foreign policy with conflict situations. It makes room, conceptually, for the consideration of common international interests, which could result in a simultaneous increase of security for all the actors in the international system. It is relevant, therefore, to both zero-sum-game and non-zero-sum-game images of the international political process. The maintenance of the international system is seen as one of the possible legitimate values of national policy.

The national security approach has another advantage. By focusing

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on common elements and uniformities in the external policies of states, and by projecting the image of an international system bearing a functional relationship to national security policies, it greatly facilitates the development of systematic comparative analysis. It opens up possibilities of comparison between disparate policies of individual nations, and can, therefore, help to organize the comparative data produced by both the historical and the behavioral approaches to foreign policy.

Taken together, these advantages enable us to place the study of national security firmly among other recent efforts to study the total behavior patterns of social systems, thus providing a frame of reference within which the findings, concepts, and techniques of the social sciences can be accommodated. The books under review amply illustrate the interdisciplinary nature of the field of national security, and the conceptual and methodological cross-fertilization between it and the other social sciences.

Before we conclude, a word of caution. It must be clearly understood that the promise of national security studies today is far greater than the fulfilment. Much of the work in the new field has been uneven in quality, and not up to rigorous scientific standards. As we have already suggested, this is partly due to the extraordinary rapidity with which the field has been developing, and to the sense of urgency and public concern surrounding it. The atmosphere of "policy science" has, in this case, had destructive as well as constructive effects. The focus upon the formulation of *specifically American* policies in response to *specifically American* problems has retarded the development of comparative analysis in a field that is potentially receptive to it. Only when more rigorous studies are undertaken and, most important, when greater quantities of non-American and international data become available will the field really advance. (The recent increase of national security studies from Great Britain, France, and other countries, is, therefore, most encouraging.)

In one respect the field of national security has already made a real, rather than a potential, contribution: it has enlarged the conception of national strategy, with its traditional concentration on military matters, by showing that equal weight must be given to peace strategy and peace research. As the books we have reviewed show, those working in the field are as concerned with the management and reduction of conflict as with the winning of wars. And in a world that has excluded war as a rational policy, national security may thus have staked its claim to a future.

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A VIEW FROM THE CONGO

By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG

Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961*, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, 518 pp. $8.80.

René Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Congo: The Politics of Fragmentation*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964, 357 pp. $7.95.

Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, 659 pp. $12.50.

ALTHOUGH the Congo crisis has attracted much attention as an issue in international politics, it has had little impact on the academic study of new states. Since 1960, students of African politics have for the most part continued to be concerned with whether or not the regimes of the new states would be democratic, and there has been a great deal of debate as to whether or not the appearance of one-party states signaled the growth of authoritarianism on the continent. The year of the Congo's birth, which was also the year of publication of Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman's *The Politics of the Developing Areas*,[1] heralded the transition from the study of the politics of non-Western areas to a focus on the process of political development itself. But the Congo reminds us that the more fundamental problem among the new states is not authoritarianism but authority; not the effectiveness of political systems in mobilizing the surrounding society to achieve rapid economic growth but the sheer possibility of minimal political order. The Congo also draws our attention to a serious analytic problem: although the country exhibits every "gap" ever imagined by scholars concerned with development and modernization, although it seems to lack the most obvious requisites posited for the maintenance of a political system, it persists.

In this light, it is surprising that the case of the Congo has not been viewed as a major challenge to the concerns of contemporary political science, much as the fall of Weimar was a challenge to social science more generally during an earlier generation. Since the situation of the Congo and of other countries like it is unlikely to change fundamentally in the foreseeable future, we must, unless we choose to play an intellectual ostrich game and leave ourselves vulnerable to the most justified charges of academic scholasticism by casting such cases

[1] (Princeton 1960).

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beyond the pale of our conceptual frameworks, take up the challenge and learn to study defective political systems as they are rather than as we would wish them to be. The three books under consideration, the most useful ones to appear in English on the contemporary Congo, provide a convenient starting point for the discussion of the implications of this challenge.

René Lemarchand covers primarily the preindependence background, examining in considerable and worthwhile detail the evolving colonial system and the rise of political organizations between 1956 and 1960 in order to explain "the politics of fragmentation." Catherine Hoskyns, who is concerned mainly with the international aspects of the Congo question, and Crawford Young, whose study deals with postindependence politics to 1964, concur in Lemarchand's general diagnosis: the explanation of this case lies in the unique sociocultural environment of the Congo, in the character of Belgian rule, and in the interaction between these two factors.

The proposition is stated most bluntly by Hoskyns. First, "the Congo is not only geographically diverse; it also has one of the most complex tribal structures in Africa and this in turn contributes to the lack of unity and to the wide differences between one region and another" (p. 5). During the colonial period, she continues, the Belgians were able to prevent tribal conflict but did little to break down the potential sources of this conflict or to build a nationality. Hence, "as the Belgian hold slackened, tribal rivalries which had been dormant for half a century came quickly to life" (p. 8). She concludes that these characteristics make the Congo inherently a difficult country to administer. Lemarchand is better informed about Congolese ethnography and also more careful in stating the consequences of the sociocultural environment for politics. Although he refers to the existence of several hundred tribal groupings, he also points to a much smaller number of culture clusters, and suggests that "depending on the level of generality which one wishes to adopt one may discern a number of different cultural aggregates within the Congo cultural area" (p. 17). The effects themselves vary; but Lemarchand still views the number and size of groups as the most significant variables: "In some areas the very multiplicity of small tribal groupings seemed to favor political integration but where local tribes were not so numerous or so small they tended to form insoluble lumps in the Congolese body politic" (*ibid.*).

Crawford Young comes still closer to a proper understanding of

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the issue. For him, the salience of ethnicity in contemporary politics is due less to a unique multiplicity of groups than to the impact of modernization which often exacerbates primordial loyalties as a kind of reaction-formation to the stresses of change. He also points out that there is nothing inherently "backward" about cultural self-assertion, and that "ethnic loyalty in itself is a natural and indeed a necessary phenomenon: psychological liberation requires pride in one's antecedents and the Congolese has an ethnic identity as well as a Congolese and African self" (p. 271). Nevertheless, Young also concludes that the Congo is a unique case: "The particular colonial experience has worked to make ethnic loyalties in the Congo stronger and supra-tribal identification probably weaker than in most other African states" (*ibid.*), which has presented special problems for Congolese elites.

I shall not here go into the entire question of analyzing the characteristics of the Belgian colonial system in a comparative perspective. The most relevant aspect seems to be not the colonial structures themselves, but the behavior of the colonial regime during the period of decolonization, itself a function of international circumstances that prevailed in the late 1950's. That the Belgians behaved as they did can be taken as a given that does not pose a serious problem of conceptualization. All three authors in fact agree on the explanation. The end started with the January 1959 riots in Léopoldville, themselves attributable to a variety of factors including especially the relaxation of authority a year earlier and the promise of political reform—presenting a striking parallel with the situation in the Ivory Coast and in Ghana in 1948-1950—as well as events across the river in Brazzaville, where President de Gaulle had held out to the other Congolese, who already manned the territorial executive, the promise of full internal self-government and even the possibility of independence. As Crawford Young aptly puts it, the riots "came as a virtual death knell for the system. The hour of demoralization had sounded for the Belgian governing elite in the Congo, which was fast losing confidence in its mission and right to rule" (p. 152). In part this elite was responding to the worldwide mood that had in anticipation designated 1960 as the year of independence for most of tropical Africa. The Belgians, perhaps prey to what was called in France "*anticolonialisme de droite*," that is, loss of interest in ruling over colonies that were no longer profitable but had become costly, must have also remembered the outcome of their northern neighbor's decision a decade earlier not to give up in Indonesia. Thus the Belgians faced squarely the impossibil-

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ity of a small country's using all-out coercion to hang on where it was obviously no longer wanted.

Whatever the reasons for their behavior, the consequences of their decision were disastrous. Particular events such as the revival of dormant antagonisms, the mutiny of the *Force Publique*, the breakdown of technical assistance arrangements, and the secession of Katanga were merely particular manifestations of the sort of structural collapse that accompanies an earthquake. Once this collapse occurred, orderly government in any form was impossible. As phrased by Hoskyns, "A central government to be effective must have either an entirely loyal administration and the means to use force quickly, or the consent of the various regions" (p. 8). It is evident that the Congo had neither.

Given the outcome of decolonization in the Congo, now known to all of us, it is not very difficult to reconstruct what preceded by paying particular attention, as the authors do, to the factors that made the outcome if not inevitable at least extremely probable. What is more interesting is that all three authors, in somewhat varying ways, view the Congo as a unique case that requires special explanation. This seems to be because they view it within the context provided by other African countries where—at least until recently—very different patterns have seemed to prevail. Lemarchand, for example, refers specifically to "obstacles" that prevented the unfolding of a probable process such as the creation of a Congolese nationality. From his statements about other African countries it is clear that he believes that this natural process somehow did occur elsewhere, and that he views as a normal outcome the emergence in many countries of patterns such as the unified mass party and the eventual institutionalization of a relatively stable one-party state. From this point of view, it is the Congo, as a deviant case, which requires explanation.

Something of value can be learned, I believe, if the outlook is reversed. If the Congo is taken, at a slightly higher level of generalization than prevails in the three books, as a model or type, we can assert certain propositions concerning the probable characteristics of political systems existing in a sociocultural environment similar to that of the Congo, which includes in particular consistent cleavages prevailing in the relative absence of cross-cutting group affiliations at the mass level, as well as an unintegrated set of elites. That description fits most African countries. Hence, the emergence of a Congolese type of political system is far from unlikely, and is in fact a very probable outcome elsewhere.

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That is a much less striking proposition in 1966 than it would have been a year earlier, and especially five years earlier, when the Congo first began to attract attention. It is strange indeed, as I suggested above, that no attempt has been made to explain the Congo and the one-party states in Africa *together*, not as apparently divergent outcomes of decolonization but rather as potentially closely related types. An attempt to do so requires the analyst to explain why, if the Congo is a probable state, other countries seem to deviate from the pattern. One major clue stems from a hypothetical question: What would have happened if the Ivory Coast or Ghana, for example, had become independent ten, or even five, years before it did? If either had, it would have been dramatically obvious that the French or British colonial system had contributed little more to national integration than did the Belgian, and that the politicization of latent cleavages in their societies by far outweighed the self-maintenance capability of even the most outstanding nationalist organizations. But from 1951 to 1957 in Ghana, and from 1952 to 1960 in the Ivory Coast, the colonial power made a commitment to support the most capable African political organization by continuing to manage governmental services more or less independently of the political process. In Ghana, institutional continuity was provided by stepping up the training and the recruitment of an African bureaucracy. In the Ivory Coast, this began much later and is still being supplemented by the provision of considerable technical assistance. Meanwhile, the *political manifestations* of the relatively unintegrated society were suppressed by the institutionalization of the one-party state.

The major difference between the Congo and what appeared until recently to be relatively stable countries thus lies in the fact that the rulers of the latter initially had a very slight advantage over the rulers of the Congo in the form of two instruments of rule, a party and a bureaucracy. But, as we shall see below, giving these instruments names usually associated with institutionalized structures is extremely misleading since close examination reveals that they bear very little resemblance to the structures to which the names usually refer. It is helpful to our understanding, although immensely unfortunate for the countries themselves, that many other African political systems, after a few years of apparent order, are beginning to approach the more probable state represented by the Congo. This trend highlights the fundamental problem of institutionalization by demonstrating how tenuous authority structures are in Africa, even where they appear to be formidable.

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Although the detailed chronicle presented by Catherine Hoskyns in the tradition of the Royal Institute of International Affairs is not concerned with theory-building in any sense, it provides once again an opportunity to raise some serious questions about contemporary approaches to the study of the politics of countries like the Congo. Hoskyns aims "to relate the internal and external aspects of the crisis and to show at every stage how events outside the Congo reacted on those inside and *vice versa*" (p. vii). In the course of her well-balanced examination she repeatedly provides evidence indicating that the situation was often so fluid during the period encompassed that one slight move in one direction or the other by one of the several non-Congolese actors involved could have altered the balance of forces within the country and determined the outcome of the major issues such as the secession of Katanga. She argues, for example, that this issue could have been settled much earlier if Conor Cruise O'Brien had not initially entrusted to the Belgian consul in Elisabethville the task of securing the departure of foreign military advisers. And in conclusion she states, "After eighteen months of struggle the Congo was left exhausted and disrupted but with a legal Government in power and with its territory intact. For the first time since independence what happened in the future seemed to depend more on political developments within the territory than upon the actions of outside powers" (p. 467). It might be more accurate to suggest that from mid-1961 on the United Nations had somehow become committed to the survival of the Congo as an integral unit; that issue was in a sense settled. But internal politics continued to be influenced by the perceptions and interests of a number of different actors in the international system.

The Congolese case thus reminds us that, in dealing with the contemporary political universe, students of comparative politics must take into account the international environment. Although for practical purposes it is necessary to work out a division of labor among scholars, at the conceptual level any attempts to develop theoretical frameworks suitable for comparison must overcome academic specializations. Some frameworks for political analysis, such as the one devised by David Easton, accomplish this at the most general level by including other political systems and international organizations in the environment of a given political system.[2] An examination of the Congo, however, enables us to state somewhat more specific propositions at a less general level, taking into consideration the actual state of the international system.

[2] *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965).

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Following Easton, I shall distinguish between the levels of political community, regime, and authorities. Although it is impossible to predict the actions of the international system at the level of political community in every case, it can be stated tentatively that, except in a relatively few cases of direct confrontation between major powers, the general effect of the international system is to provide support for the integrity of political communities as they were defined at the time of decolonization. In Africa, for example, there was no international outcry when French West Africa or French Equatorial Africa became independent as twelve states instead of two, or even when the Federation of Mali broke up into its constituent parts. By contrast, there was a great deal of concern in the case of the Congo, much as there would be if the centrifugal tendencies in Nigeria were to reach the point of no return. In spite of the often-repeated assertion that African boundaries are "artificial," and in spite of tensions between sets of neighbors over boundary issues, a variety of constraints operate to keep these boundaries very much as they are, except by mutual agreement. Conflicts do occur, but much less frequently than, let us say, in nineteenth-century Europe. There are also severe constraints upon secession after independence, even when the desire to secede is worded in terms of self-determination.

If in order to maintain the political community as it was defined as of June 30, 1960, the Congo had been forced to rely exclusively on the operation of endogenous processes, this community would not have survived for very long after that date. Yet, in spite of the catastrophic mutiny, the secession of Katanga, and the growing strength of centrifugal tendencies, it has continued to exist. Much as a firm might go bankrupt in a completely free market, so the Congo might have disappeared as an entity in a neutral international environment. But the contemporary international political system is never neutral in this respect. The situation of a country like the Congo is more like that of a firm in a modern capitalist economy which can appeal to some government board to secure temporary or permanent protection against the free play of market forces. The final decision of the board can be viewed as one in which the firm itself participates—for example, by sending advocates to plead its cause—but in the main it is the result of an interplay of factors over which the firm itself has relatively little control. In this case, the board acted favorably. The international system can also influence the political systems of new states at the level of the authorities. Hoskyns illustrates how this operated, for example, in the early showdown between Patrice Lumumba

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and President Kasavubu to the benefit of the latter, and again to the benefit of Colonel Mobutu and his College of Commissioners during Mobutu's first takeover. In other independent African countries, there have been visible interventions to *support* incumbent authorities in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Gabon, and in addition a more or less permanent form of support in the presence until recently of French military forces in a number of French-speaking countries. For obvious reasons, much less is known about successful or unsuccessful external interventions *against* incumbent authorities, since these are usually more surreptitious, but it is not very difficult to imagine how relatively easy such interventions would be if anyone cared to make the required effort.

The situation is very different at the level of the regime, defined by Easton as the "regularized method for ordering political relationships," which can be viewed as the total set of operative norms and structures that characterize a given system.[3] Here, it is the limits upon the international system's leverage which are most obvious. This is once again illustrated by Hoskyns who points out, for example, that although the backing of the West could keep the College of Commissioners created by Mobutu in 1961 in power, this was not sufficient to make the College's rule effective or acceptable to the majority of the Congolese. Unlike the levels of the community and of the authorities, which can be maintained or altered more or less by fiat, the regime is a process, and hence is much more difficult to control. Endogenous tendencies are likely to persist relatively undisturbed. That is perhaps what Crawford Young had in mind when he stated in his introduction to *Politics in the Congo* that "both analytically and practically, it is possible to accept the UN and foreign influences as given constants in the political equation. . . . The UN's interventions have mainly been operative at the summit level. . . . Our assumption here is that political forces present in the situation moved toward an equilibrium starting from this given exogenous factor" (pp. 7-8).

It is precisely at the level of the regime, where the most interesting and important political questions are usually raised, that scholars concerned with the new states encounter the greatest difficulties in dealing with cases like the Congo. Available classificatory concepts referring to the regime level, and expressed by such terms as "democratic" or "totalitarian," or even by such recently devised terms as "tutelary democracy" or "modernizing oligarchy," are fairly useless because

[3] P. 191.

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they assume a degree of institutionalization which does not exist. These labels evoke constitutions, in the Aristotelian sense, while the major characteristic of the Congo is that it has no constitution.

Even if we set our sights more modestly and attempt to restrict ourselves to a less general level of discourse, such as the analysis of particular concrete structures, we encounter serious difficulties, as illustrated by the question of "political parties" in the Congo. Having struggled valiantly to fit preindependence political organizations within the framework provided initially by Duverger and commonly used to study the politics of other African countries, Lemarchand states, "In summary, Congolese parties share many structural characteristics with other African parties. From the standpoint of their morphology, leadership and internal organization, they reveal the same basic features as parties elsewhere in Africa, the same complexity, the same flexibility" (p. 271). But he then qualifies his assertion most drastically: "In regard to the scope of their activities, however, they are altogether different institutions. . . . The dominant characteristic of Congolese parties was their rudimentary organizational framework" (*ibid.*). Turning to the postindependence situation, he concludes that "under the circumstances, it is not surprising that so few Congolese leaders managed to extend their organization beyond the confines of the major towns. Nor is it surprising, in view of their structural weakness and limited geographical extension, that so few parties survived the turmoil which followed independence" (*ibid.*). Hoskyns concurs: "By 1961, all national political activity had ceased and even at the local level the lead had been taken by individual politicians, tribal leaders, and army groups rather than by the political parties" (p. 381). And finally, Crawford Young, analyzing the demise of "the political sector, hastily grafted onto the ponderous colonial bureaucratic state in the three weeks before independence" (p. 358), attributes it primarily to the fate of the parties: "Even the three major parties . . . rapidly experienced a dislocation of their grass-roots structure after independence. From 1960 through 1963, parties had become nothing more than caucus groups at the various assemblies, with a nominal extra-parliamentary organization consisting of a central committee whose functions were limited to the issue of an occasional communique" (p. 371). Although the prospects of elections in 1964 (finally held the following year) led to various attempts to revive parties, it is fairly clear from recent events that none of them was successful.

The retrospective information available concerning the Convention People's Party of Ghana since the coup of February 1966 suggests that

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the existence of a "rudimentary organizational framework" was not limited to Congolese parties, and confirms my earlier comment that observers have tended to exaggerate the contrast between the situation in the Congo and in other African countries.[4] This in turn raises the question of the heuristic value of the apparatus used to study political parties in industrialized societies for the study of political processes in Africa. All three authors would probably agree on a negative estimate of such value in relation to the postindependence situation because they believe that in the Congo political parties disappeared. In a sense, however, this view misses the point. An alternative interpretation would be that what happened in the Congo was not a deterioration of political parties, but rather that parties had in fact never existed. Some organizations referred to themselves as parties, of course, but that is significant at the level of symbol-manipulation rather than at the structural level. It is more accurate to refer to "movements," "congeries," or "leagues," which established electoral committees of various sorts in the face of impending elections and created minimal links between the national, provincial, and local levels. It is as misleading to refer to them as "political parties" as it is to speak of "grass-roots structure," with all the permanence such imagery suggests. In this sense, the "deterioration" noted by all three authors is an artifact of the conceptual apparatus of the observer. Much the same argument can be made for the process that has been identified as the transformation of "one-party states" into "no-party states" in other parts of the continent.[5] Parallel problems are encountered in dealing with other major structures, the military and the bureaucracy. In the middle of her narrative, Hoskyns suggests that in November 1960, "since the régime [in the present sense of 'authorities'] could not depend on the political element to maintain contact between the provinces and the centre, it could only hope to function adequately if the army was able to enforce effective discipline throughout the country as a whole and if the administrative links could be restored" (p. 245). Although these conditions were not met at the time, the army benefited from considerable assistance later on and was eventually rebuilt. Hence, Crawford Young's conclusion, fully sustained by events that occurred after the publication of his book, is that "the Congo is thus likely to provide

[4] For a critical analysis of the organizational characteristics of "mass parties," see my *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago 1966).

[5] For a discussion of this possibility, see James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley 1964), 676-77.

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tropical Africa its first experience of a political system in which a large role devolves upon a military elite" (p. 474). Yet Young is aware that the Congolese army is itself a weak institution, as demonstrated when its capabilities were tested during the insurrections of 1964 in the Eastern Congo. He remarks that the army does not have the cadres to rule by itself and hence requires the collaboration of the bureaucracy. But we know that in spite of a variety of crash programs since independence the character of the Congolese administration is such as hardly to warrant the use of the term "bureaucracy," which once again denotes a set of institutionalized norms.

Paradoxically, the Congo furnishes some important clues concerning the direction our efforts at reconceptualization must take. It illustrates most dramatically the case of a political system that survives in the absence of an institutionalized regime encompassing the entire society. The fragmentation of the Congo into a large number of very loosely connected provinces suggests that the sector of activity with which the central authorities, whatever their composition at a given time, can deal effectively is extremely limited and is likely to remain so for a long time. If we ask, with reference to the Congo, how values are authoritatively allocated for the entire society, it is evident that the political activities of the central authorities account for only a small part of the total set. The remainder of the set is constituted by the activities of a variety of residual structures, loosely or not at all connected with the center. These include traditional authorities and transitional local elites about which little is yet known. Upon serious investigation, it is seen that the Congolese model, far from being a unique case, in fact fits the situation of many other African countries, regardless of formal constitutional arrangements and rhetoric, and regardless of whether the central authorities are constituted by army personnel, civil employees of the government, or politicians, alone or in combination. The major difference is that in other countries the stresses on the system did not occur simultaneously. Hence the relative absence of spectacular disorder and violence in these other countries must not be taken as an indication that structures of authority are very firmly institutionalized.

"Political development" is a useful term to refer to significant change in the direction of the institutionalization of a regime for the societies caught within the net of political entities established as the result of colonization and decolonization and maintained by the grace of the

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international system. The Congo reminds us, however, that in the contemporary world states can survive even if development does not occur. A major challenge to political science is therefore to construct concepts to deal with such situations while avoiding a confusion between intellectual order and order in the thing studied.

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AMERICAN POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

By AMELIA C. LEISS

Waldemar A. Nielsen, *African Battleline: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa*, New York, Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965, 155 pp. $3.50, (paper) $1.95.

THE problems of southern Africa have ceased to be the exclusive concern of a handful of scholars or merely the source of annual news items during debates at the United Nations General Assembly. The southern tip of the continent of Africa has been discovered as newsworthy by no less an observer than the *New York Times* and has become a matter of sufficient interest to important parts of the American populace to gain it the active attention of American political figures. As it becomes a matter of major interest to an ever wider segment of the American population, southern Africa is posing hard and urgent questions for government policymakers. There is no need to repeat here the reasons for the intensification of interest in this part of the world. The causes of this concern have been adequately and at times eloquently described in the growing volume of literature, Waldemar Nielsen's book as well as other recent studies reviewed on these pages.

Many pitfalls face the analyst of the current southern African scene. Perhaps the most frequent trap the current literature falls into is the tendency to proceed from a description of the intolerable present to a vividly drawn picture of future racial justice, social equality, and economic prosperity, pausing only briefly to assert that the policy devices advocated by the particular author will assuredly bring about the transition. To the extent that such authors are concerned with alternative policies, they frequently confine themselves to painting a grim picture of the ideological and racial Armageddon sure to follow if any advice but their own is accepted. A second pitfall is the assumption that those who are the real or vicarious victims of the present situation in southern Africa will moderate their stands if they can be made to understand the dangers implicit in some of the more radical policies that are proposed. However, these dangers in any event seem remote from and irrelevant to the acknowledged evils of the present. And whether intended or not, such an approach frequently seems to be advocating a policy of inertia.

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Those who are at present focusing their attention on southern Africa, and those whose attention shortly will be forced to focus there as reaction to the International Court's failure to render a judgment in the South West Africa case embitters race relations in the area even further, have reason to be grateful to Mr. Nielsen and to the Council on Foreign Relations for having produced a study that avoids both of these analytic hazards. Mr. Nielsen is no less passionate than others in his denunciation of the inhumanities and indignities inflicted on the African majority in many areas of southern Africa. He is, similarly, no less aware than are others of the dangers to southern Africa and the international system generally of precipitous and extreme reaction. But he goes beyond most current analyses to develop a set of proposals for United States policy initiatives that are responsive to the urgent requirements for action in the face of severe restrictions on the freedom to act. One need not agree with the details of Mr. Nielsen's conclusions to applaud the consistency and responsibility with which he has pursued this difficult course.

Part of the value of this study of southern African problems is the fact that Mr. Nielsen distinguishes among the problems of the different parts of the area. The underlying theme in all sections of this part of the African continent is the same—the domination by white minorities of the majority non-white population. Even in the cases of the soon-to-be independent High Commission Territories, the severe economic and political problems the Territories will face are compounded and complicated by the fact that they exist within this racially tense context. But the differences in the status of the several areas that make up southern Africa are of vital importance when one is concerned with the range of policy alternatives open to the United States government and the instrumentalities through which action can appropriately be taken. The fact that Angola and Mozambique are, despite Portuguese dissimulation, colonies of a European ally of the United States creates both special restraints and special opportunities. The anomalous status of South West Africa as a remnant of the League of Nations mandate system makes it a unique case. The very different dependent status of Rhodesia involves special responsibilities for the United Kingdom and its ally, the United States. And the fact that the Republic of South Africa, which emotionally is certainly the key target in the area, is and has been for many years a fully independent state places it in yet another category.

Recognizing that there are these significant differences in status does not mean, of course, that the United States' interest in seeing the

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emergence in the southern third of the African continent of stable governments, viable economies, racial democracy, and social justice is any less acute in an independent state than in a dependent one. But when one examines, as one must when asking what United States policy should be and what are the appropriate modes and channels by which the United States can pursue these goals, the differences are critical.

In addition to failing to distinguish the essential differences among the several problems that make up "the southern African problem," proponents of various solutions frequently confuse the varying kinds of limitations that bear on the freedom and capacity of organizations and states to act. This issue arises at many levels. One set of limitations stems from the feeling that developments within the area are rapidly hardening the positions of both the white minorities and the non-white majorities, thereby grievously restricting the freedom of either side to alter its course peacefully in response to either external or internal pressure. There are subtle differences in the way in which this problem of narrowing options is posed. To some observers, the critical element is that the white minorities, in response to internal and international pressure, have become more deeply determined than ever to maintain their control, regardless of the dangers and penalties that course may encounter. Increasingly they have turned upon the moderates within their own ranks and have come to view any concession as capitulation. On the other hand, the failure of the non-white majorities to mount effective and unified opposition to the white minority governments, together with the countermeasures that all these governments have taken to prepare themselves with the physical means to exercise control, have led those who refuse to tolerate continued and consolidated white hegemony to the conclusion that, although the non-whites in the area are the primary victims of the whites' racial policies, the major initiative for change must come from outside the area.

Those who see this dangerous narrowing of the limits of action by groups within southern Africa hold widely divergent views about the extent and nature of the limitations on action of states outside the region. In listening to debates at the United Nations and elsewhere, one sometimes has the impression that the independent states of central Africa feel that the capacity of the United States and the United Kingdom to effect change in the racial policies of the whites in southern Africa is restricted only by their own economic self-interest. If the United States and the United Kingdom can only be persuaded to make

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some slight economic sacrifice, the argument goes, pressure from these two powers alone would be sufficient to force Portugal to abandon its colonies, the South Africans to abandon apartheid, and the Rhodesian whites to abandon their defiance of the United Kingdom and to accept an eventual majority government of their country. Indeed, insofar as Rhodesia is concerned, this assumption appears to have been shared by policymakers in Washington and London.

There is no question, of course, that the economic interest of the United Kingdom in particular in most of southern Africa is substantial. There is also no doubt that this interest is a two-edged sword that both gives the United Kingdom a high degree of influence and, equally important, severely restricts its freedom of action. But there is reason to question, particularly in the light of the course of events in Rhodesia (perhaps economically the most vulnerable of the governments in southern Africa), whether this large economic pressure is alone sufficient to bring about the desired changes. Even the limited use of force to enforce economic embargoes has proved ineffective. It was to be anticipated that the failure of the economic restrictions on which those urging action had placed so much faith has quickly led to demands for more drastic action, the employment of military force to compel compliance.

In a very real sense, of course, the tacticians who are guiding the struggle for severe international measures against the white governments of southern Africa are correct in assigning a critical role to the United States and the United Kingdom and the other great powers. These powers alone have the economic and material means to mount the kinds of pressures the activists have in mind. In addition, these states, as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, stand as the major hurdles to be crossed on the road to compulsory United Nations collective measures.

If some analyses seem to suggest a freedom of action and an unlimited power to act that go beyond the realities of the situation, the opposite assumption is made by others. Nurtured by analyses of the dangers and costs of any of the proposed courses of action, these analysts have backed themselves into a position of such immobility that the most imaginative course they can suggest for the United States is that it should seek to dissociate itself from the white-dominated regimes in southern Africa in order that, when the holocaust comes, it may hope to remain aloof, and thus at least minimize the amount of damage its position may suffer. There are clearly major flaws in this line of reasoning. In the first place, the act of dissociation is a more positive

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form of action than its proponents appear to accept. The policy has overtones of the assumptions in the 1930's that refraining from supporting either side in a civil or international conflict was indeed a neutral position. It is, of course, imperative that the United States by its words and its actions remove any misconceptions there may be that it is the protector of white minority governments in southern Africa. But this is not, in itself, a total policy; it is merely the first step toward a more active policy.

A variant of this theme which is frequently heard is that the United States must deal with "one crisis at a time." While a world such as this suggests might be an easier one to deal with, we cannot afford to assume that we control the hands of history, nor can we afford to be so exclusively preoccupied with real problems in one part of the world that we obscure our view of real problems elsewhere.

Most discussion of the range of alternatives for the United States vis-à-vis southern Africa focuses on the appropriate limits of given instrumentalities of action, particularly the United Nations. Questions related to one or another aspect of the problems of southern Africa have been on the agenda of various organs of the United Nations since its founding. And, from the beginning, the question has been raised in one or another form of the legitimate role that the international body could play. Some of the limits that have been suggested have been emphatically rejected: The Portuguese contention that the territories of Angola and Mozambique are integral parts of Portugal and therefore not appropriate subjects for United Nations interest has failed to persuade anybody. South African efforts to deny the organization a legitimate role in considering its policies in South West Africa have been even more emphatically repulsed. On the constitutionally more complex issue of the racial policy pursued by the Republic of South Africa within its own boundaries, the decisive assertion of the legitimate role for the United Nations has been somewhat slower in coming but is now no less generally accepted. Over the twenty years in which these questions have been before the United Nations, the scope of the organization's legitimate interest in the area has been steadily enlarged—from the right to discuss, to the right to suggest, to the right to recommend, and now to the right to act. It is around this threshold of action that the debate on the appropriate role for the United Nations in the varied problems of southern Africa now revolves.

The issue is a highly complex one, and there are very distinct constitutional differences among the several problems in southern Africa. Much of the debate has concentrated on the question of whether the

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

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United Nations should employ coercive collective measures to force the Republic of South Africa to abandon its policy of apartheid. A different although related set of issues would have been raised by discussion as to whether, if the International Court of Justice had ruled on the merits of the case of South West Africa, the United Nations should employ collective measures to enforce South African compliance with the Court judgment. Yet a third set of issues is raised by the question of United Nations collective measures against Rhodesia, and potentially against other states that have failed to comply with Security Council decisions in this case.

Viewed from the perspective of the United Nations, the three cases are completely different. In the case of South West Africa, despite the recent ruling of the International Court that Ethiopia and Liberia lack sufficient legal interest to warrant a judgment on the merits of their claim that South Africa has violated its obligations under the mandate agreement, the international character of the dispute over South West Africa remains unquestionable. The African states, having failed to obtain a legal ruling, can be expected to intensify their political campaign to have the situation in the territory declared a threat to the peace and thus to press for strong measures in the Security Council. The possibility of utilizing Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter has been negated by the nature of the Court action. But the dispute has by no means been deleted from the international agenda by legal technicalities. In the case of Rhodesia the constitutional questions have not arisen. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the white-dominated Rhodesian government initiated an unquestionably international dispute between the rebellious colony and the United Kingdom. Again, the argument that rages around the appropriate forms of action the United Nations should now take in Rhodesia is not a dispute about the organization's right to act, but rather about the most effective ways in which it can act.

It is in South Africa that the most acute constitutional questions arise to complicate and at times obscure the political and moral aspects of the problem. The United Nations Charter, like most constitutional documents, is at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory. By and large, the very obscurities of the Charter have given the United Nations the flexibility it has required to adapt to changing world situations. Perhaps the greatest ambiguity of all is that an international organization composed of sovereign states and committed to restricting the use of force and coercion among them is equally dedicated to a set of concepts of political, social, and racial justice that find their substance only

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within the societies of its sovereign members. It is doubtful that any single member of the organization has achieved the ideal society that the Charter envisions. Indeed, one could readily cite any number of shortcomings among the UN membership. The thing that makes South Africa, and to a lesser extent Rhodesia, different is that the ultimate goals of these societies are diametrically opposed to the goals of the UN Charter, as well as to the avowed goals of every other society in the world.

While the obligations assumed by members of the United Nations thus fall into the realms of both the principles under which states should deal with each other and the principles by which individual states should deal with their citizens, the power that has been given the organization to act—in a binding rather than a recommendatory manner—is confined to situations in which there is a threat to the peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression. It is the contention of those who call upon the United Nations to take immediate steps to force South Africa to abandon its policy of apartheid that the character of the South African regime does constitute a threat to the peace. To date, however, those pressing this view have been unable to persuade the Western members of the Security Council that, however dangerous or repugnant the policies of the Republic of South Africa may be, they have as yet assumed this character. Unless the tensions over apartheid should lead to an actual breach of international frontiers by armed forces, or to a major breakdown of public order in the Republic, it is difficult to see what arguments can be marshalled to persuade the Western members of the Security Council to alter their position.

The degree to which the debate over the appropriate policy for South Africa has focused on the question of the constitutional limits of United Nations action has had the unfortunate tendency of leading some to assume that the limitations on United Nations action and the limitations on United States action are identical. Thus they tend to pose the alternatives baldly as either United Nations collective measures, undertaken with the active support of the United States, or an inactive United States policy. There is, of course, no such identity of limits. It is here, perhaps more than at any other point, that Mr. Nielsen's volume is of such extraordinary value. His analysis leads him to reject a course of collective measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to force a change in South African policies—but this is not the point at which his discussion ends. He goes on to explore a creative range of policy options open to the United States in its bilateral relationships with South Africa and in its potentially expanded con-

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tacts with groups that now constitute the opposition in the Republic and elsewhere in southern Africa but who will, one day, inevitably occupy positions of power and responsibility.

To those who are impatient to see change in southern Africa, the policy prescriptions of Mr. Nielsen's volume are bound to be disappointing. Indeed, one may legitimately question whether the impact of the modest courses he sees open to the United States can be felt in southern Africa in time to have any bearing on the immediate crisis. But Mr. Nielsen's analysis is a beginning—a step toward a fruitful discussion of the real as opposed to the fancied limits of the capacity of the United States to act on southern African problems—and a reminder that we may have to live with problems we cannot resolve.

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